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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRUNO DfASTON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Case No,
DOROTHY D'ASTON, et al.,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLEES PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals1 decision conflict with prior

Utah cases in holding that a postnuptial property agreement binds
a divorce court absent unique and compelling circumstances?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals disregard its own opinion by

granting appellant relief while she was still in contempt of the
trial court and had not complied with the trial court's orders?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals unfairly limit the discretion

of the trial court on remand by ruling on factual issues which were
disputed and not decided by the trial court?
OPINIONS OF COURT OF APPEALS
Two opinions were issued by the Court of Appeals.

The most

recent, and the one challenged by the instant petition is D'Aston
v. D'Aston, 794 P.2d 500, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Ct. App. 1990).
A copy of that opinion ("D'Aston II11) appears in Appendix "B".
An earlier opinion of the Court of Appeals addressed whether
the court should consider the appeal while the defendant was in

contempt.

DfAston v. DfAston, 790 P.2d 590, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 25

(Ct. App. 1990) ("D'Aston I", copy in Appendix "A").
JURISDICTION
The opinion to be reviewed (D'Aston II) was entered June 14,
1990.

Upon motion of Bruno D'Aston

("Husband"), the Court of

Appeals extended the time for filing a petition for rehearing
through July 12, 1990, and Husband filed a petition on that date.1
The Petition for Rehearing was denied by Order entered August 29,
1990, and an Amended Order Denying Petition for Rehearing filed
August 30, 1990. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990) and § 78-2a-4 (1987).
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Bruno D'Aston is not aware of any controlling constitutional
provisions, statutes, ordinances, or regulations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. This is an action for divorce. The

complaint also named the parties1 two adult children as defendants
and sought an order compelling the defendant wife and the children
to return to the plaintiff husband

certain personal property

alleged to have been stolen from the husband.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Plaintiff

("Husband") filed his complaint for divorce against defendant

x

The order of the Court of Appeals denying the Petition for
Rehearing states that the Petition was filed July 16, 1990. A copy
of the Petition was lodged with the Court of Appeals on July 12,
but it did not comply with the applicable rules for format. The
Court of Appeals granted a five-day extension to correct the
defect. A corrected Petition was filed July 16, 1990.

("Wife") on May 2, 1986.

The complaint also named the two adult

children of the parties as defendants and sought an order compelling Wife and the children to return certain personal property
alleged to have been stolen from Husband.

(R. 1-5.)

Wife answered

and filed a counterclaim for divorce and also sought an award of
alimony.

(R. 29-33.)

At Husband's request, the trial court

ordered Wife to pay Husband the sum of $2,500.00 per month as
support during the pendency of the action.

(R. 244-45.)

The case came on for trial on April 18-21, 1988.

(R. 307-32.)

The trial court filed a Memorandum Decision on November 17, 1988
(R. 440-53), and filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.
454-66) and a Decree of Divorce (R. 467-538) on December 15, 1988.
Wife served a Motion to Amend Judgment or Grant a New Trial
on December 22, 1988.

(R. 541-42.)

The court denied the motion

by ruling entered on January 10, 1989.

(R. 556.)

A formal Order

Denying Defendant Dorothy D'Aston's Rule 59 Motion was entered on
January 12, 1989.

(R. 562-63.)

on January 23, 1989.

Wife filed her Notice of Appeal

(R. 579-80.)

Subsequent to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, Husband
proceeded on his claim against defendant Eric Aston. An Order and
Decree substantially in favor of Husband was entered on March 9,
1990.

Eric Aston subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal (Case No.

900223-CA), and Husband filed a Notice of Cross Appeal (Case No.
900281-CA).

The appeal and crops appeal were consolidated under

Case No. 900223-CA by Order entered June 1, 1990.
During the pendency of the instant appeal, the trial court
found Wife in contempt of court by reason of her failure to comply
with certain provisions of the Decree of Divorce.

Husband moved

to dismiss Wife's appeal because of Wife's contempt of court and
avoidance of process.

The Court of Appeals preliminarily denied

the motion and indicated that it would be heard in conjunction with
arguments on the merits.
Following oral arguments and on April 9, 1990, the Court of
Appeals held that the appeal would be dismissed

unless Wife

submitted herself to the process of the trial court and offered
security to protect the judgment pending appeal.

D1Aston v.

D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("D'Aston I").
On May 4, 1990, Wife filed a Notice of Appearance with the
Court of Appeals.

(A copy appears in Appendix "F.")

The Court of

Appeals thereafter entered a second opinion addressing the merits
of the appeal and reversing the trial court.

D'Aston v. D'Aston,

794 P.2d 500 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("D'Aston II").
The Notice of Appearance filed by Wife noted that she remained
in contempt of the trial court.

On May 22, 1990, the trial court

entered an Order (copy attached as Appendix "G"), giving Wife until
June 22, 1990, to purge herself of the contempt by depositing with
the court the money which she had previously and incorrectly
represented to the trial court was in a safety deposit box. Wife
remained in contempt of court at the time the opinion of the Court
of Appeals was issued on June 14, 1990, and continues to remain in
contempt of the trial court.
C.

Statement

of Facts.

Bruno

D'Aston

("Husband") and

Dorothy D'Aston ("Wife") were married on September 22, 1953, and
remained married until the time of this divorce action.

Husband

owned separate property prior to the marriage, consisting generally

of a coin and stamp collection valued by Husband at $567,700.00,
and other valuable items. (R. 686-87; Ex. 8, copy attached to
Decree in Appendix "C")

Wife disputed the testimony and asserted

that the assets owned by Husband at the time of their marriage
consisted of $5,000.00 in cash and a 1952 Oldsmobile.
During the course of the marriage
substantial property.

(R. 1402.)

the parties

acquired

The property in general consisted of a

business real property in City of Industry, California, a residence
(Skyline Drive property) in Hacienda Heights, California, and
personal property including cash and bank accounts. (R. 687-91.)
In March, 1983, Husband and Wife executed a document entitled
"Agreement."

(Ex. 21.)

Husband testified the document was

suggested by his attorney who was also vice president of Husband's
corporation.

Husband testified they were threatened with two

lawsuits and the attorney suggested that they (Husband and Wife)
put the factory building and the Skyline property (the valuable
home) in Wife's name so the creditors would have a difficult time
to attach it if the lawsuits came to fruition.

(R. 754.)

Husband

testified that in a discussion with Wife he told her that they put
the property in her name in case something happened with the
lawsuit that was threatened, and that Wife agreed to it.

(R. 755,

835.) Wife testified that Husband did not tell her anything about
pending lawsuits or threats of lawsuits.

(R. 1413.)

Husband testified that after the signing of the document there
was no change in the handling of their financial affairs.

He

testified that Wife handled the money and wrote the checks as she
had always done before the 1973 agreement, and continued the same
way from the early 1960's until April 30, 1986.
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(R. 1586-87.)

The property given to Wife under the agreement was predominantly the business property, the residence, and cash and bank
accounts.

The business property was subsequently liquidated for

approximately $1,000,000.00. (R. 756, 852.)

In March, 1982, the

residence property was sold for $1,250,000.00.

The proceeds from

the sale included a promissory note secured by a trust deed on the
property in the sum of $687,788.42. (R. 713-14; Ex. 133.)
In the latter part of April, 1986, Husband returned home from
a coin show in Bellevue, Washington.
property

consisted

predominately

At this time, the parties'

of

valuable

coins

owned

by

Husband, and cash and real property in Wife's name. (R. 719-20; Ex.
20.)

Husband had with him certain coins he had on consignment, as

well as coins of his own.

These coins he kept in three cases in

his vehicle. All three cases were chained and locked. (R. 723-24.)
Husband

testified

that on April

30, 1986, after he had

returned from the coin show, Wife invited him to share coffee with
her. While Wife was thus occupying Husband, their son, Eric Aston,
broke into Husband's vehicle and removed hundreds of thousands of
dollars worth of coins and other valuable assets.

Eric then

returned and stated to his father, in the presence of his mother,
that he, Eric, had removed the coins because "we" could no longer
trust Bruno D'Aston.

(R. 725.)

The items stolen included nearly

all of the assets conveyed to Husband under the 1973 agreement.
Both Eric Aston and Wife defied they took the coins or that they
had possession of them at the time of trial. (R. 1001-06.)
At the hearing on Husband's request for a temporary alimony
allowance, Husband testified that Wife was receiving $6,300.00 per
month interest payment on the note from the sale of the California

house.

(R. 609.)

Wife testified and said nothing concerning the

payments being received from the note.

The trial court ordered

Wife to pay Husband $2,500.00 per month out of the $6,304.73 that
she received each month.

(R. 658.)

In fact, prior to January,

1988, Wife had discounted the note and received cash in the sum of
$633,000.00.

(R. 1500, Ex. 144.)

She was at all times under an

order not to dispose of any property.

(R. 54-56.)

At the trial, Husband testified that his income was only
$438.00 per month from Social Security, and that Wife had possession of all the parties1 assets except the motor home Husband lived
in and the Volkswagen he drove. (R. 758-60.)

Wife testified that

she had on hand, remaining from the $633,000.00, $300,000.00 cash
in a safety deposit box in Far West Bank, $34,000.00 in savings in
Far West Bank, $26,000.00 in checking at Far West Bank, and
$75,000.00 cash in a safe at home. (R. 1501-03.) She testified she
had purchased

$86,700.00 in diamonds and

$7,600.00 in silver

bullion, and that she had spent over $100,000.00
expenses from September, 1987, through April, 1988.

for living

(R. 1503-04.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
DfAston I required Wife to submit to the jurisdiction of the
trial court and provide security for payment of the judgment
against her, or her appeal would be dismissed.

Wife failed to

fully comply with that directive. DfAston II was issued while Wife
remained in contempt of the trial court.
failed to enforce its own order.

The Court of Appeals

Wife failed to satisfy the

requirements of D'Aston I, and her appeal should be dismissed.
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In addressing the merits of the appeal in D1 Aston II, the
court held the postnuptial property agreement of the parties to be
binding on the trial court absent "unique and compelling circumstances.11

This test is not supported by Utah authority.

It

conflicts with prior decisions of this Court which hold that
"compelling

circumstances" are required

to modify

a property

settlement agreement which has been incorporated in a decree of
divorce, but that a predivorce property settlement agreement may
be modified by a trial court to achieve fairness and equity.
Review by writ of certiorari is necessary to correct this decision.
Finally, the opinion in D1 Aston II extends too far.

The

evidence would support a finding of "unique and compelling circumstances."

The trial court made no finding on the evidence

because the trial court's ruling on the property agreement made
such findings unnecessary.

D1Aston II can be read as precluding

the trial court from now making findings on those issues and
fashioning an equitable decree accordingly.

D'Aston II should be

limited to only holding that the 1973 property agreement was
binding between the parties.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO REQUIRE
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS OWN ORDER.
In DfAston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
("D'Aston I'M , the court required Wife to "submit herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy that court's concerns
before she may exercise that right [to appeal]."

Q

790 P.2d at 594.

Wife failed to comply with that requirement. The Court of Appeals
nonetheless

granted

her the relief

she requested

on appeal.

Husband called Wife's non-compliance to the attention of the Court
of Appeals by filing a petition for rehearing.

The Court of

Appeals denied the petition without opinion.
Wife asserted in her Response to Petition for Rehearing that
her mere

appearance before the trial

court constituted

full

compliance with the Court of Appeals' order. The order was not so
limited. Wife was required to submit herself to the trial court's
jurisdiction and "satisfy that court's concerns" before receiving
the benefits of her right to appeal.

She had "the obligation to

come forward and offer a reasonable alternative to the trial court
to safeguard her assets from dissipation pending her appeal." Id.
D'Aston I clearly requires Wife to do more than merely appear
in court.

The censured conduct was not merely her avoidance of

process, but included her demonstration that she was "unwilling to
respond to a court order with which [s]he disagrees," but which she
sought to challenge on appeal.

790 P.2d at 595 (quoting Tobin v.

Casaus, 128 Cal. App. 2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 (1954)). The Court
of Appeals accordingly required that she "submit" to, i.e., comply
with, the jurisdiction of the trial court and its orders:
We therefore hold that appellant has 30 days
from the date of the issuance of this opinion
to bring herself within the process of the
trial court. If appellant submits herself to
the tria1 court, she should be allowed an
opportunity to offer alternatives to the trial
court to protect the judgment. Appellant may
persuade the court it should hold the disputed
judgment amount in trust until a resolution of
this appeal on the merits. However, if appellant persists in secreting herself in violation
of the trial court's orders, her appeal will

Q

be dismissed at the expiration of the 30-day
period.
590 P.2d at 595 (emphasis added).
The transcript of the hearing before the trial court (copy
attached as Appendix "E") clearly show that Wife did not satisfy
the trial court's concerns nor fully "submit" to its orders and
process.

She not only failed to pay the money into court or a

trust account, but she either spent the money or gave it away.
(See Transcript of hearing May 4, 1990, at pages 4, 11-14.)

The

trial court viewed her trial testimony concerning the money to be
"a flat out lie to this court."

(Id. at page 19.) The trial court

granted her yet additional time to pay the money into court, but
expressly stated that she was still in contempt and "in deep
trouble" as far as the trial court was concerned.

(Id. at page 5.)

Although she did appear at a hearing, she remained in contempt
of the trial court.

Wife may and should be punished for her

contempt even if the disobeyed order may be incorrect.

See In re

Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 733 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1987).
Wife failed to "satisfy" the trial court's concerns within the
time frame previously set by this Court.
failed to follow its own order.

The Court of Appeals

D'Aston II should be vacated and

the appeal dismissed as required by D1Aston I.
POINT II
THE "UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES" T^ST
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AND CONFLICTS WITH
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
D'Aston II held the 1973 property agreement binding on the
parties, and rejected Husband's argument that the trial court

i n

should be afforded discretion to divide the parties1 property as
equity required notwithstanding the terms of the agreement.

The

court held that "unique and compelling circumstances" must exist
to justify varying from a postnuptial agreement, and held that the
record did not disclose such compelling circumstances. D'Aston II,
794 P.2d at 504 n. 6.

The argument below demonstrates that the

"unique and compelling circumstances" test is not supported by and
conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and the Court of
Appeals.

Point III of this Petition establishes that "unique and

compelling circumstances" do exist in this case.
Footnote 6 of the opinion in DfAston II states, in part:
Husband argues on appeal that even if we
find the trial court erred when it found the
1973 agreement was not intended to apply in the
event of a divorce, the error was harmless
because of the broad equitable powers trial
courts possess in domestic matters. See Colman
v. Colman, 743 P. 2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) . However, even if a trial court has the
equitable power to disregard an otherwise
enforceable postnuptial property settlement
agreement and to distribute the separate
property of the spouses, the circumstances must
be unique and compelling to justify the application of such an exception.
The trial
court made no findings to delineate what it
found as compelling circumstances to justify
such an action and we find none.
DfAston II. 794 P.2d at 504 n. 6.
The court gives no supporting authority for this "unique and
compelling circumstances" test. Prior decisions of this Court and
the Court of Appeals have applied a "compelling circumstances" test
only to modification of the property division in a final divorce
decree. Much less stringent tests apply to prenuptial agreements,
or postnuptial

agreements

made

in contemplation

DfAston II conflict with these decisions.
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of divorce.

A "compelling circumstances" test has been adopted by this
Court as applicable to modifications of a property settlement
agreement which has been sanctioned by a court and incorporated in
a divorce decree.

Foulger v. Foulger, 62 6 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah

1981), Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah 1980); Land
v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980).
A completely different test applies to modification of a
property settlement agreement not yet sanctioned by the court. In
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the court
considered the effect to be given a property settlement agreement
executed in contemplation of a divorce. The court held as follows:
[I]t is well recognized that a parties1 stipulation as to property rights in a divorce
action, although advisory and usually followed
unless the court finds it to be unfair or
unreasonable, is not necessarily binding on the
trial court. It is only a recommendation to
be adhered to if the court believes it to be
fair and reasonable.
743 P.2d at 789 (citing Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082
(Utah 1987); Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975)).
The opinion in Colman does not state whether the property
settlement agreement was executed prior to the commencement of the
divorce action or during the pendency of the divorce proceedings.
The distinction does not appear critical to that decision.
In the instant action, in contrast, the Court of Appeals held
that if a property settlement agreement is executed at some unspecified earlier time, at a time when the parties are not immediately contemplating divorce but at a time when divorce is
certainly foreseeable, the agreement becomes not merely advisory
if "fair and reasonable," but conclusively binding unless "unique

io

and compelling" circumstances exist. The Court of Appeals does not
cite to any prior case law establishing such a distinction, and
Husband is not aware of any.
Husband respectfully submits that no logical basis exists for
giving greater effect to a postnuptial agreement (whether executed
one year or twenty years before the divorce) than to a predivorce
property settlement agreement. Logic dictates that the predivorce
(postnuptial) agreement be given less weight, not greater.

A

predivorce agreement is enforced within a short period of time
after execution.

There is little likelihood that the parties1

circumstances will change prior to the time the agreement is
enforced. The postnuptial agreement in this case, in contrast, was
executed nearly fifteen years before enforcement was sought. There
had been a vast and material change in circumstances subsequent to
the execution of the agreement. Husband respectfully submits that
there is no legal or logical reason for giving greater effect to
a contract which was executed with less knowledge.2

Alternatively, this Court should adopt the standards for
enforcement of a prenuptial (or postnuptial) agreement as set forth
in Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987). The court held
that the following three criteria are generally considered in
determining whether to enforce such an agreement:
1.
Was the agreement obtained through fraud,
duress or mistake, or misrepresentation or nondisclosure
of material fact?
2.

Was the agreement unconscionable when executed?

3.
Have the facts and circumstances changed since
the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement
unfair and unreasonable?
Brooks, 733 P.2d at 1049 (citing Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635,
292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1982)). The "unfair and unreasonable" test
in the third factor is identical to that applied to property
settlement agreements by Utah courts. Colman, 743 P.2d at 789.
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It is important to emphasize that Husband does not dispute,
for purposes of this Point, that the 1973 agreement mandates that
the trial

court treat the designated

properties

as

separate

property. Once the property is properly labeled as either separate
or marital, however, the trial court in dividing the property
should be granted a latitude of discretion equal or greater to that
applicable when dealing with a property settlement agreement.
Once it is determined that the property is separate, the trial
court must consider several factors in determining whether it
should be divided.

Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).

The trial court did not have any reason to make findings on those
factors in this case, because it had already determined that the
1973 agreement was not enforceable and that all the property was
marital property.

The trial court should be permitted on remand

to exercise its discretion, in accordance with the principles set
forth above, to divide the separate property if equity so requires.
POINT III
EVIDENCE OF UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES
EXISTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT
IN DIVIDING THE SEPARATE PROPERTY.
Husband testified that on April

30, 1986, after he had

returned from a coin show in the State of Washington, Wife invited
him to share coffee with her. While Wife thus occupied him, their
son, Eric Aston, broke into Husband's vehicle and removed hundreds
of thousands of dollars worth of coins and other valuable assets.
Eric then returned and stated to Husband, in Wife's presence, that
he, Eric, had removed the coins because "we" could no longer trust

1 A

Husband. (R. 725.)

The items stolen included nearly all of the

assets conveyed to Husband under the 1973 agreement.
Wife and Eric disputed Husband's testimony.

The trial court

determined that it was not necessary to resolve the dispute because
the trial court held that the 1973 agreement was not enforceable
in any event.

The Court of Appeals disagreed and held the 1973

agreement to be enforceable.

The Court of Appeals held that

postnuptial agreements are enforceable unless "unique and compelling circumstances" exist to justify varying from the agreement.
The court did not define what would constitute "unique and compelling circumstances," but stated in footnote that "[t]he trial court
made no findings to delineate what it found as compelling circumstances to justify such an action and we find none."

794 P.2d

at 504 n. 6.
Point II above shows that the "unique and compelling circumstances" test is not proper.

Even if that test applies,

however, unique and compelling circumstances exist in this case.
In Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), for example, the
Court held that the trial court properly awarded a portion of the
husband's separate property to the wife where the wife had no
income or assets and where her present financial needs were the
result of the husband's tortious conduct.

The Court of Appeals

asserts that Noble is distinguishable because it did not involve
a prenuptial

or postnuptial

agreement.

The critical issue,

however, is that the standard applied in Noble is the same as the
Court of Appeals has previously held applies where a property
settlement agreement has been made.

The Court in Noble held:

[T]here is no per se ban on awarding one spouse
a portion of the premarital assets of another.
15

In fact, our cases have consistently held that
under appropriate circumstances, achieving a
fair, just, and equitable result may require
that the trial court exercise its discretion
to award one spouse the premarital property of
the other.
761 P.2d at 1373 (citations omitted).
This language is remarkably similar to that in Colman v.
Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), a case which did involve
a postnuptial agreement

(although executed in contemplation of

divorce):
[I]t is well recognized that a parties' stipulation as to property rights in a divorce
action, although advisory and usually followed
unless the court finds it to be unfair or
unreasonable, is not necessarily binding on the
trial court. It is only a recommendation to
be adhered to if the court believes it to be
fair and reasonable.
743 P.2d at 789 (citations omitted).
Theft must certainly be considered to be a compelling circumstance.

Evidence exists which would support a finding that Wife

stole the coins from Husband.

Although the location of the coins

was not known at the time this case was tried,3 some of the coins
have subsequently been discovered in Eric Aston's possession. (See
Appendix "I".) This corroborates Husband's testimony that Eric and
Dorothy D1Aston conspired to steal the coins from Husband.
The Court of Appeals' holding
effective remedy.

leaves Husband without an

Wife assisted in the theft of all of the assets

conveyed to Husband under the 1973 agreeront, but the Court of

3

The trial court held that if the coins were later found in
the possession of either party, that party would be considered in
contempt of court and punished. (R. 471.)

Appeals nonetheless prohibits the trial court from allowing Husband
a share in the assets Wife received under the 1973 agreement.
The trial court should be granted discretion to make whatever
orders are necessary and just in this case.

The Court of Appeals

having held that the trial court was in error in its interpretation
of the 1973 agreement, this Court should now remand the case to the
trial court to make whatever decree is just and appropriate under
the circumstances of the case, yet in harmony with the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of the agreement.
POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE 1973 AGREEMENT OPERATED
TO BIND THE DIVORCE COURT.
Husband does not, for the purposes of this Petition for
Certiorari, contest the holding in DfAston II that the parties
intended the 1973 agreement to be binding, and that the agreement
was unambiguous.

Husband respectfully submits, however, that the

Court of Appeals has misinterpreted the agreement.

The critical

portion of the agreement (copy in Appendix "H") states as follows:
3. Hereafter, and until this agreement
is modified in writing attached hereto, all
property, real, personal and mixed, acquired
by either party in his or her sole name, from
whatever source derived and wherever situated,
shall be the sole and separate property of such
person, notwithstanding any law, statute, or
court decision giving presumptive effect to the
status of marriage; and such property shall be
free of all claims, demand [sic] or liens of
the other, direct or indirect, and however
derived.
Defendant's Exhibit 37 (emphasis added).
DfAston II held that the emphasized portion clearly indicated
an intent that the agreement be binding and conclusive on any
i n

divorce court.

794 P.2d at 504. The agreement does not, however,

state that it is binding on all court decisions.

It is only

intended to prevent a court decisions "giving presumptive effect
to the status of marriage."

In other words, the agreement prohib-

its the court from presuming, solely by reason of the marriage,
that the property was community or marital property. The agreement
only determines the status of the property as separate.
This argument is supported by Parkhurst v. Gibson, 573 A.2d
454 (N.H. 1990).

The prenuptial agreement at issue in that case

stated, among other things, that "[i]t is mutually declared that
it is the intention of the parties to this agreement that by virtue
of their prospective marriage neither one shall have nor acquire
any right, title or claim in and to the real or personal estate of
the other party . . . ."
however, specifically

573 A.2d at 456.

use the words

The agreement did not

"divorce," "alimony," or

"property settlement," but appeared to be directed at determining
the status of the parties1 property for inheritance purposes. The
subject agreement in this case similarly does not specifically
refer to divorce or to a property settlement in divorce, and should
be read as only determining the status of the property as separate.
Husband does not contest, for the purposes of this Petition
for Rehearing, that the 1973 agreement conclusively establishes the
status of the property as separate.

In Utah, the general rule is

that "in appropriate circumstances, equity will require that each
party retain the separate property brought to the marriage." Burke
v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).

By designating the

property as separate, therefore, the 1973 agreement created a
presumption that the property would remain the property of Wife.

The trial court must treat the property as separate property.

As

with any separate property, however, the court can order one party
to convey portions of his or her separate property to the other in
order to achieve equity under the circumstances of the case.

Id.

Although the agreement mandates that the property be dealt with by
a divorce court as separate property, nothing in the agreement can
be read as prohibiting the divorce court from otherwise treating
the property the same as any other separate property.
CONCLUSION
D1Aston II should be vacated and the appeal dismissed as
required by D'Aston I and for the reason that Wife has been and
remains in contempt of the orders of the trial court. A person who
is openly contemptuous of the trial court should not be entitled
to relief in the appellate courts of this state.
DfAston II should also be vacated as erroneous on the merits.
The opinion contradicts prior opinions of this Court and of the
Court of Appeals.

Prior cases hold that the "unique and compel-

ling" circumstances test applies only where a property settlement
agreement has been approved by a court and incorporated in a
divorce decree.

The trial court has discretion to vary from a

property agreement to achieve a result that is fair and reasonable.
The record evidence, and that which has been discovered
subsequent to the initial decree, would justify the trial court in
dividing the parties1 separate property.

The trial court made no

finding concerning that evidence, because it was not necessary.

1Q

DfAston II should be vacated and the case remanded to the
trial court with full discretion to divide the separate property
if necessary to fashion an equitable decree.
DATED this

\ d

da

Y

of

September, 1990.
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[5] Further, in viewing all the facts m
the light most favorable to Brmkerhoff, we
can find no prejudice. Harris v. Utah
Transit Auth., 671 P 2d 217, 222-23 (Utah
1983); Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P 2d 865, 868 (Utah 1981).
Bnnkerhoff neither below nor on appeal
articulates how he was prejudiced by DLS's
failure to notify him in the notice of hearing that the hearing was going to be informal. It seems clear that no prejudice
would ordinarily occur when an informal
hearing is held under the UAPA because
the litigant has an absolute right to a trial
de novo before the district court. In this
trial de novo, Bnnkerhoff was able to
present his entire case before a new tribunal for an independent decision. Based
upon the foregoing, we find the trial court
erred in revoking the order of suspension
on the basis that the notice of hearing sent
by DLS did not state whether the administrative hearing was to be formal or informal as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-3(2)(a)(v) (1989).
REASONS FOR THE DECISION
UNDER SECTION 63-46b-5
Bnnkerhoff also alleges that DLS violated Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-5(l)0) (1989)
by failing to set forth specific reasons for
its suspension of his driving privileges.
This statute states, m pertinent part, that
"[w]ithm a reasonable time after the close
of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the
presiding officer shall issue a signed order
m wntmg that states the following(li)
the reasons for the decision."
[6] We dispose of this issue on similar
grounds. First, Bnnkerhoff failed to raise
an objection so as to allow DLS to cure any
defect, and second, Bnnkerhoff does not
claim, let alone demonstrate, that he was
prejudiced by any alleged error
The record below shows that Bnnkerhoff
made no request of DLS to provide him
with more specific reasons for the suspension of his license As stated above, a
failure to object to an error and allow a
tribunal to correct its error precludes an
appellant from asserting the issue on apan opportunity to order a continuance to reme

peal. Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P 2d
778, 781 (Utah 1986); Condas v. Condas,
618 P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980).
Finally, Bnnkerhoff does not allege, and
cannot show, prejudice because, under the
statutory scheme, he was allowed a trial de
novo after which the trial court has the
responsibility to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law justifying its decision.
In summary, the tnal de novo cured any
technical procedural errors occurring at the
informal DLS heanng. The purpose of allowing an agency to choose an informal
hearing procedure would be defeated if
technical, non-prejudicial, procedural errors
were sufficient to overturn the agency action. The statutory trial de novo is the
proper remedy to cure these non-prejudicial
errors.
We find that Bnnkerhoff failed to object
and preserve his alleged errors. Furthermore, we hold that the trial de novo m the
district court provided by the UAPA eliminated any prejudice to defendant. We
therefore reverse and remand for entry of
an order to reinstate DLS's suspension of
Bnnkerhoff s dnvmg privileges.
DAVIDSON and BENCH, J J , concur.
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Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al., Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 890050-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 9, 1990.
Divorce action was brought. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd
dv anv problem with notice
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L. Park, J., entered judgment, and wife
appealed. The Court oi Appeals, Billings,
J., held that: (1) service on wife's attorney
of order to show cause why wife should not
be held in contempt was sufficient where
wife secreted herself to prevent service of
order, and (2) wife would be given 30 days
to bring herself within process of trial
court, and if she failed to do so, her appeal
would be dismissed.
Ordered accordingly.
1. Divorce <®=>269(8)
Service on wife's attorney of order to
show cause why wife should not be held in
contempt in divorce proceedings was sufficient where wife initially had been served
with process in case and appeared by counsel in matter but subsequently secreted
herself to prevent service of order to show
cause.
2. Divorce <s»278
Wife, who had secreted herself and
refused to submit to process of district
court in divorce action, would have 30 days
to bring herself within process of trial
court if she wished to appeal divorce judgment: however, if wife persisted in secreting herself in violation of trial court orders,
her appeal would be subject to dismissal.
Brian C. Harrison (argued), Provo, for
defendants-appellants.
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh,
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston, filed an appeal from a divorce decree entered by the
trial court on December 15, 1988. Appellee, Bruno D'Aston ("Mr. D'Aston"), filed a
Motion to Dismiss appellant's appeal on the
grounds that she was currently in contempt of the trial court's order and had
secreted herself, refusing to submit to the

process of the district court. He thus argues that appellant should not be allowed
to seek a review of the divorce decree on
the merits. We agree with Mr. D'Aston
and therefore stay this appeal and allow
appellant 30 days from the date of the
issuance of this opinion to submit to the
process of the trial court and to give this
court notice of her actions. If appellant
complies with this court's order and gives
this court written verification of her compliance within the 30-day period, then we
will consider her appeal on the merits.
However, if appellant fails to submit to the
process of the trial court within the 30-day
period, the motion to dismiss her appeal
will be granted.
FACTS
We only discuss the facts relevant to this
order, not the underlying dispute.
At the time of trial, appellant testified
that she had $300,000 in cash in a safe
deposit box in Far West Bank and 375,000
in cash in a safe at home. In the divorce
decree, the trial court ordered appellant to
pay Mr. D'Aston $236,800 "from the $300,000.00 in the safe deposit box.'' To date,
appellant has failed to comply with that
order.
The trial court issued a writ of execution
directing the constable to execute on the
safe deposit box at Far West Bank. The
constable discovered that no such safe deposit box under appellant's name existed,
nor did she have any substantial assets at
Far West Bank.
Mr. D'Aston, on January 11, 1989, filed a
Motion to Compel Compliance with Decree
of the Court. On January 23, 1989, appellant filed a Motion for Stay and Approval
of Supersedeas Bond. The trial court ordered a stay and set the amount of the
supersedeas bond, which was to be posted
within 30 days. Appellant failed to post a
supersedeas bond.
Mr. D'Aston, on March 17, 1989, obtained
an Order to Show Cause directing appellant
to appear and show cause why she should
not be held in contempt for her failure to
pay Mr. D'Aston the $236,800 ordered in
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the decree or to post a supersedeas bond.
The process server could not find appellant
in order to serve the Order to Show Cause.
However, her counsel was served with a
copy of the Order to Show Cause.
On March 22, 1989, the trial court held a
hearing on Mr. D'Aston's Motion to Compel
Compliance. Appellant's counsel was in
court that day and the judge requested his
appearance at the hearing. Appellant's
counsel stated he was making a special
appearance as he had not been given proper notice of the hearing.
On April 7, 1989, the court held an order
to show cause hearing. Neither appellant
nor her counsel was present. In a minute
entry, the court noted that the March 22,
1989, hearing had been continued to April
7, 1989, and that appellant's counsel had
been informed of this fact at the March 22,
1989, hearing. In addition, the record reflects that appellant's counsel was served
with the Order to Show Cause which listed
the April 7, 1989, hearing date.
On April 13, 1989, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law holding
appellant in contempt of court because she
was "purposefully hiding herself from the
jurisdiction of the Court and from service,"
and issued an order of commitment and
bench warrant. The court amended its order of commitment on May 26, 1989. Appellant again evaded service. Appellant's
counsel, however, was served with the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the
order of commitment.

without authority to hold her in contempt.
Appellant thus contends this court may not
dismiss her appeal for failure to comply
with the trial court's orders.
[1] Utah courts have acknowledged the
importance of actual notice in contempt
proceedings. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d
118, 378 P.2d 519, 520 (1963); see generally
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 117172 (Utah 1988). However, whether a court
can issue a civil order of contempt without
personal service where a party purposefully hides to prevent service of the order has
not been addressed to date in Utah. Nonetheless, we are in accord with other jurisdictions which have held that where a party
initially has been served with process in a
case, and has appeared by counsel in the
matter, service of an order to show cause
why the party should not be held in contempt on the party's attorney is sufficient.
See Kottemann v. Kottemann, 150 Cal.
App.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 52 (1957); Brewer
v. Brewer, 206 Ga. 93, 55 S.E.2d 593, 594
(1949); State ex rei Brubaker v. Pritchard, 236 Ind. 222. 138 N.E.2d 233, 236
(1956); Caplow v. Eighth Judicial Dist
Court 72 New 265. 302 P.2d 755, 756
(1956); Macdermid v. Macdermid. 116 Vt.
237, 73 A.2d 315, 318 (1950); see generally
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice to, or
service upon, contemnor's attorney in
civil contempt proceedings, 60 A.L.R.2d
1244 (1958).

In response to Mr. D'Aston's motion to
dismiss her appeal, appellant argues that
since she has not been served with the
Order to Show Cause, the trial court was

In Kottemann, which is factually similar
to this case, the plaintiff had left his residence and thus could not be served with a
motion for contempt. 310 P.2d at 50. The
plaintiffs attorneys were served with the
motion. Id. at 50-51. The attorneys then
asserted they did not know the whereabouts of their client and only had authority to represent him in the appeal. Id. at
51. The court rejected the attorneys' attempts to limit their authority and concluded that the service of the order to show
cause upon the attorneys was proper. Id.
at 52.1

1. Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to hold
that no formal adjudication of contempt is necessary in order to dismiss the appeal for failure

to comply with a trial court's order. See Tobin
v. Casaus, 128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795
(1954) (party could not be found for service of

Thereafter, appellant's counsel made a
Motion to Strike Findings of Fact, Order of
Commitment and Bench Warrant. He asserts that he does not know where appellant is and that his current representation
is now limited to this appeal. That motion
was denied.
NOTICE
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The trial court found that appellant was
secreting herself to avoid service of process in this matter. Appellant's counsel
was served with notice of the Motion to
Compel Compliance, the Order to Show
Cause regarding contempt, and the court's
findings of contempt. Appellant's counsel
appeared at the March 22, 1989, hearing on
the Motion to Compel Compliance and was
given notice of the Order to Show Cause
hearing. Because appellant has purposefully hidden to avoid service of process and
notice of the contempt proceedings and the
court's order was given to appellant's attorney, we find the trial court's order of
contempt was properly entered.

[2] Likewise, Utah's appellate courts
have not considered whether they may dismiss a civil appeal when the appellant is in
contempt of a trial court order in the same
action. However, in the area of criminal
appeals, the Utah Supreme Court has dismissed the appeal of a prisoner after he
escaped custody. State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d
703, 704 (Utah 1985); see also Hardy v.
Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1981)
(court dismissed an escapee's appeal from a
dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus). In
Tuttle, the Utah Supreme Court refined its
position in Hardy. The court held that an
appellant prisoner's escape is not an abandonment of his right to appeal and that the
dismissal of his appeal is not an appropriate punishment for his escape. Tuttle, 713
P.2d at 704-05. The court stressed the
fundamental right to appellate review of a
criminal conviction when reinstating the appeal after the prisoner was returned to
custody. Id. at 705.

(1957) (failure to pay alimony and attorney
fees); Michael v. Michael, 253 N.E.2d 261,
263 (Ind.1969) (appellant took child in violation of custody order and fled jurisdiction);
In re Morrell, 174 Ohio St. 427, 189 N.E.2d
873, 874 (Ohio 1963) (appellant took child in
violation of custody order and could not be
found); Huskey ?;. Huskey, 284 S.C. 504,
327 S.E.2d 359, 360 (Ct.App.1985) (party
left jurisdiction to avoid arrest). Other
courts have allowed the party time to comply with the trial court's order before dismissing the appeal. Stewart v. Stewart,
91 Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962) (30
days to comply); Tobin v. Casaus, 128
Cal.App.2d 588,*275 P.2d 792, 795 (1954) (30
days to comply); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 191 Conn. 309, 464 A.2d 771, 774
(1983) (30 days to comply); Pasin v. Pasin.,
517 So.2d 742, 742 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987)
(15 days to comply); In re Marriage of
Marks, 96 IU.App.3d 360, 51 Ill.Dec. 626,
629, 420 N.E.2d 1184. 1187 (1981) (30 days
to comply); Henderson v. Henderson, 329
Mass. 257, 107 N.E.2d 773, 774 (1952) (30
days to comply); Prevenas v. Prevenas,
193 Neb. 399, 227 N.W.2d 29, 30 (1975) (20
days to comply); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 114 R.I. 718, 339 A.2d 247, 250 (1975)
(30 days to comply); Strange v. Strange,
464 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.Civ.App.1970) (per
curiam) (10 days to comply); Pike v. Pike,
24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d 401, 404 (1946)
(10 days to comply). These courts justify
the dismissal of the appeals on the ground
that it violates the principles of justice to
allow a party who flaunts the orders of the
courts to seek judicial assistance. See, e.g.,
Stewart, 372 P.2d at 700; Rude, 314 P.2d
at 230; Greenwood. 464 A.2d at 773;
Strange, 464 S.W.2d at 219.

Appellate courts from other jurisdictions
have dismissed the civil appeals of contumacious parties without allowing the parties an opportunity to bring themselves
into compliance with the trial court's order.
Rude v. Rude, 153 Cal.App.2d 243, 314
P.2d 226, 230 (1957) (failure to pay support
and attorney fees); Kottemann v. Kottemann, 150 Cal.App.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 53

Still another approach is to stay the appeal until the appellant has submitted to
the process of the trial court. This approach gives the trial court the flexibility
to fashion the terms under which the noncomplying party may purge its contempt
rather than necessarily ordering the enforcement of the judgment. In Closset v.
Closset, 71 Nev. 80? 280 P.2d 290, 291

process); Pike v. Pike, 24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d
401, 404 (1946) (party secreted herself and her

children to avoid custody order and service of
process).

CONTEMPT
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(1955), the appellant had failed to comply
with a trial court order in a divorce proceeding and had been found in contempt.
The Nevada Supreme Court did not dismiss
his appeal for failure to comply with the
judgment below, but held that the appeal
would be dismissed unless the appellant
within 30 days submitted himself to the
process of the trial court or posted a supersedeas bond. Id. 280 P.2d at 291. The
court stated:
[AJppellant husband is now a fugitive
from process of the trial court. We shall
not permit him to avail himself of judicial
review while at the same time he places
himself beyond reach of the process of
the trial court in defiance of its attempts
to enforce its judgment
We do but insist that one seeking the
aid of the courts of this state should
remain throughout the course of such
proceeding, amenable to all judicial process of the state which may issue in
connection with such proceeding.
Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court considered an appellate court's dismissal of a
civil appeal on the basis that the appellant
was in contempt of the trial court's order in
National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold. 348 U.S. 37, 75 S.Ct. 92, 99
L.Ed. 46 (1954). The Court was asked to
decide whether the Washington Supreme
Court violated either the equal protection
clause or the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment when it dismissed
an appeal from a money judgment as a
reasonable measure for safeguarding the
collectibility of that judgment. The appellant had filed a notice of appeal, but had
offered no supersedeas bond and had obtained no stay of the proceedings. Id. at
39, 75 S.Ct. at 93-94. The trial court ordered the appellant to deliver certain bonds
in its possession to the court's receiver for
safekeeping pending disposition of the appeal. Id. The appellant refused and was
held in contempt. Id. As a result, the
Washington Supreme Court struck the ap2. Utah Const, art VIII, § 5 provides, in pertinent
part: "Except for matters filed originally with
the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an

peal on the merits, giving the appellant 15
days to purge its contempt by delivering
the bonds. Id. at 40, 75 S.Ct. at 94. The
United States Supreme Court found no constitutional violation, stating that "[wjhile a
statutory review is important and must be
exercised without discrimination, such a review is not a requirement of due process."
Id. at 43, 75 S.Ct. at 95. The Court
stressed that "[petitioner's appeal was not
dismissed because of petitioner's failure to
satisfy a judgment pending an appeal from
it. It was dismissed because of petitioner's
failure to comply with the court's order to
safeguard petitioner's assets from dissipation pending such appeal." Id. at 44, 75
S.Ct. at 96.
We are persuaded that the Closset approach is most consistent with the Utah
Supreme Court's Tuttle decision and the
United States Supreme Court's Arnold decision. By adopting this approach, we do
not deny appellant her right to an appeal
under Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5,2 but rather insist she must submit herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy
that court's concerns before she may exercise that right. She merely has the obligation to come forward and offer a reasonable alternative to the trial court to safeguard her assets from dissipation pending
her appeal.
Appellant was given the opportunity to
post a supersedeas bond, but has refused.
She has ignored the orders of the trial
court and, apart from obtaining a temporary stay which she allowed to lapse for
want of a bond, she has provided no reasonable alternative to allow the court to
insure that her assets are available to satisfy the judgment pending appeal. By her
actions, appellant is frustrating the administration of justice.
Appellant has not claimed that she did
not have the ability to comply with the trial
court's order. See Stewart v. Stewart, 91
Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962). This
situation is similar to one faced by a Caliappeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction
over the cause."
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fomia court, where it found it was "dealing
with a litigant who not only has previously
failed to appear as ordered, but who up to
this very time remains a fugitive from justice. Apparently, he is unwilling to respond to a court order with which he disagrees, but seeks to obtain on appeal" a
more favorable result. Tobin v. Casaus,
128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795
(1954).
We therefore hold that appellant has 30
days from the date of the issuance of this
opinion to bring herself within the process
of the trial court. If appellant submits
herself to the trial court, she should be
allowed an opportunity to offer alternatives
to the trial court to protect the judgment.
Appellant may persuade the court it should
hold the disputed judgment amount in trust
until a resolution of this appeal on the
merits. However, if appellant persists in
secreting herself in violation of the trial
court's orders, her appeal will be dismissed
at the expiration of the 30-day period.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.

rw
(O

H>

| « Y NUMBER SYSTEM

Lewis DUNCAN, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of
Patrick Duncan, deceased; Jason E.
Duncan, a minor by and through his
Guardian ad Litem; Alice Duncan; Noreen Duncan; Michael Duncan; Tim
Duncan; Kevin Duncan; Brian Duncan; Michelle Bowers, individually and
as personal representative of the Estate
of Jefrey and Nicole Bowers, deceased;
Judson Bowers; Florence Hanson;

Shelly Bowers; Sherry Bowers; Monica
Henwood, individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of Ramon
Henwood, deceased; Phyllis Kenwood;
and Owen Henwood, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation; The State of Utah;
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1 through
100, inclusive. Defendants and Respondents.
No. 890291-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 12, 1990.
Heirs of victims of train-automobile accident brought action against railroad, Department of Transportation and railroad
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., entered
summary judgment dismissing wrongful
death action. Heirs appealed. The Court
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, held that: (1) heirs failed to
establish that either engineer or railroad
were negligent, and (2) Department, having
given at least some warning or control at
railroad crossing, was gover^.mentally immune in deciding whether to improve
means of warning or control at crossing
because of fiscal effects of decision.
Affirmed.
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion.
1. Railroads <3=>348<1)
Evidence failed to support claim of
heirs of accident victims that there was
negligence in operation of train or entrusting its operation to engineer who was in
charge at time of automobile-train collision.
2. Railroads <3=>348<2)
Evidence did not support claim of heirs
of accident victims that railroad negligently
maintained railroad right-of-way at cross
ing with street where train-automobile colli
sion occurred; there was nothing to indi
cate what could have made railroad's right
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judgment or order of the circuit court.
They, therefore, reason that this is an exception to the general delegation of appellate jurisdiction over circuit court orders to
the Utah Court of Appeals.
Again, we do not disagree with the defendants' argument in the abstract, but
cannot decipher how the argument helps
them. Defendants still point to no statute
giving the district court jurisdiction over
appeals from the decisions of a magistrate
under Rule 7. In fact, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1989) vests "interlocutory
appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a first
degree or capital felony" in the Utah Court
of Appeals. Certainly the magistrate was
acting as a court of record in a criminal
case when it held the preliminary hearing.
Finally, both defendants make a number
of policy arguments in favor of giving the
district courts jurisdiction over objections
to bindover orders alleging insufficiency of
the evidence. Although some of their contentions have merit,8 such arguments must
be made to the legislature. It is the legislature which is charged with the task of
statutorily delegating appellate jurisdiction
and we cannot modify its decisions because
we believe policy considerations so dictate.
In conclusion, we affirm the orders of
the district courts refusing to exercise jurisdiction.
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al., Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 890050-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 14, 1990.
Action was brought for divorce. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd
L. Park, J., entered decree of divorce, and
wife appealed, challenging property distribution. The Court of Appeals, 790 P.2d
590, ordered wife to submit herself to process of lower court within 30 days or her
appeal would be dismissed. After wife
gave notice of compliance with order, merits of appeal were addressed. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) postnuptial agreement not made in contemplation of divorce was enforceable, absent
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure,
and (2) postnuptial agreement unambiguously provided that it would apply to disposition of spouses' property in event of
divorce.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Husband and Wife ®=>30
Prenuptial agreements are enforceable
as long as there is no fraud, coercion, or
material nondisclosure.
2. Husband and Wife <s=>30
Postnuptial agreement not in contemplation of divorce is enforceable absent
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.
3. Husband and Wife <s=>31(2)
Normal rules of contract construction
would be applied in resolving disagreement

been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The
magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

8. Defendants correctly claim that because the
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is discretionary, defendants might be forced to go
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is
denied.
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between husband and wife regarding scope
and meaning of postnuptial agreement.
4. Husband and Wife <s=>31(2)
Core principle in construing postnuptial agreement was to look to four corners of agreement to determine parties'
intentions.
5. Appeal and Error <®=»842(8)
Threshold determination of whether
writing is ambiguous, such that court may
resort to extrinsic evidence of parties' intent, is question of law, and thus trial
court's determination is reviewed under
correction-of-error standard, according no
particular deference to trial court
6. Evidence <s=>450(5)
Postnuptial agreement between husband and wife unambiguously provided
that it would apply to disposition of parties'
property in event of divorce and, therefore,
extrinsic evidence regarding spouses' intent in event of divorce should not have
been considered, where postnuptial agreement, entered into in community property
state, provided that spouses' property
would be divided and division would control
for all purposes, and unambiguously and
specifically referred to rebutting presumption that all property acquired during marriage was community property.
7. Divorce <3=>249.2
Any equitable power of trial court to
disregard otherwise enforceable postnuptial property settlement agreement and
to distribute separate property of spouses
at divorce had to be justified by unique and
compelling circumstances.

Brian C. Harrison (argued), Harris, Carter & Harrison, Provo, for defendants and
appellants.
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh,
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for
plaintiff and appellee.
OPINION
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
ORME, JJ.

BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston ("Wife"), appeals from a divorce decree entered by the
district court, principally claiming the court
erred in failing to distribute the parties'
property pursuant to a postnuptial agreement.
On appeal, Bruno D'Aston ("Husband")
responded that since Wife was in contempt
of the trial court and was avoiding court
process, this court should not consider her
appeal on the merits. We agreed with
Husband and ordered Wife to submit herself to the process of the trial court within
30 days or we would dismiss her appeal.
See D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Ct.
App.1990). Wife gave us notice of her
compliance with our order on May 4, 1990,
and therefore we address the merits of her
appeal in this opinion.
We agree with Wife's contention that the
trial court erred in failing to distribute the
parties' property pursuant to their postnuptial agreement and therefore reverse
and remand.
Husband and Wife divorced on December
15, 1988, after a 35-year marriage. In
1973, Husband asked Wife to enter into a
written property agreement, which had
been prepared by his attorney. The agreement was executed by both parties in 1973,
then notarized and recorded in the State of
California in 1975.
Under the 1973 agreement, Wife received
two parcels of real estate and cash. Husband received all real property outside the
United States; personal property in his possession, which included $1 million in coins
and a collection of antique cars; and all
domestic and foreign patents and patent
rights. The agreement also provided that
all property acquired by either party in
his/her own name would be the separate
property of that person. Finally, the
agreement provided that the parties would
execute documents to implement the agreement, and that each had the advice of counsel, had read the agreement, and had not
signed the agreement under duress, fraud
or undue influence. Shortly after the
agreement was signed, the parties con-
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veyed the property as provided in the
agreement.
On May 2, 1986, Husband filed for divorce. Husband claimed that much of the
tangible personal property given to him
under the 1973 agreement had been stolen
on April 30, 1986, the day Wife had asked
him to leave their home. On July 31, 1986,
Husband's California attorney, who had
drafted the 1973 agreement, sent a letter to
Wife's Utah attorney which stated the 1973
agreement was in full force and effect
Both parties at trial acknowledged they
executed the 1973 agreement voluntarily
and did not execute it under duress, fraud
or undue influence. However, at trial,
Husband claimed the 1973 agreement
should not control the disposition of the
parties' property in this divorce action because the agreement was entered into only
to protect the couple's assets from possible
creditors in pending litigation, not to distribute property in the event of divorce.
Wife at trial claimed she had no knowledge
of the alleged pending litigation and assumed the 1973 agreement was to control
for all purposes, including the possibility of
divorce.

The trial court held the 1973 agreement
was not intended to control in the event of
divorce, and thus, equitably divided all of
the parties' property and awarded no alimony to either party. Wife appeals, claiming
that (1) the trial court erred in dividing the
parties' separate property in this divorce
action contrary to the terms of the 1973
agreement, (2) the trial court erred in denying Wife alimony, and (3) the conduct of
the trial judge constituted judicial bias.

1. See Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah
1986) ("it should be noted that in general, prenuptial agreements concerning the disposition
of property owned by the parties at the time of
their marriage are valid so long as there is no
fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure");
Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah
Ct.App.1988).

agreement to protect inheritance rights valid if
property fairly disclosed and spouse enters into
freely and for good consideration); Button v.
Button, 131 Wis.2d 84, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550-51
(1986) (postnuptial agreement must meet requirements of fair and reasonable disclosure,
entered into voluntarily and freely, and substantive provisions fair to each spouse). But cf.
Ching v. Ching. 751 P.2d 93, 97 (Haw.Ct.App.
1988) (general rule that property agreements
should be enforced absent fraud or unconscionability applies to prenuptial, but not to postnuptial, agreements).

VALIDITY OF POSTNUPTIAL
AGREEMENTS
[1,2] In Utah, prenuptial agreements
are enforceable as long as there is no
fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure.1
Utah's courts have not yet considered the
enforceability of postnuptial agreements
not in contemplation of divorce. However,
other jurisdictions review postnuptial property agreements under the same standards
as those applied to prenuptial agreements.2
We agree with the majority of our neighboring jurisdictions and thus hold that a
postnuptial agreement is enforceable in
Utah absent fraud, coercion, or material
nondisclosure.3

2. See In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 449
P.2d 7, 16 (1969) (en banc) ("[MJarital partners
may in Arizona validly divide their property
presently and prospectively by a post-nuptial
agreement, even without its being incident to a
contemplated separation or divorce," provided it 3. This postnuptial agreement was entered into
is fair and equitable and is free from fraud,
in California. Under California law, married
coercion or undue influence and that "wife actcouples may contract to change the separate or
ed with full knowledge of the property involved
community status of their property. Cal. Civil
and her rights therein."); In re Estate of Lewin,
Code § 5103 (1990); In re Marriage of Dawley,
42 Coio.App. 129, 595 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1979)
17 Cal.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 328 n. 6, 131 Cal.
("Nuptial agreements, whether executed before
Rptr. 3 (1976). Further, married couples may
or after the marriage, are enforceable in Coloraenter into contracts with each other concerning
do [and a] nuptial agreement will be upheld
their property rights as though unmarried, subunless the person attacking it proves fraud, conject to rules controlling actions of persons occucealment, or failure to disclose material inforpying confidential relations with each other.
mation."). See also In re Estate of Loughmiller,
Haseltine v. Haseltine, 203 Cal.App.2d 48, 21
229 Kan. 584, 629 P.2d 156, 162 (1981) (postCal.Rptr. 238, 244 (1962); In re Estate of Marsh,
nuptial agreements, fairly and understanding^
151 Cal.App.2d 356, 311 P.2d 596, 599 (1957).
made, are enforceable); In re Estate of Gab, 364
California law is in harmony with Utah law on
N.W.2d 924, 925-26 (S.D.I985) (postnuptial
the issue of the enforceability and interpretation
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Neither Husband nor Wife assert that
the 1973 property agreement was entered
into as a result of fraud or coercion nor do
they contend that there was material nondisclosure of the parties' assets. Thus, this
postnuptial agreement should be enforced
pursuant to its terms.
Our conclusion, however, does not resolve this controversy as Husband and
Wife disagree as to the meaning and scope
of the 1973 postnuptial property agreement Wife contends the agreement by its
unambiguous terms applies in the event of
divorce. Husband argues that it was executed merely to protect the parties' property from creditors and was not intended to
control a distribution of the parties' property in the event of divorce. Thus, we must
determine what the parties intended when
they entered into this 1973 agreement
Utah courts have applied general contract principles when interpreting prenuptial agreements. See Berman v. Berman,
749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (A
prenuptial agreement should be treated
like any other contract "In interpreting
contracts, the principal concern is to determine what the parties intended by what
they said."). This approach is consistent
with other jurisdictions' treatment of postnuptial agreements.4
[3,4] Thus, in order to resolve Husband
and Wife's disagreement as to the scope
and meaning of this postnuptial agreement,
we apply normal rules of contract construction. The core principle is that in construing this contract, we first look to the four
corners of the agreement to determine the
parties' intentions. See Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Utah CtApp.
of postnuptial agreements and thus we need not
resolve the issue of which state's law should
apply.
4. See Matlock v. Matlock 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d
629, 633 (1978) ("[C]ontracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which is
to fix property rights between a husband and
wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out
the intentions of the makers and to uphold such
contracts where they are fairly and understand-

1989); see also Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d
1382,1385 (Utah 1989); LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah
1988); Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs.,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
[5-7] The relevant provisions of the
1973 agreement denoting its scope and application state, with our emphasis:
1. The husband does transfer, bargain, convey and quitclaim to the wife all
of his right, title and interest, if any
there be, in and to the following:
(a) The real property at 14211 Skyline Drive, Hacienda Heights, California and in and to all buildings, appurtenances and fixtures thereon.
(b) The real property at 230 South
Ninth Avenue, City of Industry, California, including all buildings, appurtenances and fixtures thereon, and any
and all oil and mineral rights thereto.
(c) Any and all cash in bank accounts located in the State of California.
2. The wife transfers, bargains, conveys and quitclaims to the husband all of
her right, title and interest in and to real
property located outside of the United
States of America, and in and to all personal property in the possession of the
husband, or subject to his control in the
United States, Europe or elsewhere in
the world, and in and to all patents or
patent rights under the laws of the United States, United Kingdom or any commonwealth thereof, Switzerland, Japan
or other countries. The provisions of
this paragraph apply to all property described herein, whether presently owned
ably made, are just and equitable in their provisions, and are not obtained by fraud or overreaching."); Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So.2d 1333,
1335 (Miss. 1980) ("The rules applicable to the
construction of written contracts in general are
to be applied in construing a postnuptial agreement."); Bosone v. Bosone, 53 Wash.App. 614,
768 P.2d 1022, 1024-25 (1989) ("a community
property agreement is a contract, and effect
should be given to the clearly expressed intent
of the parties").
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or in existence or to be acquired or created in the future.
3. Hereafter, and until this agreement is modified in writing attached
hereto, all property, real, personal and
mixed, acquired by either party in his or
her sole name, from whatever source derived and wherever situated, shall be the
sole and separate property of such person, notwithstanding any law, statute
or court decision giving presumptive
effect to the status of marriage; and
such property shall be free of all claims,
demand or liens of the other, direct or
indirect, and however derived.
This postnuptial agreement provides that
Husband and Wife's property will be divided and the division will control for all purposes. The agreement was entered into in
a community property state and the contractual language unambiguously and specifically refers to rebutting the presumption that all property acquired during the
marriage is community property.
The trial court did not expressly conclude
that the 1973 property agreement was ambiguous, but nevertheless proceeded to
take extrinsic evidence5 as to the parties'
intentions and, based upon this controverted extrinsic evidence, concluded that the
5. "Resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties'
intent is permissible only if the contract document appears to express the parties' agreement
incompletely or if it is ambiguous in expressing
that agreement." Neilson, 780 P.2d at 1267; see
also Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah
1982) (only when an ambiguity exists which
cannot be reconciled by an objective and reasonable interpretation of the agreement as a
whole should the court resort to evidence beyond the four corners of the agreement).
6. Husband argues on appeal that even if we find
the trial court erred when it found the 1973
agreement was not intended to apply in the
event of a divorce, the error was harmless because of the broad equitable powers trial courts
possess in domestic matters. See Colman v.
Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
However, even if a trial court has the equitable
power to disregard an otherwise enforceable
postnuptial property settlement agreement and
to distribute the separate property of the spouses, the circumstances must be unique and compelling to justify the application of such an

parties did not intend the 1973 agreement
to apply in the event of divorce.
The threshold determination of whether
a writing is ambiguous is a question of law,
Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at 895;
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,
1293 (Utah 1983); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60-31 (Ct.App.1990),
and thus we review a trial court's determination under a correction-of-error standard,
according no particular deference to the
trial court. Id.; see also Seashores Inc. v.
Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah CtApp.
1987).
We find this postnuptial agreement unambiguously provides that it will apply to a
disposition of the parties' property in the
event of divorce.8 Thus, we reverse the
trial court's contrary ruling which was
based upon extrinsic evidence as to what
Husband and Wife intended by their 1973
agreement
In summary, we reverse the trial court's
property distribution and remand for enforcement of the 1973 postnuptial property
agreement and then the division of the
remaining property, if any, not controlled
by it. Because we reverse and remand the
property division, we also reverse and remand on the issue of alimony. We believe
our decision necessitates the reconsideration of whether either Husband or Wife
exception. The trial court made no findings to
delineate what it found as compelling circumstances to justify such an action and we find
none.
In support of his argument, Husband claims
that Utah courts have distributed premarital,
gift or inheritance property of one spouse to the
other spouse. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369,
1373 (Utah 1988); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133,
135 (Utah 1987); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d
1144, 1147-48 (Utah Ct.App.1988); Peterson v.
Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, 595-96 (Utah Ct.App.
1988). We find these cases clearly distinguishable as they do not involve an otherwise enforceable prenupuai ^r postnuptial agreement.
Husband also argues that Utah courts may
refuse to apply property settlement agreements
in a divorce action. See Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d
472, 476 (Utah 1975); Colman v. Colman, 743
P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct.App.1987). Again, these
cases do not deal with postnuptial property settlement agreements not in contemplation of divorce and are otherwise factuallv distinguishable.
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should receive alimony.7
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.
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JACOBSEN, MORRIN & ROBBINS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL BOARD
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 890468-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 28, 1990.
General contractor brought suit
against high school board for balance due
on a construction contact. The Second District Court, Weber County, John F. Wahlquist, J., awarded, inter alia, judgment to
the contractor and denied the board's counterclaim seeking recovery premised on alleged fact that construction "deadlines"
were not met. Board appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Bench, J., held that the board's
appeal was moot due to the board's paying
of judgment and mailing of satisfaction of
judgment to contractor, and fact that appeal did not involve claims separate and
distinct from those involved in satisfaction
of judgment.
Appeal dismissed.
Appeal and Error <$=>781(7)
School board's appeal of judgment entered in favor of general contractor on a
construction contract with board was
"moot" due to board's payment of judg7. We need not consider the issue of whether the
trial court was biased against Wife as we have
reversed the trial court's property distribution
on other grounds.

ment and mailing satisfaction of judgment
to contractor for execution which did not
evidence an intent to appeal, where appeal
did not involve a claim separate and distinct
from those involved in satisfaction of judgment, and board's counterclaim seeking recovery for alleged breach of contractor's
duties under contract was not a separate
and distinct controversy.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Edward J. McDonough, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant
Michael Wilkins and Kendall S. Peterson,
Tibbals, Howell, Moxley & Wilkins, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, GARFF, and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff general contractor sued defendant high school board for the balance due
on a construction contract. The district
court awarded judgment to plaintiff and
denied defendant's counterclaim. We dismiss defendant's appeal as moot.
In July 1984, defendant St. Joseph High
School Board of Financial Trustees ("high
school") executed a written contract with
plaintiff Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Construction Company ("contractor")l for construction work on St. Joseph High School
in Ogden, Utah. Two separate projects
were encompassed by the contract—the remodeling of a gymnasium and locker
rooms, and the addition of a classroom and
library.
Using a standard form contract published by the American Institute of Architects,
high school agreed to pay contractor the
total cost of construction plus a five-percent supervision fee. No firm costs were
established in the contract, although "bud1. Now doing business as Jacobsen-Robbins
Construction Company.
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S. REX LEWIS (1953), for:
HOWARD, LEWS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

Our File No. 17,603

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,

:
:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
:

vs.

DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.
LISA ASTON and ERIC
ASTON,

:

Civil No. CV 86 1124

:
:

Judge Boyd L. Park

Co-defendants.
This matter came on duly and regularly for trial before the above-entitled Court
sitting without a jury, on April 18, 1988, through April 21, 1988.

The plaintiff

appeared in person and was represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis
& Petersen.

The defendant and the co-defendants appeared in person and were

represented by their counsel, Brian C. Harrison and Don Mullen.

The parties were

sworn and testified, other witnesses for the parties were sworn and testified, and the
Court received in evidence Exhibit Nos. 1 through 31, 32b-k, 35 to 41, 43 to 45, 47 to
51, 53, 55 to 83, 85 to 88, 91, 92, 94 to 98, 101 to 108a, 109a, 109b, 110 to 128, 129,

129a, 130, 130a, 131 to 146, 147, 147a, 148 to 149a, 150 to 159, 161 to 163, 165 to 177.
The Court having heard the evidence, examined the exhibits, having subsequently met
with counsel, and having ruled on subsequent motions and having made its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the

defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, to become final on the signing and entry of the Decree.
2.

The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, is awarded a Decree of Divorce from

the plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, to become final on the signing and entry of the Decree.
3.

The agreement entered into between Bruno D'Aston and Dorothy D'Aston

in March of 1973 is null and void and is not a binding agreement for estate distribution between the parties.
4.

The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, is awarded as her sole and separate

property the following:
a.

The residence of the parties situated in Provo, Utah County,

State of Utah, and described as follows:
All of Lots 40 and 41, Plat "C Evening Glow Subdivision,
Provo, Utah County, Utah according to the official plat
on file in the office of the Recorder, Utah County, Utah.
Together with the improvements thereon and all built-in appliances.
b.

One-half of the furniture, furnishings, appliances (not built-in)

and one-half of all art objects, silverware, bedding, etc. to be agreed upon by the
parties or in the event of no agreement, then two lists will be made of equal value by
the plaintiff and the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, will have the right to choose which
2

list of property she wants. (A copy of exhibit 11 is attached hereto and make a part
hereof by reference as though it were fully herein set forth).
c.

Jewelry as listed on exhibit no. 17.

d.

Cash as follows:

Cash put aside for payment of judgment

$ 75,000.00

Savings account

34,000.00

Checking account

26,000.00

Diamonds

86,000.00

Silver bullion

7,600.00

Cash from the 5300,000 in savings
box in the sum of

63.200.00

Total cash, diamonds and silver
bullion, excluding 575,000.00
for payment of judgment

5236,800.00

e.

1985 Mercury automobile.

f.

One-half

of all jewelry, stamps, books, silver and paintings

(which are not a part of the household art objects described in exhibit no. 14. A copy
of exhibit 14 is attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference as though it were
fully herein set forth).
g.

125 - 520.00 gold St. Gaudens and 562,099.00 of the cash from

exhibit 17 when this property is located. A copy of exhibit 17 is attached hereto and
by reference made a part hereof as though it were fully herein set forth.
h.

30% of value of all coins alleged to have been stolen and listed

in exhibit nos. 22 and 23. Copies of exhibit nos. 22 and 23 are attached hereto and by
reference made a part hereof as though they were fully herein set forth.
3

5.

The plaintiff,

Bruno D'Aston, is awarded the following

described

property:
a.

Vacant lot situated in Provo, Utah County, State of Utah,

described as follows:
Lot 17, Sec. A, Oak Cliff Planned Dwelling Group
Subdivision, Provo, Utah County, Utah, according to the
official plat recorded in the office of the Utah County
Recorder, Utah County, Utah.
b.

One-half of ail the furniture, furnishings and appliances (not

built-in) and one-half of all art objects, silverware, utensils, bedding, etc. to be
divided as provided in the above paragraph 4b.
c.

Cash in the sum of 5236,800.00 from the 5300,000.00 in the safe

deposit box which the defendant Dorothy D'Aston is ordered to forthwith deliver to
the Clerk of the Court for delivery to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney.
d.

Motor home and Volkswagen automobile.

e.

All of the property acquired by the plaintiff

prior to the

marriage as described in exhibit no. 8. A copy of exhibit no. 8 is attached hereto and
made a part hereof by reference as though it were fully herein set forth.
f.

All optical equipment as described on exhibit nos. 12 and 13.

Copies of exhibit nos. 12 and 13 are attached hereto and made a part hereof by
reference as though they were fully herein set forth.
g.

One-half

of all jewelry, stamps, books, silver and paintings

(which are not part of the household art objects), all of which are described in exhibit
no. 14.

4

h.

All the consigned coins described in exhibit no. 24.

Plaintiff is

obligated for the debt of the consignment. A copy of exhibit no. 24 is attached hereto
and made a part hereof by reference as though it were fully herein set forth.
i.

125 • S20.00 gold St. Gaudens and 562,099.00 of the cash from

exhibit no. 17, when this property is located.
j.

All patents and patent rights.

k.

70% of value of all coins alleged to have been stolen as listed in

exhibit nos. 22 and 23.
6.

In the event the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are

found to be in the possession of the defendants, Dorothy D'Aston and/or Eric Aston, it
should be considered as a contempt of court and punished as such.
In the event the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are found to
be in the possession of the plaintiff, it should be considered as a contempt of court
and punished as such.
7.

The co-defendant Eric Aston is awarded the gun that is being held by

Utah County Constable, Anthony R. Fernlund.
8.

The defendant, Dorothy D* Aston, is not awarded any alimony from the

plaintiff.
9.

The plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, is not awarded any alimony from the

defendant, Dorothy D*Aston.
10.

Each party is ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and court costs.

5

DATED this X5^dav of

}(/%r<tr*&tU

1 988.

BOYETL PARK "'
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS'TO ?ORMx^

*'S. REX LEWIS?ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff

£

BRIAN C HARRISON, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant, Dorothy D'Aston,
and Co-defendants, Eric Aston and Lisa Aston

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand
delivered to the following this

day of

, 1988.

Brian C. Harrison, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
3325 North University Avenue
Suite 200, Jamestown Square
Provo, Utah 84604
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AMERICAN CAUErtA EXCHANGE
615 South S p r i n g S t r e e t
Los A n - e U a • CA
90014
Tel,
627-3678

Invoice

B30142
S
#

i

0

'

Cu$Jome»'$ Order

AS t O D

Du/e

4-5-72

Aston Laboratories
230 So. 9 t h Ave.
City of Industry, Cali f.

QAff SHtPPfQ

^-5-72

Nut 30

T

;Rudy RuncjL-

40mm Distagon f . 4 lens /'/4970779
Luna P r o . Meter 7V566103
Lens shade 40
Linhof Nuline 2 Tripod
Minox Case S cord used

817!. 60
72. 00
24. 96
92 .no
-1 .50

I
1

',0iii

50 .55
f

« . Mil • • • , •»

, UD li. O

Redtfprm
7S

730
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*J3 * M * 1 I ft^rlac t t r w t
U a A f « * U s , Ct
900M
?»L. fcZF-54.78

Do*

4-5-72

o
•

Aston Laboratories
.230 So. 9th Ave.
° City of Industry, Calif.
T

0
U f f V«**€D

5H»»tD VtA

TERMS

FOI

Net 30

*=*2
1
1
1

SAIESMAN

Rudy Runge

Lelca Sumilax
lens #2^18231
Lens Cap
Lens Ser. 8 f I I t e r
Tax

Form

730

INVOICE

Exhibit 13 - Page 3 of 26

256 .80
2 ,kO
16 tBO
Z76 rOTT
13 180 1
'£2H§ rBU<V

A8S3ICA3 C.V42HA EXCHAW3E
615 South Spring S t r e e t
Los A n g e l e s , CA
90014
Tai.
627-5678

Invoice B

L
D
T
O

Date

Customer's Order

30327
s
0

Aston Laboratories Inc.

230 9th Ave.
City of Industry, Calif.

91746

4-18-72

S
H
I
P
P
E
0
T
O

OAtE SHIPPED

*M8-72

SHtPPEO V U

Met 30

Rudyqftungc

3ig .80
.80

Super Angulon 21wn f 3.2 #2^73283
21mm Finder
Lens Case

d .60

Tot720"
Tax
UPS

20 .16

73^

L00

152"£36

Radrform
7S 730

INVOICE
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AaERICA^ CAUERA EXCHANGE
615 South Spring S t r e e t
Las AngeLea, CA
90014
Tel* 627-5678

B 30228

Customer's O r d e r

^ j -#

Dote

AStOn

s

0
I
0

Aston Laboratories
230 9th Ave.
City of Industry, C a l i f .

T
O

limJmJ2

H
I
P
9
E
0

917^6

T
O
I S H»PP€D

'-72

SHIPPED VIA

UBS

6
20
20
10

IE9MS

FOB.

Metl^O

SALESMAN

Rudy Runge

Prism. Finder HC-1
Hassel. T r i p o d Coup l i n e
Haasel. 21 Ex. Tube
Minox Right angle f i n d e r
Color f i l m
TX f i l m 120
EX 120
£X 120
Hassel. & Lash holder
Safe lock copy stand s t
Hinox TX
Linhof Cable
Lelca Book
(paid)
1

INVOICE

Exhibit 13 - Page 5 of 26

.*?»

UPS
7TQX

221 .60
)k .72
kk .32
6 .20
2 .95
3 .8k
21 *60
20 Loo
10 .08
22 -00
26 .50
10 .50
n
"TioA"llT
1L-5fi

jftoii .81

LS-3
1

AMERICA%I CA'lEBA EXCHAaG'
615 South Spring S t r e e t
Los A n g a l e s , CA
90014
T o l . 6^7-5678

yjL

*<lft

Invoice

B 30485

Date 4 - 2 4 - 7 2

Customer's Order

s

o

Aston Laboratories
230 9th Ave.
City of Industry, CA.

I
0

T
O

9 »746
T
O

O A T E SHIPPED

A-2W2
1
1
6
1
1
1

SHIPPED VIA

TERMS

P OB

Net 30
1
1
6
1
1
1

SALESM A N

Rurfv Ri

nop

Graphic View
#7327504
Cable release
Gra€i4x Holders
4x5' Tx 4164 F i l m
Kodak Focusing c l o t h
Carrying Bag

455 .00
4 50
24 ,00
3 65

If

Tax

Rcdifprm
7S 730

INVOICE
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^99.
2k.
$527, tt

V

AUERICAIl CAMERA EXCHANGE

6 i 5 South Spring S t r e « t
Loa A n g i l e 3 , CA
90014
T e l . 6 27-5678

oie.

B

Customer's Order

3095O
O
i
0
T
0

Date

s

5-9-72

H
I
P
P

Aston Laboratories
230 West 9th Ave.
City of Industry, CA.

e
o
T

o
DATE SHIPPED

5-9-72
1
1
1

J
1
1

SHIPPED VIA

TERMS

FOB.

Net 30

SALESMAN

Rudy Runge

179.195
331 Joo
U2S

Swift Zoom Spotting Scope
Hasselblad Body only # 1 1 9 W
Back cover
Less
Tax

1

(ifprm
; 730

1

1
55 Tube exchange a t no. char<ge.

INVOICE
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5I3.I2U
102 J6i4
20J53

$ A 3 1 . 09

KZSRICAi: CAtfEBA SXCHAHG2
615 South Spring S t r e e t
Los A n g a l a s , CA
90014
T e U 627-5678

>*• B 32175

Customer's Order M r .

AstOH

S

? • Aston Laboratories
D
230 9th Avenue
T
City of Industry, CA.

917^6

Dote 5 - 2 5 - 7 2
s
H
I
P
P
E
0

r
o
DATE SHIPPED

[-25,-72
1

SHIPPED V I A

UPS

SALESMAN

J»0223 Bellows Extension
5050^4 Shade f o r Bellows

difprm
» 730

Rudv Runge

Net W

191
extension

INVOICE
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20
152

Tax

12109

UPS

_ 170
$25^151

ASSaiCAJf CAHESA EXCHANGE
615 South Spring S t r e e t
Lo3 A n g e l e s , CA
90014
T » l . 627-5678

B

32231
S
O
I
0
T
O

Date 5 - 3 0 - 7 2
s

Customer's O r d e r

H
I
P
P
E
0

Aston Laboratories
230 So. 9th AveCity of Industry, CA*

T
0
A re SHIPPED

-n

SHIPPEO

v u

TERMS

SAIESMAN

FOB.

Net 30

Rudv Runqe
250 00
1 07
249 50
135 50
20100
262100
2k 00
12100

60mn Dlstagon used #2679051
Ex 130
Leica M3 used #1155019
50mm Suralcron #1568527
Used Camera Case
Leica M3 Used #807246
Used meter
Used case
5% Tax

jrm

30

INVOICE
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47I70
$1,001 .77

JMl£2rCA3 CAMERA EICHAHGE
615 South Spring S t r e e t
Los Arise Las, CA
90014
Tel.
627-5678

•to B 32243
s
o

Oof 5-30-72

Customer's Order

Aston Laboratories
230 9th Ave.
Cltyof Industry, CA,

I
D
T
O

T
O
DATE SHIPPED

5-30-72
1
1
1
20
20
2

1
1
1
20
20
2

SHIPPED VIA

TERMS

FOB

Net 30

SALESMAN

Rudy Runqe

Trfpod 1A100
1 Ax 119 tfjipod head
1*4x168 tripod head
K-N 36 exp.
EX"T6 exp/
39E fii Iters

2. 39
2. 6k
Tax

12l00
12L20
211.60
J» 7L80
52.80
19L20

—rstra
517381.28
.88

iiform
> 730

INVOICE
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AaERICAM CAMERA EXCHAHC2
615 South S p r i n g S t r e e t
L03 A n g a l e a , CA
90014
T « l . 627-5b78

>ic. B 32702

Customer's Order

Date 6-J 6-72

S

s

? •Aston Laboratories Inc.
o 230 9th Ave.
T City of Industry, CA# 917W

H
I
P
?

DATg SHIPPED

6-16-72

SHIPPED VIA

E
0
T
O
SALESMAN

TERMS

Net 30

Rudv Runoe

Microscope adapter
250nro f . l Sonnar #589723
Knob r i n g

FI Itn cutter
Film screen adapter
Hasselblad lent film adapter
Tax

00
295, 00
3, 85
5, 00
25, 00
23. 16
392i0I
19JS0
S4 I U 61

ifprm
730

INVOICE
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A2ERICAM CAAERA EXCHAtfGZ
615 South Spring S t r e e t
Los Angalaa, CA
90014
T « l . 627-5678

>fc. B 3 3 H 6

s

0
I
0

Aston Laboratories
230 9 t h Ave.

T

City of Industry, CA.

0

Dofe 6-28-72

Customer's Order

H
I
P
P
£
0

Inc*

917^6

T

0
PATE SHIPPED

6-28-72

SHIPPED

vu

SALESMAN

TERMS

Net 30

Rudy Run.ge
50H 60
27 60
10 00
92 00
160
"PHTTHO"

telca M5 #1291385
M5 Case #145*1
Rol1 studio paper
Mayflower skope
Viewer

Tax

todifprm
7S 730

INVOICE
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3212k

$67? oA

A3E8ICAM ZMZRA EXCHANGE
o l 5 South Spring S t r e e t
Los A n g e l e s , CA
900i4
T « l . .6^7-5678

B32693

Customer's Order

Dote 6-15-72
s

•Aston Laboratories Inc.
o 230 9th Ave*
T
City of Industry, CA. 917^$
L

H
I

P
P
£
0
T
O

DATE SHIPPED

SHIPPED V I A

S-TS-72
J

1
3
2
2
!

Ji££.

SALESMAN

TgPMS

Net ?0

Rudy Runge

Hasselblad 500 EL -M body # 16099 w/70mm
magazine # 304462
Magnifier hood
Sets of film magazines
Mask for SWC finder
59021 70mm negative files
35mm conversion kit for prints projector

oo
60
00
56
351 52

694
72
24
\k\

Tax
UPS

•form

730

INVOICE
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n/cl
TOTj 35"
42 I03
THHItTT

EHICAN CAUERA EXCHANGE

bl5 South Spring S t r e e t
Los hnzzUs,
CA
90014
T«l.
b27-5b78

B 32699

Dote 6-16-72

Customer's Order

s
0

-Aston Laboratories inc.
230 9th Ave.
City of Industry, CA. 917^6

I
0

T
O

f

o
TE SHIPPED

SHIPPED VIA

-16-72
1
1
6
1
6
6
1
1

UPS

TERMS

F O.8.

Wet 30

S*1ES«A*N

Rudy Runge

Mlnox tripod
FI*ah
Dozenbbubes
Minon B v e r a used # 651117
Mlnox color 36 exposures
TX 135-2.6 exposures
HasseIbTad lOOf camera # CT22836 mag,azine
#CT31352 80nro Tessar # 1337962
Ser. 7 f i l t e r

1 .10

280 ,00
5 -££

Tax

ifprm
730

INVOICE
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26. 00
18. 00
5. 9^
119. 95
\k, 58
6. 60

T7b 37

23 44
"$5W T&

AVESICAS cASERA excoAws*
615 South Zpring S t r e e t
Los Ao^elea, CA
90014
Tel.
627-5678

Dote

Customer's Ordtr

c«B 3 2 4 1 1
s
o

6-5-72

Aston L a b o r a t o r i e s
230 N i n t h Ave.
C i t y of I n d u s t r y , CA,

I
0
T

o

I
0
>ATE SHIPPED

SHIPPED

UPS

•5-72

1
1
I

vu

TERMS

FOB

Net 30

SALESMAN

Rudy Runge

Professional lens shade
Exackta case
(used)
Hasselblad SWC complete with view finder

61 .20
9 .00
832 .00

$ML20

Tax
Ups

Camera #9997
Lens
#^9583^5
magazine #1780A9

arm

no

INVOICE
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A5L11
1L 50
$$A8 .81

AUEItlCAtf CAaERA EXCHANGE
615 South S p r i n s S t r e a t
L03 A n g e l e s , CA
90014
Tal.
627-5678

B 33291

Date 7 - 5 - 7 2

Customer's Order

S

O
I
0

Aston Laboratories lnc<
230 9th Ave.

T
0

C i t y of I n d u s t r y , CA.
T
0

kit

SHIPPED

SHIPPED V I A

-5-72

UPS
1

TERMS

SALESMAN

f O.B.

Net 30

Rudy Runge

K31B SB Complete o u t f i t w/barn doors

215 ,00
Tax
Ups

difprm
5 730

172. 00
8J 60
186«"65
1. 00
$ 1 8 1 , CT

INVOICE
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5

A: .ICAit CAMERA EXCHANGE
615 South S p r i n g S t r e e t
U a A n g e l e s , CA
90014
Tel.
627-5678

»B kk0k6

Customer's Order

Dote 7 - 2 - 7 3
s

o
I
0
T

H
I
P
P
E
0

Aston L a b o r a t o r i e s I n c .
2 3 0 S o , 9 t h Ave.
C i t y of i n d u s t r y , CA. 917^6

o

T
O
SHIPPED v u

VE SHIP»€D

li23

UPS

1
!

1
1
1
5
5
1
1

TERMS

f.08.

Net 30

SALESMAN

Rudv Runae

P o l a r o i d SX 70
SX 70 Case
Close up attachment
Acces. shoe
Tripod mount
Color fdlm
Fteh bars
Lens shade
Shutter cord

6. 90
2. 77

180. DO
13.05
7.D5
5.B5
6.B5
3^-50
13.B5

2.fe5

5 .g5
272.PS
Less
Tax
UPS

5A.So

2 1 7 . P^
13. 06
2 . 50

$233'.fc 1

INVOICE
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AaSWCA!! CAJESA EXCHANGE
615 South Spring S t r e e t
Los A n g e l a s , CA
90014
Tel.
627-5673

Customer's Order
voic B 33891
s
O
I
Aston L a b o r a t o r i e s i n c .
0
230 9th Ave*
T
City of I n d u s t r y , CA*
O

Date 7 - 2 1 - 7 2

0
DATE SHIPPED

SWPPFO V I A

TERMS

7-21 - 7 5

UPS

1
1

Letca MA camera # 1267792
MRA Meter
#28135

1
1

f.O.S.

Net- 30

SALESMAN

RuHv Riinnp

360.00

ss.bo

Tax
UPS

A 15.120

20J76
5^35. S6
1 . 50

$A37. A5

Rcdiform

7S 730

INVOICE
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SO

AUESXCAH CA2ERA EZCHAHGE
615 South Spring S t r d a t
Los A n g e l a s , CA
90014
Tel.
627*5678

13030

Date

Customer's Order

S
0

i
0

Dr. Brunna D. Aston
U 2 1 1 Skyline Drive
Hacienda Heights, Calif. 917^5
Aston Laboratory, Inc.

T
O

SHIPPED VIA

>T£ SHIPPED

TEPMS

I

o
SAIESMAN

f O B.

Rudy

Net.30
1
1
1

August k, 1975

S
H
I
p
p
E
0

50mm Elmar Lens #905301 F3. 5
Lens Cap
Case

69 95
i». .60

k\150
79 :o'5
6% Sales Tax

J»

lh

b3 "79 "

30

INVOICE

ak ( 5 0 Mts) 7 P 7 3 0
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AMERICAN CAIIEHA EXCHAHG*

615 South Sprlag Street
Los Angeles, CA 90014
TaL. 627-5678

»voic.B 35383
s
o

Dot.8-11-72

Customer's Order

s

Aston Laboratories
230 9 t h Ave.
City of Industry, CA.

L
D
T
O

H
I
P
9
E
0
T
O

DATE SHIPPED

8-11-72
1
1
1

1
1
1

SHIPPED VIA

/TERMS

SAIE5MAN

F.O.B.

Net 30

*udy Runge

W. 50

Real cord for 500EL camera
Haneblad 1000F combination case
Ne* York BSW p r i n t

53, 50

kl. 150
Tax

Redifprm
7S 730

INVOICE

Exhibit 13 - Page 20 of 26

1^50
7J28
$152. 75

AMERICAN CAMERA EXCHAHCE
615 Sooth Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA
90014

oce B 3464*6
s
o
I
0
T

Dot. 8-16-72

Customer's Order

Aston Laboratories t n c .
230 9th Ave.
City of Industry> CA.

o
T
0
SHIPPED VIA

DATE SHIPPED

TERMS

F.0.8.

Net 30

•16-72
2
1

SALESMAN

Rudy Runge

14823 Cases
AC Adapter
Tax

dtfprm
5 730

86.
25.
IN.
5.
$116.

kO
00
AO
57

97

INVOICE
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50

ASSSICAN CAMERA EXCHABGS
615 South Spring S t r a e t
Los A n g e l e s , CA
90014
T « l . 627-5678
Invoice B 3 4 6 4 9

Dot .

Customer's Order

S

o

Aston Laboratories

L

230 9th Ave.

D
T
O

H
I
P
P
£
0
T
O

SHIPPED VIA

TERMS

F 0.8.

Pet 30

B-l$-72

1
1
1
2

T
1
1
2

inc.

City of Industry, CA*

Q A T E SHIPPED

8-16-72

s

SALESMAN

Rudy Runge

Leica 3G Camera #948254
Elraar 50nw f 2.8 #1575322
Case
Chains

2. 80
Tax

Rediform

7S 730

26a .69
lol 00
5 .60
"T75i TSo"
13i

12H§

INVOICE
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5

FINE

PHOTOGB'

'C

EQUIPMENT

B 31096

1

«

'1 EXCHMGE
615 SOUTH SPRING STREET

a^OH^JDU.;

LOS ANGELES. CALIF. 90014
PHONE 627-5678

I

"LOOK FOR THE BIG "A" ON SPRING STREET"

*=>v s-*C

NAME.

L h r\

•V^)-H;
^

CUSIOMCR

fP H O N E

STREET.
HOW SHIPPED

CITY

STATE

otrnpT

CASH

1

C.0.0

I CHAR<*£ L O N ACCT i WILL CALcJMOSE. RETD

CUST. O R O E R f

PRICE

DESCRIPTION

QUAN.

A. <AC^h

V^NWJ»^1.Q

VfatL
\

^ <i

AMOUNT

1(^~

m

i

h O fr\

isnft

^-n

^7

Title to the above described Equipment shall not pass from Amencon Camera
Exchange io the Purcnoser and Amtricon Com«ra Eichonge retains a secunty
interest (herein until the entire indebtedness evidenced by ihtt agreement is
poid in lull.
NOTICE See reverse side and accompanying statement lor important intormotion. in consideiuhon oi the extension oi credit lor purchases made bv me
ami in worraniy IIKJI any goods described herein ore to be used primarily
for persunoi. family ond household purposes unless otherwise specified here,
I aijree to the terms above and on the reverse hereol.

CUSIOMER'S

SiGNAlURE

|kink.(.(ou

<Bt
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AMERICAN CAHERA EXCHA2C*.
615 South S p r i n g Sfcraat
Los A a g e l e s , CA
90014
T « l . 627-5678

invoice

DtJ„

Customer's Order

B 35797
s

f .Aston Laboratories Inc.
o 230 9th Ave.
T City of Industry, CA. 917^6
DATE SHIPPED

9-26-72
1
2
1
1

1
2
1
1

SHIPPED VIA

9-26-72

S
H
I
9
P
E
0
T
O
SALESMAN

FOB.

TERMS

Rudy Runoe

Net 30
Studlomatlc 1 Stand #105-133
Camera Mt. Brkt. #105136
Med. C t r * g t . #105-138
Prec. T l l t t o p 1! #105357

Tax
Shipping charge
from Germany

Rediform

7S 730

INVOICE

E x h i b i t 13 - Page 24 of 26

829. 35
U7
B7«. 32
39. 27
$910. 39

b l i :>e\lth 5p^- : .:i^
i,ca A n . j s l a s ,
CA
Tel.
627-S67iS

>i« B A6482

iti^at
90014

Dot.

Customer's Order

9-7-73

S
H
I
P
P
E
D

s

i * Aston Laboratories inc.
230 S. flth Ave.
£
City of Industry, CA. 917^6
0

T
O
DATS SHIPPED

SHIPPED V I A

Net 30

9-7-7?
Z
6

F.O.B.

1
Z
6

SALESMAN

Rudy Runce
323.00

Used R o l l e i f l e x 2.8 camera #1623515
Camera Case
CX 120

am

tax
Trade-in f i l m

Sl.9*«
9*
19. 06

"So"

T3oT Jii
34

ifprm
730
• l"ok (50 Mtti 7P730

INVOICE
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ASEBXCA3 CAMERA EXCHANGE;

615 South Spring S t r e e t
Lod A n g e l e s , CA
90014
T e l . 627-5678

Invoke B 3 5 2 6 0

Da.. 9-7-72

Customer's Order

S

s

Aston Laboratories Inc*
230 9th Ave.
City of I n d u s t r y , CA,

I
0
T
O

H
I
P
P

E
0
T
O

SHIPPED VIA

OATE SHIPPED

UPS

9-7-72
1
1

1
1

TERMS

P.O.B.

Net 30

SALESMAN

!

Rudy Runge

Lelca 59nwn f i n d e r
Lelca 35nrcn f i n d e r
Tax
UPS

3 1 . 20
* 5 . 60
7b. "83
3 . 8k
• 60

$81. 24

R«difprm
7S 730

INVOICE
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I,

OD

- #!£
0rt£
CMS

one.

ft

jj .

iz.

»

+*
A

IHK

__.

1$K

/ +u

k

^-HAiu kMK

3.*«* l.zso7S0-

k

M% _- w,U >Zk *... .«

?**-

one

2.TOO

OstE

S.°o°

<PK€TWO,
—

IOO-1>U(-*

Two

Hi&H4rttf

04u

PQIHT-IM6-%—
10.000
10. oe><3

IQO&D

tf#££S779HfS

\JS00
O«oeo
2^.00 0

CeuJ&ioft &jV#/Z(/?ftp!>£.C£L4(Jf
c*LL€cri9*i rtftzoUi<z-'8oGtL*J2iZ ro /fOf

SxOOO

lZ-Soo

Exhibit 14

Slr,IHWESTEHN GOLD COS
CITY CSNTSE 3UILDINC*

r*
^/C
/7

AT,/
£0-

6400 UPTOWN BOULEVARD, SUITE 403-S
AL3UGUERCUE. NEW MEXICO 37110

I

r*JU-~~

TELEPHONES: (505) 331-3535 • 1-aQQ-545-o575
MAiUNG A QQRESS: P.O. SOX 9083 AJi^^ ALBUQUERQUE SM 37113
SILL TO:

Rare Cain ufe:

S/sm .

Bullion LJ

Date

DaX8 PtitfwrtJ
Co«om«f N
Aaar

9/Z5/3Z

TERMS

"7^<D. 72r,s #10

W^
I j

Ctv

PURCHASE

P*on«

Show CI
QUANTTTY
too ma

Inventory
Numor

Offica
Unit

G3A06

DESCRIPTION

TOTAL
•AMOUNT

TZiSfe

h ^ £ SH-r £^rW<=>
^?fTnl 2571

?%7^

£?y?

CVitt*, T > \ w , i

?/?*&

tITPi

ITS, by. QVr7^ a ^ s F "
'ff^Qfffaj'
^7^1

SP SC'A L

INSTRUCTIONS

SUB TOTAL
TAX

TTTLE DCES NOT PASS UNTIL MERCHANDISE IS PAIO FOR IN FU

mirtfi *
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250729132250-00

300000-00 +
6304-73 +
2750-00 +
003
309054-73

*

309054-73
132250-00
2606-00

+
-

T24T98-73

*

999
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HENSEL INVESTMENT, INC,

OAl EWOOD DOWNS
APARIMEN1S
.»s time* tn
i »-A¥»H i n

I I I W P O M O N A OLVD. -

f WNOPHNO-'

M O t l f E H E Y PARK. C A l IF 0 1 7 6 4 - ( 2 1 3 ) 7 2 0 2 1 0 0

NAME OF VENnOH-

,

DATE

or

ll-MJi I l - S U O
• IF. t O W

\m

VOICfcOAU

SIMMONS
APARTMENTS

D*

Vs) (WtOr^

I T)o«-of|l.|

lUMHtF^nENC&ANPM^MPl

INVOICE NO I

IM^

L a ^ o cD>

$ AMOUNT;

OISCPUN?'-

• I CHECKN

BAMNC&

'• '

»'l
Hi

ft j

^lj
I I

n»{

*•!

HENSEL INVESTMENT, INC.

"l

I I I W P O M O N A 01.VU. -

H,|

M O I J I E I I E Y PAI1K. CALIF. 0 1 7 6 4

P H O N E - | 2 I 3 > 7 2 8 - 2 100 __
/
DATE

OALEWOOD DOWNS APARTMENTS
SIMMONS APARTMENTS

l/lf^J

fr

CHECK

*-~f

CALIFORNIA FIRST BANK

MOMlEBEUOOFfiCfc
050 l l o d h WIICOM Av«nu«. MonUballo. C»lllo»nU 900*40

16-49/122!

PAY
EXACTLY T I U A ^
1

))u^o/i^o

7

DOLLANS AND

}\L>0«>/)A>P

si

^>Op/?OD.b-,-L

r
MGNSEL
I E N S E L IIN
N V E S ]J M E N . I N C

<u TV }Um

.
jOtf

*

PAY
l O 1Mb*
ORDER OF

»\s8

:sNia

labial)K.0l)l^l
II *j '-)' - ^)\^>l_

i

I

D/KJ

l

_

_

I

2&JLZ1&*IAJL
QEonae ii. H E N S E L • pnesioENF

•*4 |

I

3 LISTED
'LOW

•*

-•"ijnnr

tft*Ml«€BB«gfl*T«CWP

>

ST/***

•zT0rt/f
/,

Wi*

^ . // >

/) 'dzn^ ^

I TV'

-?, *s2>

/*

I

wcamc

CJ.

-

fit* ^

ggeunvg o*«*ci.

CALIFORNIA SAFETY CENTER, INC.

(21CJ 72S-d*75

111 w. PCJUCNA auva —

(7H» + * O l 3 * 0

>ecx ts

,DcJiroi^nu
if»«BC£ N O

(8121 371-757C
SAM UCRA APART%4g*
( 8 1 3 371^3^6

31754

rVJtfFQFUEllCnJfc

M.flDflW.r^

W6NT 01?
SUSTSD
LOW.
OAIE: I

MONTESST ^AAK. CAUF.

I

I) £<

~ ITEfi»«EFEfiENCHA«IM€aja^

SAMGUMT

nfirj^z'T <3»JY

^

'•

|

tnsccunr

Vf*

£ 3«« 2/•<

7

9/

#7=

for,

*

;

* /

.i»«oonow«3
APARTMENTS

' t-.I« f*

HENSEL INVESTMENT, INC.
111 W. PCMCNA aLYO. -

;

MCNTSHcT ?A*K. CAUF. 91734 - ( T I 3 1 728-2100

j

^- -^
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^^r-'bi- ^7 - ?a^e ^ of
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4
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W^"

j.POO
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a
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THE OREGON MINT
POST OFFICE BOX 89
UMPQUA, OREGON 97436
(503)672-0157

CONSIGNMENT FORM
The Oregon Mint hereby auchoriz
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The Oregon Mint hereby indemnifies \and holds harmless
the above named for any merchandise*, le*st due Co f ire,
theft, Act of God, or any causes beyond their control.
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OTYOUI

7-/z-r5"

Signature,

, in?•!*€??-— &v

, PHONE NO,

E x h i b i t 24 - ' P a g e 6 c£. 10:-

THE OREGON MINT
POST OFFICE BOX 89
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The Oregon Mint hereby indemnifies and holds harmless
the above named for any merchandise l o s t due to f i r e ,
t h e f t , Act of God, or any causes be^md their control*
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May 7, 1985
Bruno Aston
P.O. Box 1543
Provo, Utah 84603
Dear Bruno:
With the Long Beach Show coming up, I would like the return of some of my dollars
you have on consignment - namely:
1876
1873
1878
1878-^
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1883
1892
1893
1896
1903

Trade !Proif
7 T-Fsather Proof
8 T-Feather
Metric Pattern Proof
Trade Proof
Gem Proof
Proof
Proof
Proof
Proof
Proof
Proof
Proof
S-<MS£ i

Have several people interested,
at other shows.

$

7,500.00
7j500.00
4,200.00
12,500.00
5,500.00
12,000.00
5,100.00
5,600.00
3,250.00
4,500.00
20,000.00
20,000.00
12,000.00
25,000.00

What doesn't move, I will give back to you to show

Thanks for the ones you moved for me in the past.
Sincerely,

Al Schafer
11043 Candor St.
Cerrltos, Cal. 90701

APPENDIX "D"
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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S. REX LEWIS (1953), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

Our File No. 17,603

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.
LISA ASTON and ERIC
ASTON,

:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

Civil No. CV 86 1124

:
:

Judge Boyd L. Park

Co-defendants.
This matter came on duly and regularly for trial before the above-entitled Court
sitting without a jury, on April 18, 1988, through April 21, 1988.

The plaintiff

appeared in person and was represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis
& Petersen.

The defendant and the co-defendants appeared in person and were

represented by their counsel, Brian C. Harrison and Don Mullen.

The parties were

sworn and testified, other witnesses for the parties were sworn and testified, and the
Court received in evidence Exhibit Nos. 1 through 31, 32b-k, 35 to 41, 43 to 45, 47 to
51, 53, 55 to 83, 85 to 88, 91, 92, 94 to 98, 101 to 108a, 109a, 109b, 110 to 128, 129,

129a, 130, 130a, 131 to 146, 147, 147a, 148 to 149a, 150 to 159, 161 to 163, 165 to 177.
The Court having heard the evidence, examined the exhibits, having subsequently met
with counsel, and having ruled on subsequent motions and being fully advised in the
premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, were both residents of

Utah County, State of Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of the
action for divorce herein.
2.

The plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, were married September

22, 1953 in New York City, New York, and have since that time been husband and
wife.

There have been two children born as issue of that marriage, to-wit:

Lisa

Aston and Eric Aston, both of whom are adults.
3.

On April 30, 1986, the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, directed the plaintiff

to leave the home of the parties from which home the plaintiff has been excluded
since that date, all of which treatment was cruel to the plaintiff causing himi great
mental distress.

The plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce from defendant,

Dorothy D'Aston, on the grounds of mental cruelty, the divorce to become final on the
signing and entry of the decree.
4.

The plaintiff has treated the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, cruelly during

the course of the marriage by continued physical and mental abuse, all of which caused
said defendant great mental distress. The defendant is entitled to a decree of divorce
from the plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, the divorce to become final on the
signing and entry of the decree.
2

5.

The plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, have acquired substantial

property during the course of their marriage from the efforts of both parties.

The

plaintiff having worked for others and also established his own businesses, and the
defendant working in the businesses of the plaintiff's from time to time. The plaintiff
brought into the marriage coin and stamp collections and other miscellaneous items
which he has listed in Exhibit No. 8 as having a current fair market value of
5567,700.00.

The defendant contends the plaintiff brought into the marriage .items

having an approximate value of 55,000.00. Because this is a thirty-five year marriage,
and because there is substantial conflicting testimony as to the whereabouts, value and
current existence of this property, the Court will not consider this property separate
and apart from the marital assets.
6./

In March of 1973, the plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, entered

into a Property Settlement Agreement in the State of California.

There is substantial

conflicting testimony and evidence regarding the purpose of said agreement.

Subse-

quent to the date of the agreement, the parties continued their married lives together,
and bought and sold property as though the agreement did not really exist, except that
certain real properties were changed to the name of defendant, Dorothy D'Aston. The
Court finds the said agreement was entered into for the purpose of avoiding possible
creditors claims due to threatened litigation, and was not intended to be a binding
agreement for estate distribution between the married parties.
7.

The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, transferred title to the residence and

one adjoining lot of the parties to defendant Lisa Aston (daughter of the married
parties) (exhibit no. 148). The plaintiff had not concurred in the gift of said premises
3

to Lisa Aston, and Lisa Aston should be ordered to transfer the property back to
Dorothy D'Aston to be dealt with by the Court as marital property.
8.

The plaintiff alleges that he owned a collection of coins, silver and gold

bullion and other valuable items located in his brief cases in his automobile, which
were secured to the automobile by chains and locks, on the morning of April 30, 1986
(exhibit no. 22).

The plaintiff also alleges he owned and stored in his motor home

parked at the residence of the married parties in Provo, Utah an inventory of coins,
stamps, gold and silver bullion, and other valuable items (exhibit no. 23).

Plaintiff

alleges that he further had a consignment from other coin dealers certain coin
collections and gold and silver bullion valued at 5324,238.00 (Exhibit no. 24), which was
located in his motor home and in his automobile.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants, Dorothy D'Aston and his son Eric Aston,
acting concertedly, broke into the motor home on or before April 30, 1986 and took
possession of all the coins, stamps, gold and silver bullion, and other valuable items
(exhibit nos. 23, 24). Plaintiff alleges that Eric Aston, acting in concert with Dorothy
D'Aston, cut the chains and locks on the brief cases in his automobile on April 30,
1986 and took the coin collection and other valuable items from the brief cases
(exhibit nos. 22, 24).

Plaintiff further alleges that Dorothy D'Aston and Eric Aston

still have in their possession the contents allegedly taken from the motor home breakin and the contents from the automobile and brief case break-in.

Plaintiff reported

the alleged theft to the Provo City Police but refused to follow through with the
complaint testifying he could not do this because it was his family.

4

9.

Defendants, Dorothy D'Aston and Eric Aston, admit that plaintiff had a

collection of coins, stamps, silver and gold bullion, and other valuable items, the total
value of which they do not know. Defendants, Dorothy D*Aston and Eric Aston, deny
any knowledge of any consigned merchandise to the plaintiff.

Defendants, Dorothy

D* Aston and Eric Aston, deny they broke into the motor home or the automobile at
any time, and deny they are in possession of the coins, stamps, silver and gold bullion
and other valuable items that plaintiff alleges were stolen.

Said defendants further

allege that the plaintiff is still in possession of these items.
10-

Witnesses for the plaintiff testify that they have seen some of the coins

alleged to have been stolen on or about April 30, 1986 in possession of defendants,
Dorothy D'Aston and Eric Aston, and offered for sale, by them at coin shows subsequent to April 30, 1986.
11.

Witnesses for defendants testify they have seen some of the coins

alleged to have been stolen on or about April 30, 1986 in possession of the plaintiff
and offered by him for sale at coin shows subsequent to April 30, 1986.
12.

The plaintiff and defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, allege they have acquired

during the course of their marriage the following assets, to-wit:

(Dollar amounts

rounded off)

Ex. **
.22

23

Property

Pltf's
Value

Defs*
Value

Possession

(1) Coins stolen
from auto 4/30/86
(alleged by pltf)

51,009,978

Don't
know

Unknown to
the Court

(2) Coins stolen
from motor home on
5

$448,398

Don't
know

Unknown to
the Court

(3) Coin consignment stolen from
auto and motor home
on or about 4/30/86
(alleged by pltf)
$324,238

Don't
know

Unknown to
the Court

(4) List of property
prior to marriage
owned by pltf

$565,700

$5,000
at time
of marriage

Pltf contends
this property
was left in the
home occupied by D.
D'Aston. D. D'Aston
contends the property
is not in the home
and does not know
where the property is.

(5) Optical
equipment

$27,918.87

Don't
know

Same as above

(6) Household
furnishings,
furniture and
appliances

$165,060

$5,000

Dorothy D'Aston

or before 4/30/86
(alleged by pltf)

Pltf contends def D.
D'Aston has this
property - Def D.
D'Aston contends pltf
has this property,
except for jewelry
given to her. The
Court does not know
where this property
is located.

(7) Property
purchased from
payment of $300,000
on sale of Calif.
home (payment of 3rd
trust deed note) and
interest checks of
$2,750 and $6,304
to-wit:
250 - $20.00 gold
St. Gaudens @ $729
each
$182,250
2,606
Jewelry
124.198
Cash
$309,054
Total
(8) Jewelry,
stamps, books

$182,250
2,606
124.198
$309,054
Does not
know

$214,200

6

Pltf contends
this property is

silver, paintings,
(510,000 of
paintings
included in
exhibit 11)
(9) 2nd trust deed
from sale of Calif
home in the amount
of $687,788.42 was
discounted by def and
she received $633,000;
from that amount she
has the following
property:
Cash - safe deposit
box
Cash - put aside for
judgment taken against
defendant
Savings account
Checking account
Diamonds
Silver Bullion

in the home occupied
by def. Def contends
not in home except
for some paintings.

$300,000

D. D'Aston

75,000
34,000
26,000
86,000
7,600

(10) Vehicles
Motor home
VW GTI
1985 Mercury

$20,000
6,000

(11) Patents

No value

(12) Provo home
1171 N. Oakmont
lots 40 & 41 Plat HCn Evening
Glow Subdivision Purchased 3/80 Cost
Remodeling (1980
cost)
Remodeling (i982
cost)

Does not
believe
they exist
except for
some paintings.

D.
D.
D.
D.
D.

D'Aston
D'Aston
D'Aston
D'Aston
D'Aston

$ 8,500

Plaintiff
Plaintiff
D. D'Aston

No value

Plaintiff

$184,722

D. D'Aston

37,596

D. D'Aston

40.284
$262,602

D. D'Aston

7

98

Did not
value

10

(13) Vacant lot
#17 - Sec A. Oak
Cliff Planned
Dwelling Group Cost
13.

S 18,000

D. D'Aston

The plaintiff alleges that there were certain automobiles at the residence

of the parties when he left the residence on or about April 30, 1986 (see exhibit no.
19).

Defendants contend the only automobile at the residence of the parties consisted

of the motor home, Volkswagen and Mercury. That the Cadillac belonged to defendant
Eric Aston. Plaintiff further contends that the vehicles as listed in defendants' Exhibit
No. 31 and Defendants' Exhibit No. 32(a-k) were sold and the money spent prior to the
divorce action.

The Court finds the only vehicles which it can order distributed are

the motor home, Volkswagen and Mercury.
14.

Plaintiff and defendant, Eric Aston, testified regarding a purported gun

collection and the sale of guns.

The Court finds there was no gun collection of any

significance at the time of the divorce proceedings and the only gun that the Court
knows the whereabouts of is the gun held by the Provo Police Department, which
belongs to defendant Eric Aston.

The Court makes no award between the married

parties or to the purported gun collection.
15.

The parties had no outstanding debts as of the time of the filing of the

complaint herein, except the alleged obligation of the plaintiff as to consigned merchandise as hereinabove mentioned.

8

(l6 v

The plaintiff's income at the present time is social security in the sum

of $438.00 per month.

The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, has no monthly earned or

retirement income.
17.

The property of the parties should be awarded as follows:
a.

To the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston:
(1)

Residence of the parties:

Lots 40 and 41, Evening Glow

Subdivision, together with the improvements thereon and all built-in appliances.
(2)

One-half of the furniture, furnishings, appliances (not

built-in) and one-half of all art objects, silverware, bedding, etc., to be agreed upon by
the parties or in the event of no agreement, then two lists be made of equal value by
the plaintiff and the defendant, Dorothy D*Aston, having the right to chose which list
of property she wants.
(3)

Jewelry listed in paragraph no. 12, item 7.

(4)

Cash as follows:

Cash put aside for payment of judgment

$ 75,000.00

Savings account

34,000.00

Checking account

26,000.00

Diamonds

86,000.00

Silver bullion

7,600.00

Cash from the $300,000 in savings
box in the sum of
Total cash, diamonds and silver
bullion, excluding $75,000.00
for payment of judgment
(5)

1985 Mercury automobile.
9

63.200.00

$236,800.00

(6)

One-half of all jewelry, stamps, books, silver and paint-

ings (which are not a part of the household art objects) described in exhibit no. 14.
(7)

125 - S20.00 gold St. Gaudens and $62,099.00 of the cash

from exhibit no. 17, when this property is located.
(8)

30% of value of all coins alleged to have been stolen as

listed in ex. nos. 22 and 23.
b.

To the plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston:
(1)

Vacant lot - 17, Sec. A, Oak Cliff

Planned Dwelling

(2)

One-half of all furniture, furnishings and appliances (not

Group.

built-in) and one-half of all art objects, silverware, utensils, bedding, etc. to be
divided as provided in paragraph 17a(2).
(3)

Cash in the sum of $236,800.00 from the $300,000.00 in

(4)

Motor home and Volkswagen automobile.

(5)

Property acquired by the plaintiff prior to the marriage

(6)

Optical equipment (exhibit nos. 12 and 13).

(7)

One-half of all jewelry, stamps and books, silver and

the safe deposit box.

(exhibit no. 8).

paintings (which are not part of the household art objects) (described in exhibit no.
14).
(8)

All of the consigned coins described in exhibit no. 24.

Plaintiff should be obligated for the debt of the consignment.
10

(9)

125 - S20.00 gold St. Gaudens and 562,099.00 of the cash

from exhibit no. 17, when this property is located.
(10)

All patents and patent rights.

(11)

70% of value of all coins alleged to have been stolen as

listed in ex. nos. 22 and 23.
18.

The Court is not convinced that the value attributable to the alleged

stolen coins by the plaintiff is a realistic value, and that the value is excessive; that
other values assigned by the plaintiff to other property were cost values or replacement values and not current fair market values.

Therefore, the Court has not at-

tempted to make the division of the marital property an absolute division of one-half
each based on values assigned by the plaintiff.
19.

The Court believes that the above distribution of property is fair and

equitable under the totality of the existing circumstances and testimony.
20.

In the event the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are

found to be in the possession of the defendants, Dorothy D'Aston or Eric Aston, it
should be considered as contempt of court and punished as such.
In the event the alleged stolen coins (exhibit nos. 22, 23 and 24) are found to
be in the possession of the plaintiff, it should be considered as contempt of court and
punished as such.
(ly

The Court makes no award of alimony for either party as there should

-be sufficient assets on which to live. The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, should be able
to draw social security at age 62.
22.

Each party should pay their own attorney fees.

il

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the defendant,

which Decree should become final upon the signing and entry of the Decree.
2.

The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from

the plaintiff, which Decree should become final upon the signing and entry of the
Decree.
(3y

The agreement entered into between the plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, and

the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, in March of 1973, should not be a binding agreement
for estate distribution between the parties.
4.

The plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, and the defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, should

each be awarded the property together with other conditions concerning the property
as more particularly set forth in the Findings of Fact.
The defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, should be entitled to no sum of money
as alimony.
6.

The plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, should be entitled to no sum of money as

alimony.
7.

Each party should pay their own attorney's fees incurred herein and

each should pay their own costs.
Let a Decree be entered accordingly.
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DATED this

/£_<day of ll6t&™&<^\

)YD £ PARK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM

•T/7
^ S L R E X LEWIST ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff

s •
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BRIAN C HARRISON, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant, Dorothy D'Aston,
and Co-defendants, Eric Aston and Lisa Aston

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand
delivered to the following this

day of

. 1988.

Brian C. Harrison, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
3325 North University Avenue
Suite 200, Jamestown Square
Provo, Utah 84604
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APPENDIX "E"
Transcript of Hearing, May 4, 1990

1 I

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

2

*

* *

3
4
5
* I BRUNO

D'ASTON

7
Plaintiff,
g |

Civil No. CV-86-1124

9 |

HEARING TRANSCRIPT
V;

10 I

)

11 I DOROTHY D '

I

ASTON

Defendant.

13
14
15

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Friday, the 4th day of

16 May, 1990, the HEARING in the above-entitled matter was
17 taken by Richard C. Tatton, a Certified Shorthand
18 Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah
19 before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, at the Utah County
20 Courthouse, Provo, Utah 84601
21
22
23
24
25

A P P E A R A N C E S

For the Defendant:

Mr. Brian Harrison
Attorney at Law
Provo, Utah

Mr. Don Mullin
Attorney at Law
Provo, Utah

For the Plaintiff:

Mr. Rex Lewis
Attorney at Law
Provo, Utah 84601

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

This is the case of Bruno D'Aston

Plaintiff, vs.Dorothy D'Aston et.al.

This matter is before

the court concerning the Court's Findings and Conclusions
of Law dated the 13th day of April, 1989 and order of
commitment regarding Dorothy D'Aston and also I suspect
seeking to come into compliance

with the holding of the

Appellate Court regarding the appeal in this matter.

Am I

correct Mr. Harrison?

2

1

MR. HARRISON:

2

THE COURT:

Yes that is correct.

All right, this court has heretofore

3

signed an order of commitment ordering that Dorothy D'Aston

4

be held in custody until such time as she complies with the

5

order of this court of December 15, 1988.

6

to speak to that Mr. Harrison?

7

MR. HARRISON:

8

statement.

9

or make a statement.

10

Do you want

I would like to make a brief

I think Mr. Lewis may want to ask some questions

I would note that Mrs. D'Aston is in court today.

Did the|

11 court note that on the record she is here?
12

THE COURT:

I did not but I will note that she is

13 here.
14

MR. HARRISON:

I have tried to look carefully at th£

15 Court of Appeal's opinion as well as

other documents in

16 this case and I have the following comments that I think may
17 be pertinent to the court.
18

One of the concerns, I believe is the existence of a

19 safety deposit box which was set forth on Mrs. D'Aston's
20 financial declaration during

about January of 1988.

It

21 was subsequently testified to during the trial in April of
22 1988.
23 I

I would indicate to the court that Mrs. D'Aston will testify

24 |if she is asked that the safety deposit box was box number
25 |

866 and that it was located at First Security Bank in Orem

3

1 not at Farwest Bank, she made a mistake.
2
3

That bank is at

1175 South State in Orem.
She will produce a letter for the court today from First

4

Security Bank that shows that box was opened in September of

5

1987 and continued to be opened until sometime in September.

6

of 1989 about a year and a half after the trial in this

7

case.

8
9

She would further testify that she of the money that
she had in there she withdrew that at a certain point.

10 she used about $160,000.00 on living expenses.
11
12
13
14

no other income source whatsoever.

That

She had

She used that for

herself going back and forth to her parent's home in Californ
for witness fees and other costs.
She gave the sum of $127,000.00 to Lisa, her daughter.

15 She did that in October of 1983.

She also had $75,000.00

16 which was at her home in cash plus some diamonds and Silver.
17 She gave $75,000.00 plus diamonds and Silver to Lisa in
18 October of 1988.
She has n-ot seen Lisa or talked with Lisa since that

19
20 time.

The court set, pursuant to our motion to set a

21 Supersedeas Bond and set the bond amount at $312,000.00.

Thai

22 was done in January of 1989.
23

Once that bond was set, as ,ou can note from what I have

24 indicated, she had already used some of the money for
25 expenses and she gave a substantial sum almost $280,000.00 in

4

Lisa in October of 1S88.

She was not able to come up with

that bond amount.
So shortly thereafter as the court will recall the court
awarded the house, the home of the parties, to her.

She

received a offer to sell the home for approximately
$210,000.00.

I then prepared a stipulation and submitted

to Mr. Lewis, Mr. D'Aston's

attorney, suggesting that the

proceeds from the sale of the home be held as part of the
security in this case if they would release the lis pendens
which they had filed against the property in which was
preventing the sale.
Mr. Lewis talked with me and told me that his client
had rejected that proposal.

And the consequence of that

rejection was that this sale failed.
Sometime later in March of 1989, Dorothy D' Aston in
approximately March 15, quit claimed

any interest that she

may of had to Eric although she never did show up as a
record title owner on that property.
THE COURT:

She initially showed up as a record

title owner.
MR. HARRISON:
THE COURT:

I think it was in Lisa's name.

Purchased in Lisa's name.

MR. DOROTHY Dl ASTON:
THE COURT:

t was given to Lisa.

You gave it to her.

MR. HARRISON:

You are right.

I think originally

5

1

it was in her name then it got conveyed to the daughter

2

Lisa some two or three years I think before our court

3

appearance.

4
5
6

THE COURT:
not.

I don't know if it was that soon or

At least that is what happened.
MR. HARRISON:

Apparently from looking at the

7

settlement statements of the title company it appears

8

that when Lisa executed a quit claim deed to Eric, Eric

9

then executed documents of sale to Mr. and Mrs. Engle.

That

10 sale instead of being $210,000.00 was for $125,000.00.
11 So the settlement statements shows that home was sold
12 for $125,000.00.

Of that amount $116,000.00 was the net

13 proceeds that went to the seller
14

in this case Eric.

Mrs. D'Aston would further testify that Eric

15 then told her that he gave $116,000.00 to Lisa.
16 received those funds.

At that point, after March of 1939,

17 Mrs. D1 Aston went to California.
18 for her mother and father.

She went there to care

Her mother

19 years of age, and her father was 82.
20 died in Novmeber of 1989.
21 continuously
22

That Lisa

at the time was 77
Her mother

She has cared for her father

since she went down there.

Her present address in California is 1322 South Delmar

23 in San Gabriel, California, that is the home of her parents.
24

She would further state that her reasons for leaving

25 this jurisdiction

were because of death threats made to

6

1

her by Bruno.

She doesn't say this byway of excusing

2 rcot complying with the court's orders but she would say
3

that she was fearful because he had threatened to kill her.

4

He had also threatened Lisa.And he in fact in another case

5

that this court may or may not have knowledge of, he

6

pulled a gun and threatened Eric in the case that was heard

7

by Judge Harding.

g
9

THE COURT:

Well is that a matter of findings on

the part of Judge Harding or is that a disputed statement?

IQ

MR. HARRISON:

I don't think that is a disputed

11 statement.
12

MR. LEWIS:

It is completely disputed.

13

MR. HARRISON:

My information on that is that it

14 is contained in the police incident report and beyond that
15 I was not involved in the trial so I couldn't
|g address that issue.
17

That had to do with a coin operation that Eric tried

18 to establish in Salt Lake and that is all I can say about
19 that because I am not involved in that.
20

With respect to Lisa's status the last contact that Mrs.

f
21 D Aston had

with Lisa was in April of 1989.

22 tal-ked with her since that time.

She has not

She has not met with her

23 since that time.

She has no idea of where she works or

24 where she lives.

I would indicate to the court

that I

1
25 asked Mrs. D Aston to give me a little bit of background

7

on that.

She tells me that following the divorce her

relationship with Lisa became strained.

She was upset

bec-ause of the loss of the Provo House which had been promise
to her by her father and mother.
Dorothy indicated that she believed that was a correct
representation and promised her that she would still try
and keep the promise if she could.
Dorothy tells me that Lisa is bright and well educated
and that Dorothy had no hesitation entrusting the proceeds
of the house and these other funds to her.
Dorothy would further indicate to the court that she
has no income now whatsoever.

Nor has she ever had any incom

except for the assets that were acquired during the marriage,
She has been unable to support herself.

She presently

has no assets except for those for the small assistance
of her father.

He allows her to live at his home and from

his Social Security income

buys the food or lets her buy

the food and pays for the living expenses in that home.
He has a Social Security income and a small pension and
that is his only source of income.
I would indicate further to the court that Dorothy's
father is here today.
Cancer of the bone.

He came with her.

He suffers from

She dresses him, bathes him, feeds him,

and is with him 24 hours a day.
I would further indicate to the court that she would

8

1

state that going back and forth to California became a very

2

difficult task for her.

3

with regard to the real estate which she believed the court

4

had awarded to her.

5

the funds to Lisa because she received a threat from Bruno

6

that he could get into any safety deposit box in the country

7

regardless of whose name it was in.

$
9
\Q
H

She asked for her son's assistance

She thought that she could intrust

Again I am not suggesting that by way of justification
merely to let you know what her state of mind was at the
time these events occurred.
Shortly after that apparently Mr. D'Aston called and

12 wanted some of the personal property that the court had
13 awarded.

Mrs. D'Aston would testify that she agreed

14 that they came to the housie and took possession of sofas,
15 dressers, pictures and lamps.

She did not inventory that

15 material and just assumed that he was taking the things he wa
17 entitled to.
18

She believes that Mr. D'Aston knows where Lisa is but

19 she has no factual basis for that.
20 receive

She has continued to

threats from him at Post Office Boxes and through

21 other means has had some of the witnesses in this case.
22

She does not know where Lisa is.

She would say that

23 her attempts to locate Lisa has been in vain.

She loves

24 her very much and she hopes that some day Lisa will realize
25 that and try and regain contact.

1

That would basically be her factual statement.

I would

.2 like to ask if the court would indulge me I would like to ask
3

Dorothy's father just to make a one or two sentence

4

statement by his need for Dorothy in caring for him if the

5

court would allow that?

6
7

THE COURT:
thing.

8
9

Well I don't know if that is material

MR. HARRISON:

I am not sure it would be material

but I think it is background that is important.

10

THE COURT:

I don't see that it is material with

11 my order and I don't see it is material with the holding of
12 the Appellate Court.
13

MR. HARRISON:

I don't think it is material, Your

14 Honor, but I think it is important background.

Dorothy's

15 father would want to let the court know that in fact what I
16 have told you is correct that he has no one to care for
17 him except her.
18

THE COURT:

Well I would suspect that is true

19 and I don't have, that may or may not be true, I don't
20 know.
21

MR. HARRISON:

I would merely say that is what he

22 would say.
23

THE COURT.

Well I don't hold that as any kind of

24 justification for what is happening?
25

MR. HARRISON:

I don't either.

I just wanted the

1C

1

court to know that.

2

witness stand?

If the court would like her to take the

3

THE COURT:

I would leave that up to Mr. Lewis.

4

MR. LEWIS:

Well I think the orders speaks for

5

itself, Your Honor, order her committed until she pays the

6

money.

7

dispose of it and ordered to pay it over.

8

has made findings.

9

that someone that has the ability and then voluntarily gets

She had the money.

She was ordered not to

She had the ability.

The law is clear

10 rid of that ability why that is no excuse.
H

The court

The case

exactly contradicts substantially all of the alleged statemen

12 of fact that were made

we just contradict them all including

13 any threats or anything that they said.
14 pulled a gun on Bruno.
15 that happened.

He

The gun thing, Eric

It is not significant here but

hasn't threatened her.

He

has

16 never been to the house and never got any assets from the
17 house.

He just hasn't had anything.

He hasn't had any

18 contact with her actually since the trial.
19

We are asking the court to just enforce the court's order

20 and have her pay the money which she proffered she could do.
21

MR. HARRISON:

The procedural

posture as I

22 see it I think the most recent order of the court is that
23 as the court will recall that Dorothy was not served with the
24 order to show cause but I was in court that day and eventuallf
25 the court told me about what it was considering doing based

11

upon no appearance or testimony by any party counsel for
Mr. D'Aston prepared the findings relative to the ability
of compliance and so forth and so on.
The point is that based upon that, the court issued
an order of commitment and then modified it to say that
she was ordered committed and set a bail amount
of $10,000.00.

in the sum

I think that is the most recent document

that now is before the court.

It is not as Mr. Lewis

characterized that she is required to pay.
THE COURT:

The $10,000.00 is simply to keep her

out of jail until the court makes a determination as to what
to do.
The Appellate Court has simply indicated that the trial
court may want to have some flexibility to fashion some terms
under which the non-complying party may purge herself of a
contempt.

You tell me how she is going to do that?

How

do you spend a $160,000.00 for support in less than a
year.

To me this is absolutely ludicrous absolutely.

four of the parties

were here'in court.

All

All four of the

parties knew what the court's orders were.

There was ample

money to sustain everybody in this action.

The appeal

could have gone on if she just simply had put the money
there.

I find no reason whatsoever to believe that she

was confused

as to where the bank box was.

absolutely ludicrous.

That is

$300,000.00 and she stands up here and

12

testifies,

Lisa stands up here and testifies.

Eric

stands up here and testifies and when that is going on she
has already given all of this money away and not one word to
the court about where it has gone.
MR. HARRISON:
that.

I think the court misunderstands

This is the letter from First Security Bank I think.
THE COURT:

Well you have already told me and

if I misunderstood you that she gave $127,000.00 to Lisa.
She gave $75,000.00 to Lisa and this was in September and
October of 1988. The court's ruling was in December.
MR. HARRISON:
THE COURT:

Right the trial was in April.

Well then she gave it away after.

MR. HARRISON:

Before the court's ruling before

the court's decision but after the trial had been
completed, I think that is correct.
THE COURT:

All right that may be so.

But

nevertheless she knew that was funds out there that belonged
to her estate and to Mr. D'Aston's estate and what gave her
the idea she had total liberty with these things to give
them away?
MR. HARRISON:
question

I think if you would ask her that

and she has told me what her answer to that that

she understood that she continued to use that money for .
her living expenses as she had done before .

That is what

she did.

13

1

I think the court
THE COURT:

2

will recall that the - -

I said that she could live on but

3 who is anticipating $160,000.00 and who is anticipating
4 making gifts of excess of $200,000.00.

I don't buy that

5 at all.
MR. HARRISON:

6

I don't, Your Honor, believe her

7 intent was to make a gift.

I think her intent was to

8 entrust this money to Lisa until

merely

it was decided and

9 after the court reached its decision in December , she was
10 never able again to talk with Lisa and has not been able
11 to.
THE COURT:

12

I don't buy that story.

I just can't

13 believe that story.
MR. HARRISON:

14

Perhaps the court would want her

15 put under oath and have Mr. Lewis or the court ask her
16 questions.

I have represented to the court

17 my ability what I think she would say.

the best of

I think that is

18 an important inquiry.
19

THE COURT:

Well I find it very difficult to believe

20 I just can't buy that kind of a story.

In effect if I let

21 her get away with this I am going to let her get away
22 kith an absolute disregard for justice in this matter , the
23 order of the court or the power of the court.

She can get

24 put the back door by coming and making a lot of excuses now
25 fchat wouldn't let her get out the front door on initially.

14

MR. HARRSION:

1

Your Honor, I think as I looked at

2 the some of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals one of
3 the distinquishing factors was that the case they particular
4 cite on, I think it was the one involving the transfer of
5 bonds.

In that case the party that was required to do

6 something never stated that

he just didn-'t have those things.

7 He said that he had them and always had them

and had them

8 all the way up through the contempt proceedings but just
9 didn't want to give them to the other party.
10

I think you have got a little bit different situation

11 here and that is that before the court made its decision
12 on the case which was in December of 1988, but after the triaJ
13 which was held in April of 1988, she transferred this
14 property,the cash,

to Lisa.

15 done was to sell the house.

The only thing that she hadn't
The hous»e was then sold in March

16 of 1989 and those funds again given to Lisa.
17

She would indicate to the court that she will answer

18 any questions relative

to bank accounts historically

19 produce bank statements, keep the court advised.
20

THE COURT:

What good is that going to do?

21

MR. HARRISON:

The point is to both parties it is

22 important it seems to me to be able to locate Lisa to both
23 parties.

There may be something in those documents that

24 may be helpful to either party.
25

THE COURT:

It may be important to them but why does

15

1 this burden

fall upon Mr. D'Aston when your client is the

2 one, your clients, all three of them, are the one that put
3 this thing in this kind of a posture.
4

MR. HARRISON:

5

THE COURT:

6 that it is

Well - -

Why should

she come in here now and say

all Mr. D'Aston's fault?

7

MR. HARRISON:

8

THE COURT:

I didn't say that.

Basically you are saying that because

9 of some alleged threats, some alleged problems.
10

MR. HARRISON:

No, I am only telling you that

11 to let you know her state of mind.
12

her behavior because of that.

I am not excusing

I just give you that by

13 way of state of mind. I think that what we have is , we
14 have a civil case where the court has rendered a judgment.
15 I think in a certain point Mrs. D'Aston had to say , okay
16 am I going to stay there and force the.proceedings by
17 posting a bond or are they entitled to go ahead and try and
18 execute and do anything else they want.
19 faith effort

She made a good

to comply with part of the bond requirement

20 which was rejected by Mr. D'Aston.

After that happened

21 she wasn't able to produce the bond so what that did was to
22 leave her open for any kind of enforcement action
23 wanted to *ake and she
24 can do about that.

that they

still open and she has nothing she

I think if the court moves the other

25 direction then what the court is saying is that well you know

16

1 we have a judgment and that has not been paid and so we are
2 going to create a debtor's prison situation.

If the court

3 says that okay I think she ought to go to jail , she will
4

never come out of there.

The only way she could possible com£

5 out of there if all of a sudden Lisa would come forward and
6 say that yes here is this money and I will go ahead and
7 deposit it with the

court.

She had no control over Lisa

8 at all.
9

THE COURT:

Well she was awarded the house.

She

10 sold the house after, sold it at a fire sale, disappeared
11 and took all the money and let

Eric give it to Lisa.

12

MR. HARRISON: That is correct.

13

THE COURT:

14

Mr. HARRISON:

I have a hard time making that wash.
Your Honor, the only two people that

15 she had, well four people left in her life were the two
16 children and her parents.

She went back and forth to try and

17 take care of her parents.

She thought she could trust

18 Lisa to hold this stuff.

She was afraid about what he might

19 do.
20

THE COURT:

Why don't we

have this during this wholje

21 period of time? . She never told you that at least if she did
22 she never represented it to the court.

Your only representation

23 to this court is I don't know how to get a hold of her.
24 don't know where she is.

I

I don't know what she is doing.

25 She can call me .

17

1

MR. HARRISON:

2

THE COURT:

3 any kind.

That is correct.

But I never got any explanation of

Now that things get down to push and shove whether

4 she gets to go forward with her appeal or not, we all of a
5 sudden have an appearance and the appearance says that
6 I don',t have any money I am stone broke, what am I going to
7 do about it?

What am I going to do about it to uphold the

8 integrity of this court's order?
9

MR. HARRISON:

Well, Your Honor, you know I have

10 thought aobut that because it is a difficult problem because
11 I think that she, I mean it is not exactly like a Motion
12 for Supplemental Proceedings where you just are trying
13 to identify and execute on it.

The assets have previously

14 been identified and listed.
15

THE COURT:

Not only identified and listed but lied

16 to as to where they were so there was no opportunity and
17 Mr. Lewis immediately went out to get those funds.
18 locate them.

We couldn

You knew within a short period of time that

19 he couldn't locate them but there was never any effort
20 to come forward at that time and say that golly gee whiz
21 they are over in First Security Bank.
22

MR. HARRISON:

23

THE COURT:

I didn't

know.

I know you didn't know and I am not

24 blaming you but I am saying that your client had that
25 opportunity and didn't.

Surely you were telling her that

18

1 those funds had been awarded.
2 order.

She had a copy of this court's

Now all of a sudden she has got this miraculous

3 memory of where the thing was.

I have real problems.

I

4 think it is a flat out lie to this court.
5

MR. HARRISON:

Well I asked her to talk with both

6 banks that she had an account in Farwest and First Security
7 and get any records

they had of any accounts or safety

8 deposit boxes and that is how I discovered .

I was

9 out at First Security Bank getting that letter, (indicating)
10

THE COURT:

All I can say is

if your client

11 legitimately doesn't know where $300,000.00 is then you
12 ought to have her tested for competency and let's get her
13 to the State Hospital where she belongs.

I don't

know of

14 any other human being that I have ever been associated with
15 that doesn't know where $300,000.00 is of their assets.
16 To sit through a five day trial and not ever have that
17 disturbed her memory is beyond me.
18

MR. HARRISON:

19

THE COURT:

I understand that.

Now to have two children here who

20 also, I am sorry Mr. Harrison it just appears to me this is a
21 conspiracy on the part of her and the two kids.

That is what

22 it smacks to me as.

It has already smacked to me earlier

23 with regard to Eric

and that is the reason

24 his case.

I am not hearing

He thinks I am prejudice and I guess you get that

25 way after hearing people lie

for five days.

19

1

MR. HARRISON:

Well, Your Honor, does the court

2 believe that at the time of trial that Lisa was not honest
3 with the court and Eric
4

THE COURT:

5

MR. HARRISON:

was not honest with the court?

I absolutely do.
Does the court believe that both

6 parties were not honest or just Mrs. D'Aston?
7

THE COURT:

I find like Judge Harding there was an

8 awful lot of lies in this trial.
9
10

MR. HARRISON:
THE COURT:

On both sides of the case?

I don't know who was lying.

I think

11 my findings of fact will indicate that, that I didn't
12 know who was lying but somebody obviously had to be lying
13 and now from every step forward from this point forward,
14 it appears, or from the point forward the trial that it appears
15 that it is Mrs. D'Aston and the two children because of
16 everything that has gone on.
17

Now you tell me

from an objective standpoint why I

18 shouldn't feel that way?
19

MR. HARRISON:

Well,if I knew of some way to I thinl

20 Lisa is the key to this thing.

If I knew of some way to loca

21 here either through employment or residence or boyfriends
22 or anything.
23

THE COURT:

You know uhe thing that disturbs me

24 when we find her I would almost beat a steak dinner and she i
25 going to come up and say that I didn't get any of this money,

20

1 Eric got it or Mrs. D'Aston had got it or Bruno took
2 it from me.

I bet

she doesn't have it.

3 will be that she doesn't have it.

The testimony

That is what I would think

4 because that is the way this ball has revolved every since
5 the date of the trial.

Whoever happens to be in front of

6 the court they don't have it somebody else has it.
7 dilemma is what to do?

The

There is obviously no way she can

8 purge herself from the contempt.
MR. HARRISON:

9

THE COURT:

10

I agree.

Do you want to see her sit in jail

11 for about six months Mr. D'Aston is that what you want?
MR. 3RUNO D'ASTON:

12

Your Honor, it is up to the

13 court, I am beyond reason to say anything.
14

THE COURT:

Well it is a real aggravation to the

MR. LEWIS:

What to do, and obviously the question

15 court.
16

17 is they haven't paid the money to the court.

We believe

18 strongly that she has the ability to pay and she has the
19 money

and you are going to say that she is going to sit

20 in jail for six months I suspect that maybe if she were there
21 the money might appear is my feeling.
22 a short time

Also I think that such

that someone has got to report back to the

23 Appellate Court by March 9th and I assume that it excuse me
24 May 9th.

If she is still in contempt of court then simply

25 the appeal would be dismissed and that is the way I read the

21

1 court's decision.
MR. HARRISON:

2

3 interpretation.
4 under the

I disagree with Mr. Lewis'

I think that her responsibility

Court of Appeals is to appear for further

5 proceedings as this court may determine appropriate.

This

6 is not a case where - 7

THE COURT:

Well - -

8

MR.HARRISON:

That the court is saying you must pay

9 a judgment as a condition of the appeal.
10

THE COURT:

Let me read what they say and

11 then you can argue this with them but this is what they say.
12 Still another approach is to stay the appeal until the
13 appellate has submitted herself to the process of the trial
14 court.

This approach gives the trial

court the flexibility

15 to fashion the terms under- which the non-complying party may
16 purge the contempt rather than necessarily ordering the
17 enforcement of the judgment.

They go on over here and say

18 that - 19

MR. HARRISON:

At the bottom of Page 6 there is

20 important language, the petitioner's appeal is not
21 dismissed because of the failure to satisfy a judgment but it
22 was dismissed because of the failure

to comply with the courl

23 order to safeguard so forth and so on.
24

THE COURT:

On top of Page 7?

25

MR. HARRISON:

Top of Page 7.

22

1

MR. HARRISON:

It seems to me, Your Honor,

2 that when you look at this case on the two extremes as far
3 as fashioning something, you have either got a case where
4 she could say that well you pay $236,000.00 into court and if
5 you don't do that you don't satisfy me with respect to
6 anything.
7

THE COURT:

8

MR. HARRISON:

9

THE COURT:

10 contempt.

Well ,the thing of it is she is in contempt,
There is no question about that.

I have already held that she is in

Now the question is am I going to allow her to

11 purge herself on what conditions?
12

MR. HARRISON:

I think at that point you get into

13 this issue of does she have the ability to purge herself
14 or not.
15

THE COURT':

Mr. Lewis

believes it is and maybe

16 I am misquoting you but it is all a pack of lies and she has
17 got the money.

If she would be put in jail the money would

18 come forward.
19

MR. HARRISON:

Your Honor, if he is wrong then

20 she stays there for what 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, a year,
21 five years?
22

THE COURT:

Well,.what if he is not wrong'

23

MR. HARRISON:

Well, if he is not wrong then that

24 would be a great relief to me and the court and to counsel.
25 I happen to believe that she has told me about having no
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1 assets.

I have talked with her father.

He would tell

2

the court the same thing that he has provided everything

3

for her since she has came down to take care of him because

4

she had nothing.

5
6

THE COURT.-

Where did $160,000.00 go in living

expenses?

7

MR. HARRISON:

I think she early on I could just

8

tell you generally that she had medical expenses, she had

9

living expenses, she had travel she had witness' expenses

10 and she had to pay for all of these people to fly from
11 wherever they were.

One guy came from Oregon and another

12 came, two people came from California for the original
13 trial that we had in this case.

She had trial related

14 expenses of about $40,000.00 to $50,000.00.

Most of that

15 a large part of that had to do with witnesses and paying
16 their lost earnings from their jobs because they were away
17 and so on and so forth.
18 where before

Then she had

that she was living on $6,000.00 or $7,000.00

19 a month as the court will recall.
20 that was accruing on a note.
21

That was the interest

So she was spending

at the level of $6,000.00 or $7,000.00 before we even came

22 to trial.
23

Then after trial - THE COURT:

Why sell the house at a fire s~le

24 for a $100,000.00 less than its value?
25

this period of time

MR. HARRISON:

Why do that?

What I know about that is that the

24

1

house had been listed for sale even before the trial and

2

they had no offers on it and all of a sudden - -

3

THE C O U R T :

4

MR. HARRISON:

One offer out there.
All of a sudden we got the one offer

5

of $210,000.00 about in January of 1989 and that is why

6

I was personally convinced that this is great because we

7

don't have the ability to pay this $300,000.00 but we could

8

pledge the $210,000.00 because it was a

9

house.

mortgage

free

We could pledge that and Bruno informed his

10 that he rejected that.

At that point that sale

lawyer

failed

II because they filed a lis pendens.
THE COURT:

12

Well it didn't stop the sale a lis

13 pendens is still there.
MR. HARRISON:

14

Apparently what happened

is about

15 a year later or several months later they found they had
16 another offer.

Those people were willing to buy it subject

17 to I g u e s s , whatever the lis pendens was and I think
18 are involved
19 has sued

in a lawsuit

right now.

they

I think Mr. D 1 A s t o n

them.
THE COURT; I suspect anyone that bought it with a

20

21 lis pendens on it whether they paid $220,000.00 or $120,000.00)
MR. HARRISON:

22
23 jlawsuit
24

I think they are involved in a

right now on that.

You know her ability to lease, and at one time the court

25 Isaid that well if she didn't have the ability to post the

25

1 $312,000.00 and if you had come back in and told me
2 about that maybe we would ha\ze modified that order to some
3 extent.

The court made that comment at the time we came in

4 and complained a little bit about the fact that we
5 couldn't stay the action anymore because we couldn't post
6 that bond and the thing we tried to do is offer the proceeds
7 of the sale and that had been rejected .
8 documents and sent them to Mr. Lewis.

I prepared the

Then he called me and

9 said that his client wouldn't accept it.

They knew that

10 they could interrupt that sale and did interrupt that sale.
11 So then the thing sort of got given to Eric and the court
12 knows the history of that.
13

THE COURT:

As I recall during the time of the trial

14 the allegations were that she was receiving this interest
15 every month

and it wasn't until the last day of the trial

16 we found out that she had already discounted the note and had
17 the money.
18

MR. HARRISON:

19 on that were wrong.

Your Honor, Mr. Lewis' representation

I think the court's impression is wrong.

20 What happened was at the time that she had given a financial
21 declaraction, she indicated on there what her assets were
22 at that time.

The record will reflect and they have been

23 transcribed - 24

THE COURT:

There wasn't any indication of anbody

25 to correct this impression then because that certainly was th<
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1 idea that I had from the very beginning and that never even
2 surfaced until the last day of trial.
M.R HARRISON:

3

Your Honor, I expected Mr. Lewis

4 to cross examine relative to that financial declaration.
5 You remember that was submitted when they came in and asked
6 for alimony . The court awarded Mr. D'Aston alimony
7 of $2500.00 a month.
THE COURT:

8

It was based upon - It wasn't alimony, it was just the

9 division of some of the assets.
MR. HARRISON:

10

11 source that was.
12 as alimony .

It was temporary support from whatever

It was phrased that way .

It was phrased

But the court awarded that $2500.00 to him on

13 the basis' of her financial declaration submitted in about
14 January
15

of that year.

Now nobody asked any further questions about it.

16 made no statements to the court about it.

I

What happened

17 was Mr. Lewis comes in to trial and all of a sudden he is
18 questioning her and she says that she has discounted the note
19 and so forth.

We were complaining because he had transferred

20 all of his assets

to this California attorney Mr.

21 Sidney Troxell and then had filed a lawsuit against her in
22 California in violation of a previous court order.

So the

23 court said that well, you transferred your assets and Mrs.
24 D'Aston discou nted it I am going to hold those things as equal
25 and not worry about either one .

But Mr. Lewis made some big
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1 argument about the fact that somehow
2 was not deceived.
3 the trial.

he was deceived.

He

He never asked any questions about it until

At the trial it came out that had been discounted

4 that is all.

Now if the court had this impression that someho\

5 it was not the case.

It had nothing to do with the evidence

6 presented or arguments of counsel had to do.
7

THE COURT:

I would expect that somebody

8 would enlighten the court as to what the true facts
9 where somewhere along the case instend of go on the assumption
10 which you knew that the assumption that the court had.
11 Somebody has that obligation.
12

MR. HARRISON:

I think at the time of trial that we

13 brought forward a financial declaration that had been used
14 before.

She testified at trial about

what the

15 differences were between that time and trial.

You know one

16 of the frustrations that she had Judge, was that Mr. D*Aston
17 never did do a financial declaration.

You don't have in your

18 record right now the fact that he owns an RV and he has all
19 this stuff that is attached to it.
20

THE COURT:

Well I did too, I knew that all the way

21 through.
22

MR. HARRISON:

on a financial declaration . I

23 asked him questions at various times in trial but there
24 has never been a financial declaration given by him.

That

25 is not to say - -

2

1

THE COURT:

It doesn't matter about the financial

2

declaration.

The concern is that I wasn't fully apprised

3

as to what the situation was and the status was.

4

MR. HARRISON:

5

THE COURT:

I understand.

Now your client's position is

6

that Lisa has all of a sudden disappeared and nobody

7

knows where she is at and she has got all the money?

8
9

MR.HARRISON:

Not all of a sudden.

She hasn't

seen her since October of 1988 which was about two months

10 before the court made its decision in this case.
11

THE COURT:

Well somebody has seen her if they

12 transferred the whole ball of wax from the sale of the
13 house to her?
14

MR. HARRISON:

15 is Eric.

Eric saw her in March of 1989.

16 and he is outside.

The only person that has seen her
Eric was subpoenaed

I don't know if the court wants to ask

17 him anything about it?
18

THE COURT:

It is not my lawsuit.

19

MR. HARRISON:

I agree

but my information is through

20 my client that Eric saw her and gave her the $116,000.00
21 in March of 1989.
22

THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Lewis do you have anything

MR. LEWIS:

Well, I certainly don't want to retry

23 further?
24
25 the case.

I think the orders of the court, the court has mad4
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1 the findings.

I don't think we can go back on them.

MR. HARRISON:

2

Let

me just respond to that brieflyi

3 It seems to me when the court is talking about a situation
4 which is a very serious one that where you have got a default,
5 findings of fact and order that it is particularly - THE COURT:

6

That has been held and I am not going to

7 rehash that.
MR- HARRISON:

8

I understand that but it is particula

9 important to note.
MRS. D'ASTON:

10

Can I take my father out and lay

11 him down ?
THE COURT:

12

You take him out Mr. Mullin I want

13 Ms. D'Aston to stay in here.
MR. MULLIN:

14

Your Honor,I don't know how to care

15 for him .
16

THE COURT:

The only care right now is to just

17 wheel him out in his wheelchair.
18

MRS. D'ASTON:

19

THE COURT:

I need to lay him down on the bench.

All right you take him out and lay

20 him down and you come back.
21

(WHEREUPON, a brief break was taken to take Mrs. D'Aston's

22 father out to lay him on the bench)
23

THE COURT:

Back on the record.

If my arithmetic

24 is accurate Lisa has $318,000.00?
25

MR. HARRISON:

Plus - -
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1

THE COURT:

That doesn't belong to her.

2

MR. HARRISON:

Plus the

financial declaration

3

in January of 1988 showed diamonds and Silver Bullion

4

worth about my recollection was about $80,000.00.

5

THE COURT:

$75,000.00.

If this is accurate you

6

told me that she gave a $127,000.00 in cash to Lisa,

7

$75,000.00 which was the value of the diamonds - -

8 1
9
10

MR. HARRISON::

$75,000.00 was the cash that she had

in her home.
THE COURT:

All right, you add those to together

11 yo get $202,000.00 .
12

MR. HARRISON: Right.

13

THE COURT:

Then she got a $116,000.00 out of the

14 sale of the home.
15

MR. HARRISON:

Plus

the diamonds and Silver Bullioi

16 which at that time were valued at approximately I think
17 $37,000.00.
IS

THE COURT:

She has those as well?

19

MR. HARRISON:

Yes those were given to her at the

20
21

THE COURT:

That is $405,000.00.

22

MR. HARRISON:

23

THE COURT:

That is right.

Well, the only thing I can see is to give|

24 Mrs. D'Aston 30 days in which to deposit $236,800.00 with this
25 court or in somebody's trust account.

That will give her 30
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1

30 days to locate Lisa .

If that has not happened in

2 30 days I am going to sentence her to 60 days in jail then
3 we will see where we are at after that.
4

MRS. D'ASTON:

5 He can't even bathe

himself.

6 I swear to God I don't.
7

THE COURT:

8

MRS. D*ASTON:

9 for me.

My father will die without my care.
I don't have the money.

I don't have anything.

Why did you give it all away?
She was supposed to hold it

I suspect Bruno got a hold of her and he has got

10 the money from her.
11

THE COURT:

I don't know why you even felt like

12 that was necessary?
13

MRS. DrASTON:

14 died in November.

Because I had to run.

My mother

I have her death certificate.

I have

15 been with them for over a year taking care of their needs.
16

THE COURT:

Why didn't you make some appearance

17 in this court?
18

MRS. D'ASTON:

19

THE COURT:

I couldn't leave them.

You could have told your attorney

20 where you were at.

You could have explained to this court

21 why you were away.

This court is not without some sympathy.

22

MRS. D'ASTON:

23 made a bad decision.

Your Honor, I made a bad choice.

I should have dealt

I

with it differentl

24 My life has been unbelievable horrible and whether you believ
25

me or not this man (indicating) he has been sending death
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1 threats to my parents when I was living with them with a
2 tape from a newspaper to tell them to drop dead that he would
3 get them.

My life has been hell for the last few years.

4 Now I ai n bankr i ip t
5 Honor

I cannot come up with that money, Your

;f I den'* take care of my father he will die.

6 will diF -*--;

e literally cannot take care of himself.

**

. am sure you could see that?

8

am all he has got left in the world ani

9

this man destroy our whole family.

1 0 my children.

He is dying of Bone Cancer.

I

vou are letting

He had destroyed

He had destroyed my parents and he has destroye4

own family.
12

He

'

ather knows about that.

He needs

a Psychiatrist and he lies and everybody believes him.

I

13 am sorry , Your -•"••-.
14

THE COURT:

You could have solved this problem

1 5 very easily by just keeping in contact with your attorney?
16

MRS. D*ASTON:

You are right, Your Honor, I should

1 7 have done something sooner but when you are caring for your
II 8 to J

i v J. n g p a r e n 15 y J u Leally don't think about anything else.

1 9 |I just figured I would just take care of them.
20 what to do.

I made stupid choices.

21 \L did not lie.
22 a mistake.

?. s far as the bank thing,

I swear to you I didn't lie.

1 just made

I thought it was in the other bank.

23 ja lot of stress .
24

I didn't know

I was under

I did not do that deliberately.

THE COURT:

I will be perfectly honest with you

25 lit is awfully hard for iie to believe that.
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I

MRS. D1 ASTON: I can see that.

2 bad decisions.

I am bankrupt.

I did make some

I have no money.

I

3 am literally living with my father in California.

I had to

4 bring him here because there is just no one to care for him.
5 He was frightened.

He said that just put me in the backseat

6 of the car and drive me with you.
7 at motels.

We had to keep stopping

This is the dearest sweetest man in the

8 world and I won't let him die without me caring for him.
9 won't turn him over to a stranger.
10 yourself Bruno?

I

How do you live with

Ifyou would let my father testify, he would

11 tell you how he used to hit me and abuse me mentally and
12 physically .

He made my life hell.

13 He is a convicted felon.

Now he should go to jail.

I never even got a traffic ticket.

14 I was a good wife and a good mother.

I was good to my

15 parents and I never hurt anybody my whole life.
16

THE COURT:

Why do you account for the fact that

17 Lisa won't even speak to you?
18
19 my heart.

MRS. D'ASTON: I don't know.
I don't know.

20 her or what happened.

I love her with all

I don .'t know whether he got to

Maybe she saw all that money and

21 just wanted no part of this whole chaos anymore.

I don't

22 know.
23

THE COURT:

24 it certainly
25

Probably not if she has got all the mom

puts her in a advantageous position.

MRS. D1ASTON:

She is my child and I still love her
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1 If the money means that much to her then let her have it.
THE COURT:

2

Your share you certainly have a right

3 to give away anyway you want to but it is your husband's shar£
4 that is creating the problem.
MRS. D'ASTON:

5

He has his assets hidden.

I know

6 that people bought coins from him in the last year.
7 He is lying about that too.
THE COURT:

8

There is a big dispute going on between

9 him and Eric in Judge Harding's courtroom over that but I am
10 not a party to that right now.
MRS. D.'ASTON:

11

He is a pathological lier, Your Honour

12 He lies about anything and everything.
THE COURT:

13

Well I am sympathetic with what you are

14 saying Mrs. D'Aston but I don't know how to maintain the
15 integrity of this court.
16

MRS. D'ASTON:

17

THE COURT:

I have not lied to you.

Somebody just flaunted the order of

18 this
MRS. D'ASTON::

19

I didn't intend to flaunt it.

I

20 made stupid decisions.
21

THE COURT:

Didn't your counsel tell you how serious

22 this was?
23

MRS. D'ASTON;:

I only called him up on a few

24 occasions.
25

THE COURT:

Why didn't he tell you, why didn't he
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1 tell you how serious this was?
MRS. D'ASTON:

2

I got so wrapped up in caring

3 for my parents that frankly I was so emotional distraught
4 this whole last year that is all I could think about.
5 know he has money to take care of himself.

I

He wasn't

6 starving.
7

THE COURT:

I don't think he is starving either.

8 That is not the question.

The question before the court

9 is the contempt of this court.

I don't understand why

10 you would even have to be in contempt of this court.
11

MRS. D'ASTON:

12 me for my stupid actions.

I would ask the court to forgive
I never meant to do anything

13 wrong because I have never done anything wrong in my life.
14 I have always tried to be nice and fair and honest in
15 dealing with people that way.
16

THE COURT:

That is not the impression, you left

17 the court with when you deed the house away, when you deed the
18 extra lot away.

When Eric comes along and sells the house

19 and the lot that I awarded directly to him.After the order
20 of the court you give all this money to Lisa and now Lisa
21 is not to be found anywhere.
22

I jean if you put yourself in my shoes what you are asking

23 me to do is put myself in your shoes, you put yourself in the
24 court's shoes and say that why do I have one
25 for believing you?

bit

I understand what you are saying.

of

reaso
I don'
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that this is obviously your father and he is

disbelieve

in bad shape and he needs some help.
MRS. D'ASTON:
THE COURT:

How old is he?

He is 82.

Does your client know where Lisa

is'

MR. BRUNDO D'ASTON:

No.

THE COURT: Have you had any contact with her at
8 all?
MR. BRUNO D'ASTON: None whatsoever,

9

I never

10 did since she was in court here and then she wasn't speaking
11 to me.
12

Your Honor, the only party that has all those assets

13 is Dorothy.

Lisa doesn't

have them . She has over a million

14 dollars in cash before any sale in California property
15 or anything else.

She ha s it.

16

THE COURT:

Lisa just up and moved?

17

MR. HARRISON:

She was employed and the fellow

18 that cam in and testified .

You remember that there was a

19 young man that came in and testified that he went to a show
*i "r~ Tu u -ome Go 1 d from Br uno during the time that Bruno
claimed that he wasn't to be transacting business.
^ •**" • - .terns of evidence.

That was

He was her boyfriend.

23 had taken him to this trade show.

She

I think it was in Long

24 Beach and made that purchase in the anticipation for the
25 court trial.

So they were both down in Los Angeles
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1 some place.

That is the last connection that I found

2 with her.
3

THE COURT:

Does Eric know where she is at?

4

MR. HARRISON:

He tells me

no

but I have no

5 problem in having him step up here on the witness stand and
6 ask that question to him?
7

THE COURT:

Well it wouldn't be beyond his power

8 to tell me no.
9
10

MR. HARRISON:
THE COURT:

That is right.

Because of all that he has gone through

11 I don't think an oath means .anything to him.
12
13

Well this is a real mess.
MR. HARISON:

Another thing I was going to suggest,

14 Your Honor, that one of

the things is important that Dorothy

15 do obviously would be to be available

at any time the

16 court wants her here or whenever Mr. Lewis wants to serve
17 her with anything else.
18

THE COURT:

I don't think that is even important and

19 if what you represent is true what difference does it make?
20

MR. HARRISON:

Well I don't know. I think there is a

21 chance that Lisa might come forward.

I don't know her

22 well enough to know if she is sensitive to difficulties
23 created in the situation ?
24

I have no idea.

At the time I spoke with her before trial I was impressed

25 to the fact that she seemed intelligent.

She is a college
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1

g r a d u a t e and s h e s e e m e d

2

l i v i n g h e r o w n l i f e and had a job and so f o r t h .

3

all I k n o w a b o u t

4

Mrs, D'Aston

5

to be r e s p o n s i b l e

had

indicated where exactly
H o w are y o u g o i n g

5

with her?

7

is g o i n g to s h o w

g

time,

9

is w h e n s h e is g o i n g to c o m e b a c k

You are saying
.

I am s u r e the only

say t h a t s h e is b a n k r u p t

11

I 1 o s 1: :i 1: :i I bi J s i n e s s

12

absent

as the m i l l i o n

U

Nobody

knows where

14

t h e y were there but

15

two s i d e s

13

D

Aston

beginning

:

But

22

happened

25

dealings.

to

this

surface
to

has took it all

This

I s going

of c o i n s

knows where

all

s h e is g o i n g

Everybody

is

or

to be as
absent.

acknowledges

they w e n t .

I k n o w the c o u r t b e l i e v e s

on key i s s u e s

and b e l i e v e s

That

is not

that

You

have

that

that M r s .

necessarily

like I was getting

all I can say

is w h a t

since indicates
more

herself

she

truthful?

I felt

is p r o b a b l y

and

dollars worth

they w e n t .

THE COURT:

20

24

is not

t h e r e is j u s t a c h a n c e

my b o y f r i e n d

nobody

touch

story.

is t r u t h f u l

19

23

of t h a t

that

t i m e s h e is g o i n g

MR. HARRISON:
Bruno

is

- -

to get in

If she has a b s e n t e d

10

17

That

her.

THE COURT:

15

in the s e n s e of ".

MR. HARRISON:
tl iat the c o u r t has

felt

In

than

to this c o u r t
the other

the

from: b o t h s i d e s „

I h a v e said b e f o r e is w h a t
that

truthful

stories

so.

that M r .

three

has
D*Aston

defendants.

A l l I can say is I t h i n k
that he wa s m o r e t r u t h f u l

in

general

than

she
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1 was.

And a lot of these orders reflect that.

I think if

2 the court considers that a chance exists that in fact
3 Mrs. D'Aston has been truthful about these things and
4 what I have stated to you as to what I proffered as her
5 testimony today is the truth and you still have his position
6

saying that is fine let her go to jail.

^

have whatever health problems he has.

8

THE COURT:

9

Let her father

He doesn't care.

Why don't we have Eric take care

of his grand dad?

10

MR. HARRISON:

11

THE COURT:

Well do you want my personal opinion

Why don't we have Eric come in and tell

12 us and ask him why he don't come in and take care of his
13 grandfather while his mother goes to jail.

Bring him in.

14 (WHEREUPON, Mr. Eric D'Aston is brought into the courtroom)
15

MR. HARRISON:

As I indicated he is here

16 pursuant to a subpoena.
17

THE COURT:

This court is about to send your mother

18 to jail and you go by Aston I guess now?
19

MR. ERIC ASTON:

20

THE COURT:

21

Yes.

We want to know why you can't take

care of your grandfather while your mother is serving

22 jail time?
23

M R . ERIC ASTON:

24 j

THE COURT:

25

MR. ERIC ASTON:

I am running a business.

Which is more important?
Feeding myself.

Because of this
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1 wno'- -.ourt thing and my lying father and he knows he is
2 lying.

hope you enjoy what you are doing? (indicating)

3

THE COURT:

Never mind making those representations

4 just answer the court's question?
5

MR. ERIC ASTON:

I have my own family now.

To

6 be quite frankly honest this whole situation has literally
7 destroyed my life in the past five years from taking coins
8 that I brought in' •

. * • •'

•

bring them in

-. being able to run

9 to having them taken fron
10 a business.
11

THE COURT:

Well that is not in this court.

That

12 is up in Judge Harding's court.
13

MR. ERIC ASTON:

I don't have room.

I have a wife

14 and a kid and a small condo.
15

THE COURT:

Do you know where your sister is a~?

16

MR. ERIC.ASTONl 'No I don't.

17

THE COURT:

I wish I did.

Do you know why she would want

18 aJlegedly she has in her possession some $405,000.00 that
19 belongs to your mother and your father?
20

MR. ERIC ASTON:

Your Honor, in my opinion my

21 father has that money right now and he knows it all right.
22 You are dealing with a professional lier and someone that is
23 very good at what they do.
24

THE COURT:

Well there is no evidence to that effect

25 The only evidence I have is representation

from Mr. Harrison

41

1 today that Lisa has all that money.
MR. ERIC ASTON:

2

I can't prove it but I

3 know my father and don't sit there and cry
4 his emotions on like that you know.
5 the bad people.
6 his motorhome.

because he turns

He made us look like

He is running around the country
He is going to shows.

with

He is spending a lot

7 of money.
8

THE COURT:

He didn't make you look like the

9 bad people because after the decision of this court it
10 could have very adequately

handled if you hadn't of sold

11 the property which you had no business in selling No. 1
12 after this court order.
13

No. 2 , your mother had the money if she would have

14 just simply put it in trust or whatever the money that I
15 awarded to your father nome of this would have happened.
16 So I don't see where you are getting off your like the Mr.
17 Clean in this thing.
18

MR. ERIC ASTON:

In selling the house I read a pape:

19 from you giving the house to my mother.

My mother stated

20 for me to sell it and give my sister the money so I did that.
21 I mean I have started my own business.
22

THE COURT:

Not only that but you sold the lot that

23 I awarded to Mr. D'Aston.
24

MR. ERIC ASTON:

I just signed the papers that

25 they told me to sign.

4

I

THE COURT:

You are a very intelligent man.

2 I don't buy that for five seconds that you don't understand
3 what is going on. Well okay, do you have any questions
4 of Mr. Eric Aston?
5

MR. LEWIS:

No.

6

THE COURT:

You may step back out of the courtroom.

7 You are not a party to this.
8
9
10

n

(WHEREUPON

•

MR. • HARRISON:

: -

• • -. nail)

It is obvious if Eric would

step forward and say that let me Lar^e care of my grandfather
that would be one thing but I think what you have heard

12 is exactly what I predicted he would say.

He just doesn't

13 care about him.
14

THE COURT:

The only milk of human kindness I

15 see in the family is Mr

-ston taking care of her father

16 and I just hope it is not a - excuse.
17

MR. HARRISON: I think that is genuine Judge.

18

THE COURT:

I feel like there has been so many

19 opportunities or at least not opportunities but there has
20 been so many occasions where they tried to pull the wool
21 over the court's eyes that I don't know what I can trust and
22 what I can't trust.
23

MR. HARRISON:

You have got Eric who doesn't

24 care if his grandfather dies.

You have got Mr. D'Aston

25 iwho doesn't care if she goes to jail for 10

years and the
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1 father dies.

You have got Lisa who doesn't care if she goes

2 to jail because she has got
3 forward with it.

I think I agree.

THE COURT:

4

the money and couldn't come

All in the name of dollars and cents.

5 Mrs. D'Aston you are still in contempt of this court bad
6 decisions or otherwise.

It is no different from the

7 criminal who commits a crime and comes in here and says
8 that please forgive me I didn't know what I was doing.
9

I made a bad choice-and there is always an accountability

10 for that.
11

I don't know what is the prognosis for your father do

12 you know?
13

MRS. D'ASTON:

14

THE COURT:

No

he has Bone Cancer.

I understand.

Has the Doctor

15 said anything about his life span?
16

MRS. D'ASTON:

17

THE COURT:

He hasn't give us any time.

Heck of a place to be playing that out

18 in the courtroom in talking about somebody's life in that
19 fashion but.
20

MR. HARRISON:

When I talked to him briefly

21 he tells me that he has Prostate Cancer

and Bone Cancer

22 and there is no prognosis for recovery and beyond that
23 that is all he told me.
24
25

THE COURT:

What I am going to do . . .

(WHEREUPON,the rest of the hearing was previously transcribe:

44

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

and t h i s concludes the other p o r t i o n of the hearing)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF UTAH
• ss .

COUNTY OF WASATCH )

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the HEAR/ was reported
by me in Stenotype, and thereafter causey me to be
transcribed into typewriting by Richard CTatton and that a*
full, true and correct transcription of id HEARING was so
taken.
I FURTHER CERTIFY th'-t I am ft of kin or otherwise
associated with any of the parties to fail cause of action
and that I am not interested in the e^ent -herp_:Ji.
WITNESS my hand and officii seal at Midwa^
Utah, this

/f^

day of uuluy, 1990

RICHARD C. TATTONjCi*
My commission expires:
June. 15-., tJSfta-^-*-??^:—NoBryPoW'ic
N-

-

WISH?!'

J

:
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APPENDIX "F"'
Notice of Appearance

HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Defendant
3325 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone:
375-9801
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUNO D'ASTON,

]

Plaintiff,

]>

-vs-

]

DOROTHY D'ASTON
Defendant.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

]
])
)

Civil No. CV-86-1124
Judge Boyd L. Park

TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS:
You will hereby take notice that the Defendant, Dorothy
D'Aston, appeared before me on the 4th day of May, 1990 for further
Court proceedings as required by your opinion in Case

Number 890050-CA filed April 9, 1990.
The Defendant is still in contempt of Court, but has been
granted 45 days in which to purge her contempt.

Additional

proceedings have been scheduled for June 22, 1990 to review this
matter.
DATED this

?

day of

"^'h;f

1990.

BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:. .

S„ Rex Lewis/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Notice of Compliance on this
7
day of
ft"! , 1£89, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to
t W
the following:

S. Rex Lewis
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
The Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Secretary

APPENDIX "G"
Order, May 22, 1990

4T

" ^ S T R I C T COURT
^ i Alt OF LiT^M

*T#

J9 58 AM '30

S. REX LEWIS (1953), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

k:aston-or.Io
Our File No. 17,603

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.

Civil No. CV 86 1124
Judge Boyd L. Park

The defendant Dorothy D'Aston personally appeared before the Court on the 4th
day of May, 1990, in person and was represented by her counsel, Brian C. Harrison.
Plaintiff appeared in person and by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis & Petersen.
The Court considered its Amended Order of Commitment dated the 26th day of May, 1989,
together with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated April 13, 1989, and having
heard representations made by defendant's counsel, us well as by the defendant, and the
defendant having previously been found in contempt of an order of this Court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1.

Defendant may purge herself of the contempt order of this Court by

depositing with the Court the sum of 5236,800.00. The defendant is given ^6 days from May
4, 1990 to purge herself of her contempt.
2.

In the event the defendant fails to make the aforesaid deposit, the

defendant is ordered committed to jail for a period of sixty (60) days.
3.

Unless previously modified by an Order of this Court, the Court will review

the Commitment Order on June 22, 1990, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. at which time the
defendant is ordered to appear in person before the Court. The Court will make its review
on that date prior to committing the defendant to jail.
4.

The Bench Warrant previously entered herein on the 13th day of April, 1989

is hereby withdrawn.
DATED this

day of iMay, 1990.

BY THE COURT

BOYD L. PARK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

day of May, 1990.

Brian C. Harrison, Esq.
3325 No. University Avenue
Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604

:RETAR^
SECRETARY
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APPENDIX "HM

Agreement

4U
RECORDED IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CA

MAR

A G R E E M E N T

7 1975 AT 8 A.M.
Recorder's Office

This agreement is made by and between BRUNO DfASTON,
husband, and DOROTHY DfASTON, wife, at Hacienda Heights, California, on the first day of March, 1973, with respect to the
following facts:
1.

The parties own property which is held in joint

tenancy, community property or in their separate names; and
2.

They wish to make this agreement to state their

actual intention with respect to said property and the status
thereof and with respect to property to be acquired hereafter.
Now, therefore, in consideration of mutual covenants
herein it is agreed as follows:
1.

The husband does transfer, bargain, convey and

quitclaim to the wife all of his right, title and interest, if
any there be, in and to the following:
(a)

The real property at 14211 Skyline Drive,

Hacienda Heights, California and in and to all buildings, appurtenances and fixtures thereon*
(b)

The real property at 230 South Ninth Avenue,

City of Industry, California, including all buildings,
appurtenances and fixtures thereon, and any and all oil
and mineral rights thereto,
(c)

Any and all cash in bank accounts located in

the State of California.
2.

The wife transfers, bargains, conveys and quit-

claims to the husband all of her right, title and interest in and
to real property located outside of the United States of America,
and in and to all personal property in the possession of the
husband, or subject to his control in the United States, Europe
or elsewhere in the world, and in and to all patents or patent
rights under the laws of the United States, United Kingdom or
(|
ooctiMriTTAfrr T I W W T O T

TAX * . .

cr.ir'irr^ cr* rvti VMUE C pr**—T? coNvnrro, |
i.? c

MAIl TAX STATEMENTS TO ' f c ^ ^ ^ f l * , * }

• r:«

-N run VALI-

"^

•.. " t'lf". /.rto

^

**D6578PC894
any commonwealth thereof, Switzerland, Japan or other countries.
The provisions of this paragraph apply to all property described
herein, whether presently owned or in existence or to be acquired
or created in the future.
3.

Hereafter, and until this agreement is modified in

writing attached hereto, all property, real, personal and mixed,
acquired by either party in his or her sole name, from whatever
source derived and wherever situated, shall be the sole and separate property of such person, notwithstanding any law, statute or
court decision giving presumptive effect to the status of marriage;
and such property shall be free of all claims, demand or liens of
the other, direct or indirect, and however derived.
4.

Ho thing herein applies to the earnings, from what-

ever source derived, of either party, which shall be community
property under the laws of the State of California.

Nor shall

anything herein be construed to derogate from the rights and
privileges of either party or both of them, under the tax laws
of any state or nation of the world.
5.

Each party agrees to execute documents necessary

to implement this agreement.
6.

This agreement may be, but need not be, recorded

in any office for recording documents in California or elsewhere.
7.

Both parties have read and understood this agree-

ment, have been advised by counsel, and do state that it has not
been made under duress, fraud or undue influence.

Dorotmr D 1 Aston

-2-

M f CA I 4 . 7 S )

TTTUE INSURANCE
ANDTRUST

dividual)
LTE OF CALIFORNIA

ss.

mm HF Log Angeles
February 28. 1975
*. personally appeared .

before

BK055T8W895

the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said

Bnmo P'A?t;pn and porothy P'As ton

, known to me
ethe.
he within in

whose name S

are

.subscribed

oment and acknowledged that t h e y

OFFICIAL S E A L

j

CORINNE H. YOUNG j
NOTAIIY PUBLIC . CALJFOAHIA J
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN
I
LOS Arfr g t r < t COUN7T
I

J^^\
Name (Typed or Printed)

My Commisaon Expires December 14, 1977 j
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(Eric Aston)

Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County, SJate of Utah.
SMITH, Clerk
Deputy

S. REX LEWIS (1953) and
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (3872), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

K:Astn-fof.lo
Our File No. 17,603

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.
LISA ASTON and ERIC
ASTON,

Civil No. CV 36 1124
Judge Ray M. Harding

Co-defendants.

Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and plaintiff's
Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel,

Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises,
and good cause appearing therefor, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court herein entered a Decree of Divorce on or about December 15, 1988,

whereby it awarded various personal property to the plaintiff, including various items which
plaintiff alleges were removed from his car and his motor home on or prior to April 30, 1986.
2.

The divorce decree also awarded to plaintiff a one-half interest in various

personal property located at the marital home of 1171 No. Oakmont, Provo, Utah ("marital
home").
3.

The Decree of Divorce awarded the marital home to defendant Dorothy

D'Aston.
4.

The Decree of Divorce also awarded to the plaintiff other personal items,

including cameras, lenses, carrying cases, and other optical equipment.
5.

Prior to the separation of plaintiff and defendant Dorothy D'Aston, plaintiff

was involved for numerous years in the buying, selling, and collecting of coins, rare coins, and
other similar items.
6.

On many of plaintiff's rare coins, he stamped the rim above the head with

the letter "A."
7.

Shortly after the plaintiff's personal property disappeared in Ap 11, 1986,

plaintiff was able to make a detailed list for the police department from his memory of many

2

of the missing items. Some of those items, while not exceptionally rare, would not be expected
to appear in an average coin shop.
8.

On March 15, 1989, Eric Aston made and executed a Bill of Sale to Lloyd Ross

Engle and Jan Chapman Engle to various items of personal property located in the marital
home. Eric Aston assisted in the sale of the real property and accepted a quit claim deed
from defendant Dorothy D'Aston aka Dorothy Aston on March 14, 1989. On the same date,
Eric Aston executed a warranty deed to the Engles for the sale of the marital home. At the
closing of the sale of the property on March 14, 1989, Eric Aston received two trust account
checks from Provo Land Title Company, one for the sum of 358,144.44, and one for the sum
of 558,144.48, for a total cash receipt of 5116,288.92.
9.

On April 14, 1989, this Court issued its .Writ of Execution and Assistance.

Pursuant to that Writ, John Sindt, a constable of Salt Lake County, took various items into his
possession on April 29, 1989, from co-defendant Eric Aston.
10.

The various property identified as Exhibit 7 at the hearing hereof obtained

by Constable Sindt, was previously located at co-defendant Eric Aston's business known as The
Gold Connection at approximately 21st South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
11.

Many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, even those which were

unusual, unexplainably appeared in Eric Aston's coin shop. Several of the coins reported
missing by plaintiff were stamped with an "A." Identical coins bearing an "A" were found
among the coins in co-defendant Eric Aston's inventory.
12.

Though given an opportunity, co-defendant Eric Aston has not adequately

explained why he had so many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins.
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13.

Within the past several months, co-defendant Eric Aston has made significant

purchases, including inventory for his coin shop, several automobiles, and two separate
condominiums. Co-defendant Eric Aston has not plausibly explained the manner and source
of the funds sufficient to purchase the inventory for his coin shop, the automobiles, and
property he has recently acquired.
14.

The Court finds and reasonably infers that much of the capital for co-

defendant Eric Aston's recent purchases came from the sale of plaintiff's coins, many of which
are still missing.
15.

The Court also finds and reasonably infers that co-defendant Eric Aston had

several coins in his possession identical to plaintiff's missing coins because those coins were
actually taken by co-defendant Eric Aston.
16.

The parties have stipulated that co-defendant Eric Aston claims no interest

in the cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment found in co-defendant Eric Aston's store,
and that the Court can enter an order awarding the same to plaintiff, which items were
received by plaintiff at the time of the hearing herein.
17.

The parties have also stipulated that plaintiff makes no claim to various

dimes, pennies, nickels, quarters, one-half dollars, dollars, and panda bullion which can be
awarded to co-defendant Eric Aston and were received by him at the time of the hearing
herein.
18.

Plaintiff has met his burden of proving ownership to many of the items

entered as evidence herein.

P o n t i f f is the owner of all coins which bear an "A" stamp,

including all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp. A list of the "A"
stamped coins held by the Court is as follows:
4

1892 P
1890
1879
1871 S
1914 S
1881
1890
1922
1923
1924
1934
1896
1904

Morgan Silver Dollar
Carson City Silver Dollar
Metric Proof U. S. Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty

0
CC
D
S
S
D
S
S

19.

Plaintiff is also the owner of the items held by the Court which match those

items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to the police. These
items on plaintiff's first list of stolen property are as follows:
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins).
U. S. Gold Dollars
1
2

1849 - AU
1853 - AU

S2 1 11 U. S. Gold
1905 - UNC
1915 •• AU
1911 •- D
S10 U. S. Gold
1
1

1910 - D - UNC
1915 - UNC

S20 U. S. Gold
1
1

1871 - AU
1897 - BU
D

1
1
1

1914 - S - BU
1925 - BU
18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget

2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars)
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985)
Canada Dollars
13
20
45
120
137
60
1
120
6
470

1958 - BU
1962 - BU
1963 - BU
1964 - BU
1965 - Type 1, BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU
1966 - LB - BU
1967 - D.G. 45° - BU
1967 - BU
1967 - Canada proof sets with $20 Gold
1984 - proof dollars and case

U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars
1

1879 - Metric proof

5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883;
1-1884; and 1-1890.
84
60

Common dates BU - dollars
Common dates CIRC - dollars

Miscellaneous Gold
6
1
3
3
2

1-oz. - K - Krugeran.
1-oz. - M - Mapleleaf.
Mex - 2 Peso
Mex - 2 1/2 Peso
Mex - 1947 - 50 Peso - BU

Stamps - one book.
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20.

Plaintiff's later inventories do not appear to have the same reliability as the

original list of stolen property.
21.

Plaintiff is the owner and should receive any items held by the Court which

match the list of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on
Exhibit 24 thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57. The
bullion which was a part of Exhibit 7 is also a part of the bullion described in Exhibit 57 at
the trial and all of these items are to be returned to plaintiff.
22.

Co-defendant Eric Aston is the owner of the items not included in the above

listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at his store.
23.

Plaintiff has incurred costs of court and is entitled to be awarded them from

the co-defendant Eric Aston.
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this

2.

The Court should approve the stipulations of the parties made at the hearing

action.

regarding ownership of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various
coins to the co-defendant Eric Aston.
3.

Plaintiff should be awarded all coins which bear an "A" stamp, including all

of the coins now htid by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and all items held by the Court
which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to
the police.
7

4.

Plaintiff should also receive any items held by the Court which match the list

of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on Exhibit 24
thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57.
5.

Plaintiff should be awarded all of the bullion which was a part of Exhibit

7 herein, and which was described in Exhibit 57 herein.
6.

Ail of the above-described items should be ordered returned to the plaintiff.

7.

Co-defendant Eric Aston should be awarded any items not included in the

above listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at the store.
8.

Plaintiff should be awarded costs of court.

9.

Co-defendant Eric Aston should not be held in contempt for his actions in

assisting in the sale of the marital home and executing the bill of sale on the various personal
property contained therein.
DATED this *Z

day of gobwiai-as 1990.

R A T ^ t HARDING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ.
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston

8

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was faxed to the
following, this

4

day of February, 1990.

Keith W. Meade, Esq.
525 East 100 South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

:
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APPENDIX "J"
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

782

Utah

743 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Phyllis E. COLMAN, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
William J. COLMAN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 860325-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct 2, 1987.
Husband appealed from order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David B. Dee, J., which divided property in
connection with divorce. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) evidence sustained trial court's determination to pierce
corporate veil of husband's corporations,
and (2) distribution was proper.
Affirmed.
1. Pleading <s=>427
If theory of recovery is fully tried by
the parties, court may base its decision on
that theory and deem the pleadings amended, even if the theory was not originally
pleaded or set forth in the pleadings or the
pretrial order; that the issue has, in fact,
been tried and that the procedure has been
authorized by the express or implied consent of the parties must be evident from
the record.
2. Divorce «=>203
Although alter ego issue was not specifically raised in pleadings, where entire
trial testimony concerned husband's control
over assets in question, the issue was tried
by the consent of the parties and trial court
properly based its decision on that issue.
3. Divorce <3»253(2)
Finding that corporation was husband's alter ego was supported by evidence
that husband ignored corporate formalities,
that he referred to the corporation's checking account as his personal account, that he
dealt with corporate assets without suggesting that he was acting on behalf of anyone
other than himself, that the officers and
directors played little or no role in the

operation of the corporate entity, that corporate records were not kept, and that the
husband used the corporation and other
corporate shells as a facade for his personal business operations.
4. Corporations <3=>1.6(10)
Corporate veil which protects stockholders from individual liability will be
pierced only reluctantly and cautiously.
5. Corporations «»1.4(4)
To disregard corporate entity under alter ego doctrine, there must be shown such
a unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist, and it
must be shown that, if the corporate form
were observed, it would sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or result in an inequity;
it is not necessary that plaintiff prove actual fraud but he must show that a failure to
pierce the corporation veil would result in
an injustice.
6. Corporations <s=»1.4(l)
Factors which are significant in determining whether corporate veil should be
pierced are undercapitalization of a oneman corporation, failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends,
siphoning of corporate funds by dominant
stockholder, nonfunctioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate
records, use of corporation as a facade or
operations of the dominant shareholder,
and use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud.
7. Corporations <3»1.4(1)
Failure to observe corporate formalities, which may justify piercing corporate
veil, includes such activities as commencement of business without the issuance of
shares, lack of shareholders at directors
meetings, lack of signing of consents, and
making of decisions by shareholders as if
they were partners.
8. Corporations <3»1.4(1)
Rationale used by courts in permitting
corporate veil to be pierced is that, if principal shareholder or owner conducts his private and corporate business on an interchangeable or joint basis as if they were
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one, he is without standing to complain
Frank J. Allen, Salt Lake Cityf for dewhen an injured party does the same.
fendant and appellant.
9. Divorce e»252.3(3)
Former spouses attempting to shield
assets from a court-ordered property distribution by using a corporate form are especially looked upon with judicial disfavor.
10. Divorce «=>252.2
Fact that property distribution may
not have been mathematically equal is not
sufficient grounds to constitute an abuse
of discretion, as fair and equitable property
distribution is not necessarily an equal distribution.
11. Divorce <3=>252.3(3)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in dividing property after piercing corporate veil on the grounds that the corporation was the husband's alter ego.
12. Divorce <3=>252.3(5)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in requiring husband to pay an amount
representing a percentage of the price of
proceeds from sale of ranch where he
found that husband held an interest in the
ranch.
13. Estoppel 3=52(4)
Estoppel arises when there is a false
representation or concealment of material
facts made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts to a party who is
without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts and made with an
intention that the representation be acted
upon, and the party to whom the representation was made relies or acts upon it to his
prejudice.
14. Estoppel <3»54
Estoppel cannot be inferred from facts
of which party to be estopped had no
knowledge.
15. Husband and Wife <3=>279(1)
Wife was not estopped from denying
that husband had furnished adequate accounting as required by their divorce
agreement even though wife's attorney had
returned certain stock certificates which he
had turned over to them.

Bryce Roe, Albert Colton, Salt Lake City,
Plaintiff and respondent

for

Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
JACKSON.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant/appellant William J. Colman
appeals from a property settlement judgment in favor of plaintiff/respondent Phyllis E. Colman stemming from their 1977
divorce. He seeks reversal of the judgment
The parties were divorced after a twentyfour year childless marriage during which
they acquired substantial property. On
August 2, 1977, in anticipation of divorce,
they executed a written property settlement agreement. Because questions had
not been resolved as to which assets controlled by defendant were part of the marital estate, this agreement required him to
provide plaintiff with a "complete accounting of all stocks currently owned by him or
in which he [had] any interest/' and a
"complete accounting of all royalty interests currently owned by him or in which he
[had] any interest" within one year of the
agreement Once the extent of defendant's holdings was determined, plaintiff
was to receive one-half of defendant's interest in any stocks "held in ... [his] name
or in which he [had] any interest," and
one-half of the sales proceeds of the
Anderson Ranch, jointly owned property
located in Cache County, Utah.
Much of the dispute between the parties
centered around defendant's relationship to
Owanah Oil Corporation [Owanah], a closely held corporation which defendant and
Francois de Gunsberg had founded in 1952
to engage in oil and gas exploration. Defendant had served as Owanah's president
during much of the parties' marriage. In
1959, Owanah was restructured to generate outside capital. As a consequence, defendant and plaintiff held approximately
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twenty percent of Owanah's outstanding
shares.
At the time of the divorce, defendant
also controlled stock, originally issued in
various names, in other closely held corporations: Western Oil Shale Corporation,
Cayman Corporation, and Royalty Investment Company. Defendant claimed that
most of this stock belonged to Owanah,
was not part of the marital estate, and,
therefore, was not subject to the property
division agreement
The Western Oil Shale Company stock
was issued in 1964 in consideration for
Owanah's interest in several oil shale leases. Although defendant alleged that none
of the parties, personal funds were expended to acquire these leases, he introduced no
evidence beyond his testimony to that effect He also explained that the stock was
issued in names other than Owanah's so
that Owanah could sell it more easily by
avoiding normal corporate formalities. At
the time of trial, he held at least 28,200
Western Oil Shale shares under his personal control, but admitted ownership of only
2,256 of them.
Cayman stock had been issued by Cayman Corporation as consideration for stock
in another closely held corporation, National 00 Shale Corporation, and for an oil and
gas lease with a producing oil well. Defendant testified that both the National Oil
Shale and Cayman shares were issued in
his name for ease in sale and handling, but
that he held them in trust for third parties.
However, he introduced no evidence other
than his testimony that there was an actual
trust relationship between himself and others. Part of the reason for his failure to
introduce evidence was the lack of Cayman
and National Oil Shale corporate records.
At the time of trial, defendant held at least
48,000 shares of Cayman stock in his name.
At the time of the property settlement
agreement, Royalty Investment Company
owned, as its only major asset, the
Anderson Ranch. At trial, defendant testified that Owanah and two other parties had
made installment payments on the ranch
and, thus, were entitled to 62%% of Royalty's outstanding stock. However, defend-

ant's earlier deposition contradicted this
testimony, stating that he and plaintiff
owned 62V2% of the Royalty stock. Defendant ^ his personal financial statements, valued the ranch at between $250,000 and $1,000,000.
In January 1982, Royalty sold the
Anderson ranch for $250,000 and authorized Owanah to use the proceeds. The
only consideration which Royalty received
for the proceeds was its choice between an
interest-bearing loan and a 4% overriding
royalty interest in Owanah.
Defendant also claims that he made an
oral accounting pursuant to the property
settlement agreement with the law firm
Roe and Fowler, and turned over to Roe
and Fowler all stock certificates in the parties' safe deposit box. Because plaintiff
was not satisfied that there had been an
adequate accounting under the terms of
the property settlement agreement she finally brought this action on May 29, 1980,
to compel the accounting and judgment for
any damages caused by defendant's delay
in submitting the accounting. The purpose
of the accounting was to identify the
amount to which plaintiff was entitled as
her share of the marital estate.
The trial court agreed that defendant
had not made an adequate accounting, finding that Owanah was defendant's alter ego
even though this issue was not explicitly
raised in the pleadings. The court also
found that the assets subject to the accounting were, in fact owned by defendant, and, pursuant to the terms of the
settlement agreement that plaintiff was
entitled to one-half of those assets. However, because most of the assets had been
sold by defendant the court established a
monetary value for the liquidated assets
and included that amount as part of the
marital estate to be distributed between
the parties. Although this was an accounting action, the court appropriately disposed
of the assets according to the terms of the
stipulated property settlement agreement
without objection by either party.
Defendant raises the following issues on
appeal: (1) Was the alter ego issue properly before the trial court? (2) If the alter
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ego issue was properly before the court,
was there sufficient evidence to sustain the
court's finding that Owanah was defendant's alter ego? (3) Does applying the alter ego doctrine effect a property distribution contrary to the parties' property distribution agreement? (4) Did the evidence,
findings, and conclusions support the order
requiring defendant to pay plaintiff an
amount representing a percentage of the
Anderson Ranch sale proceeds? (5) Is
plaintiff estopped from denying that defendant furnished a satisfactory accounting?

that was tried inadvertently/' MBI Motor
Co., 506 P.2d at 711.
Implied consent to try an issue may be
found "where one party raises an issue
material to the other party's case or where
evidence is introduced without objection,"
General Ins. Co. of Am., 545 P.2d a,t 50506, where it "appear[s] that the parties
understood the evidence [was] to be aimed
at the unpleaded issue." MBI Motor Co.,
506 F.2d at 711. See First Security Bank
of Utah v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d
859, 861 (Utah 1979).

[1] If a theory of recovery is fully tried
by the parties, the court may base its decision on that theory and deem the pleadings
amended, even if the theory was not originally pleaded or set forth in the pleadings
or the pretrial order. MBI Motor Co. v.
Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6th
Cir.1974). However, that the issue has, in
fact, been tried, and that this procedure
has been authorized by express or implied
consent of the parties must be evident from
the record. Wirtz v. KM. Sloan, Inc., 285
F.Supp. 669, 675 (W.D.Pa.1968). "A trial
court may not base its decision on an issue

in the pleadings, either initially or by
amendment, the entire trial testimony concerned defendant's control over the assets
in question. During trial, evidence concerning every element of the alter ego issue was introduced without objection. Further, the basic question raised in an alter
ego case is whether the principal had personal control over assets which he claimed
to belong to the corporation. Since this
question is the essential issue presented by
this accounting action, we find that the
parties received adequate notice of the alter ego issue and an opportunity to meet it

1. Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b) (1977) reads as follows:
When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial

on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.

Thus, the test for determining whether
pleadings
should be deemed amended unI
der
Utah
R.Civ.P. 15(b) is "whether the
Under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of
opposing
party
had a fair opportunity to
Civil Procedure, issues not raised by the
defend
and
whether
it could offer additionpleadings may be tried by the express or
1
al
evidence
if
the
case
were retried on a
implied consent of the parties. The Utah
different
theory."
R.A.
Pohl
Const. Co. v.
Supreme Court has observed that issues
Marshall,
640
F.2d
266,
267
(10th
Cir.1981).
tried by express or implied consent shall be
See
also
Cheney
v.
Rucker,
14
Utah 2d
treated as if raised in the pleadings.
205,
381
P.2d
86,
91
(1963);
Buehner
Block
Therefore, "even failure to amend the
Co.
v.
Glezos,
6
Utah
2d
226,
310
P.2d
517,
pleadings does not affect the result of the
519-20
(1957).
trial of these issues." General Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d
[2] In the present case, even though the
502, 506 (Utah 1976).
alter ego issue was not specifically raised
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There was no indication in the record that 370, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973); Geary v.
defendant ever represented to the court Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P.2d 396, 398 (1932).
that he was taken by surprise or was other- It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove
wise disadvantaged in meeting the alter actual fraud, but must only show that failego issue. See Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d ure to pierce the corporate veil would reat 91. We find, therefore, that the alter sult in an injustice. Healthwin-Midtown
ego issue was properly before the court. Convalescent Hosp., 511 F.Supp. at 420.
[6,7] Certain factors which are deemed
II
significant, although not conclusive, in de[3,4] There is sufficient evidence to termining whether this test has been met
sustain the trial court's finding that Owan- include: (1) undercapitalization of a oneah was defendant's alter ego. "Ordinarily, man corporation; (2) failure to observe cora corporation is regarded as a separate and porate formalities;2 (3) nonpayment of divdistinct legal entity from its stockholders." idends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by
Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunctionP.2d 526, 528 (1973). This is true whether ing of other officers or directors; (6) abthe corporation has many stockholders or sence of corporate records; (7) the use of
only one. Ramsey v. Adams, 4 Kan. the corporation as a facade for operations
App.2d 184, 603 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1979); of the dominant stockholder or stockholdKline v. Kline, 104 Mich.App. 700, 305 ers; 3 and (8) the use of the corporate entiN.W.2d 297, 298 (1981). Consequently, the ty in promoting injustice or fraud. Ramcorporate veil which protects stockholders sey v. Adams, 603 P.2d at 1028; Amoco
from individual liability will only be pierced Chemicals Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589,
reluctantly and cautiously. Ramsey v. 567 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 (1977). See also
Adams, 603 P.2d at 1027; William B. Rob- Ramirez v. United States, 514 F.Supp. 759,
erts, Inc. v. McDrilling, Co., 579 S.W.2d 763-64 (D.Puerto Rico 1981); Healthwin335, 345 (Tex.Civ.App.1979).
Midtown Convalescent Hosp., 511 F.Supp.
at 418-19; Dillman v. Nobles, 351 So.2d
[5] To disregard the corporate entity 210, 213-14 (La.App.1977).
under the equitable alter ego doctrine, two
circumstances must be shown: (1) Such a
[8] The rationale used by courts in perunity of interest and ownership that the mitting the corporate veil to be pierced is
separate personalities of the corporation that if a principal shareholder or owner
and the individual no longer exist, but the conducts his private and corporate business
corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one on an interchangeable or joint basis as if
or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, they were one, he is without standing to
the corporate form would sanction a fraud, complain when an injured party does the
promote injustice, or result in an inequity. same. Bone Constr. Co. v. Lewis, 148
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan GaApp. 61, 250 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1978). In
Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). Ac- Lyons v. Lyons, 340 So.2d 450, 451 (Ala.
cord United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Civ.App.1976), the court stated that "[a]
Convalescent Hosp. and Rehabilitation court of equity looks through form to subCenter, Inc., 511 F.Supp. 416 (C.D.Calif. stance and has often disregarded the corpo1981). See also Centurian Corp. v. Fiber- rate form when it was fiction in fact and
chem, Inc., 562 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah deed and was merely serving the personal
1977); Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d use and convenience of the owner." The
2. Failure to observe corporate formalities in- 3. Failure to distinguish between corporate and
cludes such activities as commencement of busipersonal property, the use of corporate funds to
ness without the issuance of shares, lack of
pay personal expenses without proper accountshareholders' or directors' meetings, lack of
ing, and failure to maintain complete corporate
signing of consents, and the making of decisions
and financial records are looked upon with exby shareholders as if they were partners. Roytreme disfavor. Roylex, 585 S.W.2d at 772.
lex, Inc. v. Langson Bros. Constr. Co., 585 S.W.2d
768, 772 (Tex.Civ.App. 1979).
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Lyons court found a corporation to be a
shareholder's alter ego, even though he
owned only one share of stock, because he
commingled corporate funds with his own,
kept no regular corporate records, meetings, or minutes aside from a bank account,
and did not file corporate income tax returns. See Standage v. Standage, 147
Ariz.App. 473, 711 P.2d 612, 614-15 (1985).

account Although he stated that this occurred because the bank initially preferred
to deal personally with the principals because of Owanah's small net worth, he also
continued this practice well after Owanah
acquired substantial assets, because, as he
stated, adjustments in loans and sales of
stock could be made without time-consuming corporate resolutions.

[9] Former spouses attempting to
shield assets from a court-ordered property
distribution by using a corporate form are
especially looked upon with judicial disfavor. See Standage v. Standage, 147 Ariz.
App. 473, 711 P.2d 612 (1985); Colandrea
v. Colandrea, 401 A.2d 480 (Md.CtSpec.
App.1979).

On September 17, 1976, defendant
pledged 50,820 shares of Western Oil Shale
stock and 48,000 shares of Cayman stock to
First Security Bank as collateral for loans
to Owanah. He testified that this stock
had originally been issued in his, his brother's, and his broker's names, rather than in
Owanah's name, so that corporate formalities could be avoided in selling the stock.
Between September 17,1978, and February
23, 1979, he held as many as 93,298 shares
of Western Oil Shale stock and 48,000
shares of Cayman stock in his personal
bank and brokerage accounts. All transactions dealing with these shares were authorized by his signature without any suggestion that he was acting on behalf of anyone
else.

In the present case, the trial court considered the evidence in the light of this
test, finding that Owanah was defendant's
alter ego on the grounds that (1) "[t]here
exists such a unity of ownership and interest between defendant and Owanah Oil
Corporation that the separate personalities
of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist/' and (2) to recognize such
separate personalities "would promote injustice and an inequitable result."
For purposes of appellate review, the
trial court's decision to pierce the corporate
veil will be upheld if there is substantial
evidence in favor of the judgment. Standage, 711 P.2d at 614-16. An examination
of the present trial record indicates that
there was substantial evidence supporting
the trial court's finding that the separate
personalities of Owanah and defendant no
longer existed.
First, defendant ignored corporate formalities. He stated that he preferred to
conduct corporate business personally,
rather than in the corporate name, because
it was more convenient than observing appropriate corporate procedures, and repeatedly did so.
Second, defendant failed to distinguish
between corporate and personal property in
his business dealings.
In correspondence with First Security
Bank, defendant continually referred to the
Owanah checking account as his personal

First Security Bank released the 48,000
shares of Cayman stock and 47,820 shares
of the Western Oil Shale stock to defendant on July 9, 1979. The bank recognized
this stock as being defendant's personal
property in that it required defendant to
sign an indemnity agreement to protect the
bank from any claim raised by plaintiff
against the shares.
Defendant testified that this stock, valued by the trial court at $14.25 per share,
was later sold to fund one of Owanah's
projects, and that the proceeds from this
sale were deposited in Owanah's account
However, payments for defendant's residential mortgage, light and utility bills
were also made directly from Owanah's
account, as were numerous cash payments
to defendant, totalling $22,695.25 within a
twelve month period. To help finance Owanah's activities, defendant also mortgaged
the parties' Park City residence for $60,000, applied part of the proceeds to a reduction of Owanah's debt, and deposited the
remainder in Owanah's account. Defend-
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ant explains the mortgage payments made
on his behalf by Owanah as repayment by
Owanah of this mortgage. Further, defendant presented no evidence at trial that
he maintained any personal checking account apart from Owanah's. Personal and
corporate affairs appear to be inextricably
interwoven.
Third, the other officers and directors
played little, if any, role in the operation of
defendant's corporate entities. Defendant
produced no evidence at trial, other than
his testimony, to indicate that others had
any interest in Owanah, although the trial
judge requested such evidence on several
occasions during the trial and the trial was
recessed for defendant to provide it
Fourth, there was an almost complete
failure to keep and maintain corporate
records. There was no evidence that
shareholder records were kept for Cayman
Corporation, even though such records
were repeatedly requested by plaintiffs
counsel and the trial judge, and defendant
was even given an opportunity by the court
to find and present them. Defendant was
similarly unable to produce any records
which showed shareholders, bylaws, or financial status of Royalty Investment Corporation. Defendant claimed that Owanah
owned Cayman stock as well as proceeds
from the sale of the Anderson Ranch,
which was owned by Royalty Investment
Corporation.

macy. Since defendant did not proffer testimony at trial of anyone other than himself, purporting to have an interest in Royalty, Owanah, or the Anderson Ranch, it is
difficult to view this transaction as anything but a personal transaction done under a corporate aegis. Thus, defendant's
equivocal testimony regarding the ownership of the Anderson Ranch, coupled with
the lack of substantial evidence that Owanah gave valuable consideration for the proceeds of the Anderson Ranch sale, supports
a finding that the corporate shells were
used as a facade for the transfer of property from a corporate shell that plaintiff had
some interest in to one in which she had
less interest

Fifth, there is evidence that Owanah and
the other corporate shells were used as a
facade for defendant's personal business
operations. The most significant evidence
was the method in which the Anderson
Ranch sale was consummated. After the
property settlement agreement had been
entered, Royalty Investment Corporation
sold the ranch, using no corporate formalities, and then deposited the sale proceeds
in Owanah's bank account for a 4% overriding royalty interest in the Owanah
project Plaintiff alleged that this was no
consideration at all. Although the transaction was ratified by Royalty on the advice
of counsel eleven months after the sale and
three days before trial, such a ratification
does not invest this transaction with legiti-

Therefore, we find that there was substantial evidence before the trial court to
support its finding that defendant's corporations were actually his alter ego.

Further, defendant's use of Owanah to
receive the proceeds from the sale of the
Cayman and Western Oil Company stock,
coupled with his use of Owanah's account
to pay his personal living expenses, suggest that defendant was using Owanah as
a facade for his personal affairs.
Finally, the use of the corporate entity in
this circumstance would result in injustice.
If viewed as legitimate corporate transactions, plaintiffs post-settlement agreement
business transactions would convert substantial assets, which otherwise would be
regarded as marital property, to corporate
assets in which plaintiff had no interest
Such shielding of assets would result in a
great injustice to plaintiff.

Ill
Because application of the alter ego doctrine is justified, we reach the issue of
whether the property division by the trial
court is in harmony with the parties' property settlement agreement Defendant argues that the property division resulting
from the alter ego finding is contrary to
the intent of the property settlement agreement because it awards plaintiff more than
half of the marital estate, and, thus, is an
abuse of judicial discretion.
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[10] In the division of marital property,
the trial court has wide discretion, and,
while the appellate court is not necessarily
bound by its findings, Thompson v.
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 361-62 (Utah
1985), the findings are presumed valid and
will not be disturbed unless the record indicates such a manifest injustice or inequity
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah
Ct.App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 737
P.2d 237, 239 (Utah CtApp.1987). Regarding challenges to property distributions,
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that
a party seeking reversal of the trial court
must prove a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly preponderated against the
findings, or that such a serious inequity
resulted from the order as to constitute
an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250
(Utah 1979). That the property distribution
may not have been mathematically equal is
not sufficient grounds to constitute an
abuse of discretion, since a fair and equitable property distribution is not necessarily an equal distribution. See Fletcher
v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223-24 (Utah
1980).
Further, it is well recognized that a parties' stipulation as to property rights in a
divorce action, although advisory and
usually followed unless the court finds it to
be unfair or unreasonable, is not necessarily binding on the trial court It is only a
recommendation to be adhered to if the
court believes it to be fair and reasonable.
Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082
(Utah 1977); Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472,
476 (Utah 1975). Thus, even if the trial
court does not exactly follow the parties'
agreement, such a decree is still within the
trial court's reasonable discretion.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously
upheld a trial court's property division under somewhat similar circumstances. In
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986),
the defendant husband appealed from the
portion of a divorce decree awarding the
plaintiff wife one-half of the value of a

corporation formed during their marriage.
He alleged that a corporation which the
trial court had determined to be his personal, premarital property had loaned $69,000
to a corporation which he and his wife
formed during the marriage. Because he
"utterly failed to prove that the loan did
indeed exist," in that he could produce no
papers documenting the loan, any terms,
conditions of repayment, or interest, and
because the trial court expressly found
that he had commingled corporate and personal funds throughout the marriage so
that it could not trace any assets to any
source, the court found that he had failed
to carry his burden of proof. Id at 119.
[11] Similarly, the present defendant
has failed to carry his burden of proof that
the disputed assets are corporate rather
than personal property, so we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's property division resulting from application of
the alter ego theory.
IV
Defendant further argues that the trial
court's order requiring him to pay plaintiff
an amount representing a percentage of
the price of the Anderson Ranch sale proceeds is without support in the findings,
conclusions, or evidence. We reiterate that
the trial judge has wide discretion in the
division of marital property, and his findings will not be disturbed by an appellate
court unless the record shows a clear abuse
of discretion. The Utah Supreme Court
has stated, in Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d
at 1082, that
in regard to the matter of the sufficiency of findings of fact, a substantial compliance with Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, is sufficient, and findings of
fact and conclusions of law will support a
judgment, though they are very general,
where they in most respects follow the
allegation of the pleadings. Findings
should be limited to the ultimate facts
and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and
sufficiently conform to the pleadings and
the evidence to support the judgment,
they will be regarded as sufficient,
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though not as full and as complete as
might be desired.
However, "to determine if equity was done,
we must have before us specific findings of
fact pertinent to that issue." Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985);
Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah
CtApp.1987).
[12] In the present case, the trial court
specifically found that "[a]t the time of the
parties' agreement, and until the property
was sold in January 1982, defendant held
title to 62V2% interest in the ranch through
Royalty Investment Company. The ranch
was sold for $250,000.00 in January 1982,
and the accounting shows that defendant is
indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $78,125.00, which is 31.25% of $250,000.00." It
is the trial judge's prerogative, not an
abuse of discretion, to choose to disbelieve
defendant's explanation of this property interest There was evidence in the record to
support such a finding, which is sufficient
to come within the guidelines outlined by
Pearson and Jones.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
award with respect to the Anderson Ranch
property.
V
Defendant's final issue raised on appeal
is whether plaintiff was estopped from denying that he furnished an adequate accounting. He alleges that he made an oral
accounting to the law firm of Roe and
Fowler and turned over to Roe and Fowler
all the stock certificates in the parties' safe
deposit box. Roe and Fowler later returned some of these certificates to defendant. Defendant argues that he acted in
reasonable reliance upon express or implied
representations that the accounting was
satisfactory because defendant made no
further demand for an accounting after
this event However, the document which
defendant received from Roe and Fowler
when it returned the certificates was only
an acknowledgement that the shares were
delivered into his control as president of
Owanah, rather than a release or exclusion
of the shares from an eventual accounting.
Further, plaintiff alleges that she was in

continual contact with defendant concerning his failure to make the accounting and
had brought a prior lawsuit against defendant to enforce the divorce decree and
agreement Finally, plaintiff stated that
she was totally without knowledge of the
business affairs concerning the disputed
assets.
[13,14] Estoppel arises when there is
(1) a false representation or concealment of
material facts; (2) made with knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the facts; (3)
made to a party who is without knowledge
or the means of knowledge of the real
facts; (4) made with the intention that the
representation be acted upon; and (5) the
party to whom the representation was
made relied or acted upon it to his prejudice. Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83
P.2d 731, 734 (1938); Morgan v. Board of
State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976).
See also City of Mercer Island v. Steinmann, 9 Wash.App. 479, 513 P.2d 80, 82
(1973). If any of these elements are missing, there can be no estoppel. Kelly v.
Richards, 83 P.2d at 734. Further, estoppel cannot be inferred from facts of which
the party to be estopped had no knowledge.
Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d
598, 602 (1970).
[15] Estoppel is not applicable under
the present facts.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
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evidence to support the trial court's finding
that the defendants as partners received
the benefit of the money loaned by the
plaintiff and that they are each liable for
its repayment.5 In conformity with the
statement in the comment just quoted
above, the fact that defendant Morgan
signed a note acknowledging his obligation
does not relieve the defendant Green of his
obligation.
[3] The final matter to be addressed is
the assertion of plaintiffs in their respondents' brief that they are entitled to the full
$3,700 face amount of the promissory note,
plus interest, without deduction for the
amounts paid by the defendants by the
checks above referred to. Their argument
is that the defendants failed to plead the
defense of payment and that the issue was
thus not properly before the trial court.
The argument is without merit. Under our
modernized rules of procedure, Rule 54(c),
U.R.C.P., provides that the court shall render the judgment to which the evidence
shows the parties are entitled, even if not so
requested in the pleadings.
What has just been said sufficiently disposes of the plaintiffs contention. But in
supplement thereto, we further observe
that the defendant did not comply with the
requirements of Rule 74(b), U.R.C.P., relating to cross appeals.6 The judgment of the
trial court is affirmed in its entirety, the
parties to bear their own costs.
HALL and HOWE, JJ., and CALVIN
GOULD, District Judge, concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate
herein; GOULD, District Judge, sat.
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5. That this Court will affirm the trial court on
any proper ground apparent from the record,
see Edwards v. Iron County, Utah, 531 P.2d 476
(1975); AUphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, Utah. 595
P.2d 860 (1979).

Heidemarie G. FOULGER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
John C. FOUGLER, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 16909.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 4, 1981.

Former husband appealed from order
of the Fourth District Court, Utah County,
David Sam, J., granting former wife's motion for modification of decree of divorce.
The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that no
compelling reasons were shown by former
wife which would warrant modification of
property disposition portion of divorce decree.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result.
Maughan, C. J., concurred in result and
filed a statement.

1. Divorce <s=>164
Trial court sitting in divorce matter
retains continuing jurisdiction to make such
modifications in initial decree of divorce as
it deems just and equitable, but where no
appeal is taken from original decree, change
of circumstances must be shown to justify
later modification. U.C.A.1953,30-3-5.
2. Divorce <3=>254(2)
Court should be reluctant to grant
modification of provisions of divorce decree
which dispose of real property, and grant
such modifications only upon showing of
compelling reasons arising from substantial
and material change in circumstances.
6. See Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst,
Utah, 617 R2d 700. 701 (1980).
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3. Divorce <*=» 254(2)
Where property disposition is product
of agreement and stipulation between the
parties, and sanctioned by trial court, trial
court should subsequently modify such provisions only with great reluctance and
based upon compelling reasons.
4. Divorce <s»254(2)
At time of making of stipulated property settlement, adopted by trial court in
original divorce decree, which awarded former marital residence to wife, facts that
wife would be solely responsible for maintenance and upkeep on residence, would make
payments on residence, together with taxes
and insurance payments, and could make
substantial improvements to property, all
without benefit of financial help or assistance from former husband, were within
contemplation of parties, and were not compelling reasons to warrant later modification of decree.
Noall T. Wootton of Wootton & Wootton,
American Fork, for defendant and appellant.
Craig M. Snyder, Provo, for plaintiff and
respondent.
HALL, Justice:
Defendant John C. Foulger takes this appeal from an order by the trial court granting plaintiff Heidemarie Foulger's motion
for modification of a decree of divorce.
On October 29, 1975, the lower court
granted the plaintiff a decree of divorce,
dissolving the parties' marriage of nine
years. The parties entered into an agreement of settlement, which was adopted by
the trial court Pursuant to that agreement, and the decree based thereon, plaintiff was awarded custody and care of the
couple's three minor cMIdren, alimony and
child support payments, and a certain portion of the marital property, including possession of the family residence on conditions
which led to the instant dispute. Para1. The trial court also granted plaintiffs motion
for an increase in child support payments, from

graph 5 of the decree of divorce, taken from
the couple's settlement agreement, states
the following:
5. That plaintiff is hereby awarded all
right, title and interest in and to the real
property and residence at 195 North 7th
East, .. . Subject, however, to a lien on
said premises in behalf of the defendant
equal to fifty percent (50%) of the
amount received from any sale in excess
of $17,000.00 which is the purchase price
of said residence. Defendant is further
awarded a first option to purchase said
residence in the event of sale and apply
his equity upon said purchase price.
Plaintiff is hereby granted the right to
reside in said residence as long as she so
desires, but in the event of sale, the above
formula shall apply.
On November 21, 1979, defendant was
served with an order to show cause why the
original decree of divorce should not be
modified with regard to those provisions
dealing with child support and defendant's
lien on the family residence. The trial
court heard the matter on December 18,
1979, at which time plaintiff asserted that
there had been-a substantial change of circumstance justifying modification of the
original divorce decree relating to defendant's lien on the family residence.1 In justification of this assertion, plaintiff pointed
out that she had been making payments on
the residence, together with tax and insurance payments thereon, since the time of
the divorce without benefit of financial help
or assistance from defendant; that she had
been solely responsible for maintenance and
upkeep on the residence since the decree of
divorce was issued; that she had made substantial improvements to the property since
the divorce, and contemplated further improvements, the effect of which would be to
increase substantially the value of the property; and that she no longer contemplated
returning to her native land of Germany
with the three minor children, allegedly defendant's motive for imposing the lien condition in the agreement.
which ruling defendant takes no appeal.
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The court found that paragraph 5 of the
original decree of divorce was "inherently
unfair" and that, the motive for the insertion thereof having been obviated, it should
be modified to grant to defendant a lien on
the family residence in an amount equal to
one-half the appreciated value of the home,
over and above its purchase price as of the
time of divorce. The purchase price of the
residence having been $17,000, and valuation thereof at the time of the divorce having been $37,000, the modification gave defendant a lien in the amount of $10,000.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the
modification of the decree was improper, in
that (1) plaintiff failed to show a sufficient
change in circumstances to justify modification of the decree, and (2) the property
disposition in the original decree constituted
a court-approved stipulation drafted by the
parties dealing at arm's length without duress or undue influence. We agree, and
reverse the trial court's ruling.
[1] Under Utah law, a trial court sitting
in a divorce matter retains continuing jurisdiction to make such modifications in the
initial decree of divorce as it deems just and
equitable.2 Where no appeal is taken from
the original divorce decree, however, a
change of circumstances must be shown in
order to justify a later modification of such
decree.3 Absent such a requirement, a decree of divorce would be subject to ad infinitum appellate review and readjustment according to the concepts of equity held by
succeeding trial judges.
[2] The change in circumstance required
to justify a modification of the decree of
divorce varies with the type of modification
contemplated. Provisions in the original
decree of divorce granting alimony, child
support, and the like must be readily susceptible to alteration at a later date, as the
needs which such provisions were designed
to fill are subject to rapid and unpredicta2. U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5, as amended.
3. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368
P.2d 264 (1962).
4. Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d
944 (1953), and cases referred to therein.

ble change. Where a disposition of real
property is in question, however, courts
should properly be more reluctant to grant
a modification. In the interest of securing
stability in titles, modifications in a decree
of divorce making disposition of real property are to be granted only upon a showing
of compelling reasons arising from a substantial and material change in circumstances.4
[3] The above holds true a fortiori
where the property disposition is the product of an agreement and stipulation between the parties, and sanctioned by the
trial court. Such a provision is the product
of an agreement bargained for by the parties. As such, a trial court should subsequently modify such a provision only with
great reluctance, and based upon compelling reasons.5
[4] In the instant case, no such compelling reasons have been shown to exist which
warrant the modification granted. Matters
such as payments on the home, and maintenance and upkeep thereof, certainly must
have been within plaintiffs contemplation
at the time she agreed to the disposition set
forth in the original divorce decree. In
regard to permanent improvements, defendant concedes that he is not entitled to
share in any increase in value resulting
therefrom, but only in the enhancement in
any increase by an accelerated economy.
The matter of plaintiff's possible departure
to Germany was, by her own admission,
never anything more than a remote possibility. The fact that she is now more established as a resident of the United States,
while it further diminishes the likelihood of
her departure, constitutes no change of circumstances sufficiently radical to justify
the trial court's action.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this
5. Despain v. Despain, Utah, 610 P.2d 1303
(1980); Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248
(1980).
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opinion. Plaintiffs prayer for attorney's
fees is denied, and the parties are to bear
their own costs.
CROCKETT,* and HOWE, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice (concurring in
the result and dissenting):
I concur in the result, but refer to my
dissenting opinions in Despain v. Despain,
Utah, 610 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1980) and Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 619 P.2d 1372
(1980).
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Ray PLEDGER, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
S. Tony COX, Director, Drivers License
Division, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 16987.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 4, 1981.

The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Maurice D. Jones, J. pro tern., upheld revocation of driver's license, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Oaks,
J.„ held that statutory "trial de novo" provided to review administrative revocation
of driver's license for refusal to submit to
blood test for alcohol content is a complete
retrial upon all the evidence, and upon such
complete retrial, the Drivers License Division should have the burden of proof and
the burden of going forward with the evidence.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
* CROCKETT, J., concurred in this case prior to
his retirement.

1. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=>744
"De novo" means literally "anew,
afresh, a second time," and has at least two
possible interpretations when applied to judicial review of administrative action: (1) a
complete retrial upon new evidence, and (2)
a trial upon the record made before the
lower tribunal, and the meaning of "trial de
novo" in each statute is dictated by the
wording and context of the statute-in which
it appears and by the nature of the administrative body, decision and procedure being
reviewed.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Automobiles e=> 144.2(4)
Statutory "trial de novo" provided to
review administrative revocation of driver's
license for refusal to submit to blood test
for alcohol content is a complete retrial
upon all the evidence, and upon such complete retrial, the Drivers License Division
should have the burden of proof and the
burden of going forward with the evidence.
U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19, 41-2-20, 41-6-44.10(b).
3. Automobiles o=> 144.2(4)
Where review of administrative revocation of driver's license for refusal to submit
to blood test for alcohol content was faulted
by erroneous ground rule about the sequence and burden of proof, Supreme Court
would not speculate about whether the error was prejudicial but would reverse and
remand the case to district court for a new
trial.

Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, of Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Bruce M.
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
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AMENDED ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Bruno D'Aston,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 890050-CA

v.
Dorothy D'Aston, et al.
Defendant and Appellant,

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, and Appellant's
Response to Petition for Rehearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellee's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this

W af

day of August, 1990,

FOR THE COURT

£2»
Mary Ty Noonan, Clerk
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Bruno D'Aston,

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890050-CA

v.
Dorothy D'Aston, et al.
Defendant and Appellant,
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THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed July 16,
1990, and Appellee's Response to Petition for Rehearing
filed Aug. 20, 1990.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this <• f[y
day of August, 1990.
FOR THE COURT

Mary Y. Noonan, Clerk

